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IDEALS OF CONDUCT

AN EXPOSITION OF MORAL ATTITUDES

BY

JOHN DASHIELL STOOPS

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To
JOHN DEWEY

PREFACE

This book treats of three phases in the evolution of morality: objective morality, the morality of the inner life, and a synthesis of these two ideals.

The first stage is the ethics of "status," of race, of blood, of solidarity. The will is organized by custom and tradition about objective social interests, the family, property and the state. The material for this stage is taken largely from Homer and the Old Testament.

Between the first and second stages there is a movement of transition. It is to be seen in Jeremiah and in Socrates. This is a movement of criticism and of moral detachment from the older objective interests of family and nationality. This development culminated in the death of Socrates and the crucifixion of Jesus.

The second stage is the outgrowth of the conflict between the newer conscience and the older objective régime. It results in a new empire of the inner life. Detached, through conflict, from objective organized interests, the will and the conscience build a kingdom within. This stage is seen in Epictetus and St. Francis. But the thousand years' reign of this ideal is more theoretical than real. This inner ideal compromises in Mediævalism and in Protestantism and it completely breaks down in the Renaissance and in modern science. The inner ideal must be regarded not as an absolute reality but as a rehearsal for a richer objective life, in the family, in one's vocation, in the state.

Thus we are led to a synthesis of the inner ideal and objective, scientific morality. Conduct is determined primarily not

by an inner ideal but by the traditions of the society in which the individual is born and educated. Through the evolution of knowledge conduct later becomes intelligent and voluntary. From this point of view modern morality may come to be a deepening and enriching of the objective patterns of conduct, the family, property, vocation, the state. This implies a new definition of the individual. Such a synthesis would make possible a kingdom on the earth for the inner world of the heart.

J. D. S.

GRINNELL, IOWA,
JANUARY, 1926.

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PART I

THE FIRST EMPIRE

IDEALS OF CONDUCT

CHAPTER I

THE GREEK AND HEBREW LOVE OF LIFE

The Greek Love of Life

Alcinous is described in Homer as sitting on a throne in his palace and drinking wine like an immortal. This abounding love of life contemplated sickness and death with indescribable horror. Death "draws the spirit from the limbs;" old age wastes one's life out of one's body. The Homeric Greek prayed to Zeus that he might live to a smooth old age. How pathetic is Homer's exclamation: "Man's life is brief enough!" When Odysseus and his companions escaped from the cave of Cyclops, a glad sight, says Homer, were they to their fellows, for they had fled from death. The soul in hades flits around like a lifeless shadow. When Odysseus visits hades he is besought by the luckless Elpenor, whose corpse had been left unburied, not only to bury his body but to plant upon the barrow his oar wherewith he rowed in the days of his life, while he was yet among his fellows. How full of the deepest yearning for life is this sad request!

In the Homeric poems the simple processes of living

are treated with moral dignity and religious idealism. Homer's love of life is inimitable. When Odysseus meets his mother in hades she beseeches him to haste with all his heart toward the sunlight. Seeing the light is synonymous with being alive; over and over again when Homer pictures the dying of a hero in battle he tells[1] us that "darkness clouded his eyes." The body in Homer is as divine as the soul; it is the gods who shed sweet sleep upon the eyelids. Again and again in Homer we meet the phrase, "after they had put from them the desire of meat and drink." The modern world can appreciate but it cannot utter with naturalness the words of Diomedes to his fellows on the eve of battle: "Go ye now to rest, full to your hearts' desire of meat and wine, wherein courage is and strength." Heroes stricken at heart because of lost companions are nevertheless described as "feasting on abundant flesh and sweet wine." The banquets of the gods occasioned laughter unquenchable, "nor was their soul aught stinted of the fair banquet, nor of the beauteous lyre that Apollo held, and the Muses singing alternately with sweet voice." Here is Homer's description of the immortality of the gods: "They eat no bread neither drink they gleaming wine, wherefore they are bloodless and are named immortals." The Greeks of Homer drank honey-hearted wine in silver bowls; red wine they drank to their hearts' desire, sweet wine unmingled, a draft divine.

Previous to the reflective movement which culminated in the Socratic age the individual's sense of

[1] The quotations are from the Iliad of Lang, Leaf and Myers, and the Odyssey of Butcher and Lang.

moral selfhood did not extend beyond the immediate groups of family, tribe, and city-state. The nurse Eurycleia, reporting to Penelope the slaying of the unwelcome suitors by her husband, says: "Then I found Odysseus standing among the slain, who around him, stretched on the hard floor, lay one upon the other; it would have comforted thy heart to see him, all stained like a lion with blood and soil of battle." In such a setting the human will seems as much a part of nature as the instinct of the animal. We moderns may admire but we cannot truly relive the Homeric unity—so devoid of self-consciousness—between man and the world of nature. Notice this characteristic lack of self-consciousness: "Like them, two lions on the mountain tops are nurtured by their dam in the deep forest thickets; and these harry the kine and goodly sheep and make havoc of the farmsteads of men, till in their turn they too are slain at men's hands with the keen bronze; in such wise were these twain vanquished at Aineias' hands and fell like tall pine trees." We see here that characteristic lack of romantic self-consciousness in the Greek individual of the pre-Socratic period which clearly differentiates him from the modern man, or from the Greek of the Socratic age. He was one with his family, with his city-state, with the world of nature, in an unconsciously intimate way unknown to ourselves.

Homer's world is not a world of blind instinct or of uncriticized custom. The conduct of Homer's characters is lighted by the keenest intelligence. But there is in Homer no dualism of will and instinct, of mind and body, of soul and world, of human and

divine. Intelligence illumines but does not block the will.

When Homer describes the killing of a group of Trojans by Diomedes and Odysseus, he refers to the slain as being deprived of "sweet life." The knife that takes the life of some lambs for a sacrifice, Homer calls a "pitiless knife." Meat and drink give strength and joy. The spirits in hades, he calls "phantoms of men outworn;" they exist, but they do not live. Homer speaks of the joy of battle, of the lust for combat. The anger which Achilles felt in his heart toward Hector was sweeter than honey. The heroes of Homer urged each other to be wroth at heart; this dynamic emotion augmented their power to survive in battle.

This is the way Homer describes the feelings of Achilles during his combat with Hector: "As a falcon upon the mountain swiftest of winged things swoopeth fleetly after a trembling dove; and she before him fleeth while he with shrill screams hard at hand still darteth at her, for his heart urgeth him to seize her, so Achilles in hot haste flew straight for him, and Hector plied swift knees." Nor was Achilles ashamed of these animal impulses. After he had laid him low with his spear, he exclaimed to Hector: "Would that my heart's desire could so bid me myself to carve and eat raw thy flesh."

Here is Homer's description of Paris as he leaves his native city to go to battle. "Neither lingered Paris long in his lofty house, but clothed on him his brave armour, bedight with bronze, and hasted through the city, trusting to his nimble feet. Even as when a

stalled horse, full-fed at the manger, breaketh his tether and speedeth at the gallop across the plain, being wont to bathe him in the fair-flowing stream exultingly; and holdeth his head on high, and his mane floateth about his shoulders, and he trusteth in his glory, and nimbly his limbs bear him . . . ; even so . . . Paris glittering in his armour like the shining sun, strode down from high Pergamos laughingly, and his swift feet bare him."

The Hebrew Love of Life

The Hebrews do not have the Greek faculty of projecting the process of their experience in the mirror of thought. The Hebrews are not so æsthetic, not so scientific, not so philosophical. They excel, they are creative, in their ethical attitude toward life. But this same untranslatable love of life which we see in Homer exists in the Old Testament. Isaiah gives an account of Hezekiah's reflections after he had recovered from sickness and so escaped sheol or hades: "By these things men live and in all these things is the life of my spirit. . . . For the grave cannot praise thee. The living, the living, he shall praise thee, as I do this day" (38:16, 18, 19). This pure joy in life overflows in the CIV Psalm. Yahweh "causeth the grass to grow for the cattle and herb for the service of man; that he may bring forth food out of the earth; and wine that maketh glad the heart of man, and oil to make his face to shine and bread which strengtheneth man's heart" (vv. 14, 15).

CHAPTER II

THE BODY IN EARLY GREEK AND HEBREW LIFE

The Body in the Early Greek Tradition

Modern literature tends toward a description of mental states; it regards the body as an instrument of the mind. In Homer the body is a basic and integral part of the personality. Individuals are recognized by their feet and knees. Instead of Agamemnon saying to Nestor, "while I live," he says, "while my breath abides in my breast and my knees move." The body in Homer is not a dead tool of the soul; it is a living thing. Anger, courage, despair, are in the heart, are in the breast. When a man dies he gasps out, he breathes out, his life. A man experiences fear because fear seizes his limbs. The soul doesn't leave the body at death; it is literally "torn from the limbs."

Characters in Homer having perfect bodily qualities are thought of as divine. "Priam marvelled at Achilles to see how great he was and how goodly, for he was like a god to look upon." Over and over again Homer speaks of the soul as being torn from the limbs, thereby expressing a closer unity of soul and body than exists in the modern mind. There was no incompatibility between spirit and body in early Greek life. The gods on the frieze of the Par-

thenon are thoroughly at home and at ease in their fleshly bodies. Homer speaks of the spirits in hades as "phantoms of men outworn." At death a man breathes away his soul out of his breast. The horses of Homer have spirits as well as men. Spirit in Homer means a certain quality of life which we live in the flesh. Greek grave stones do not portray a happy release from life; they depict a tender sadness at the loss of life, a quiet eagerness to hold to wife and child, to material possessions, a deathless desire to carry on the familiar activities of life.

The perfect harmony between the minds of the Homeric Greeks and the world of nature is shown by the place which the human body had in their scale of values. In no other literature do we find such an idealization of the human form. When the Phæacians, whom Homer calls "masters of the oar," wished to entertain Odysseus, they made trial of divers games in which they excelled,—boxing, wrestling, leaping, and games demanding speed of foot. Attracted, as Homer tells us, by Odysseus' well-fashioned thighs and sinewy legs, his stalwart neck and mighty strength, they asked him to try his skill with them, telling him that "there is no greater glory for a man while yet he lives, than that which he achieves by hand and foot." Veritably religious were these Greeks in their attitude toward the movements of the body. Inimitably has Homer stated this attitude: around the muse gathered "boys in their first bloom, skilled in the dance, and they smote the good floor with their feet. And Odysseus gazed at the twinklings of the feet, and marvelled in spirit." Here is a word-painting of life more subtle than the work of

a Donatello or a Della Robbia. While Nausicaa and her maidens wait for the newly-washed clothes to dry in the bright sunlight they play at ball by the river's edge; and who can define the influence of this beautiful Homeric picture on the education and art, on the life, of the world? The parents' souls, says Homer, glowed with gladness at the sight of their graceful daughters entering the dance. Where else can be found such pictures of human forms divine as in Homer? Nausicaa thought Odysseus like the gods because of his grace and beauty; Odysseus likened Nausicaa to Artemis on account of her beauty and stature and shapeliness. The gods of such a beauty-loving race were paragons of beauty. Calypso, the goddess, tells Odysseus that she is not less noble in form and fashion than Penelope for the immortals surpass mortal women in shape and comeliness. Her shining robe was light of woof and gracious and about her waist she wore a fair golden girdle. Hermes wore "lovely golden sandals that wax not old." The beautiful baths of Greek and Roman civilization were not an accident; they were the expression of an underlying conception of life. Bathed and clad in fragrant attire is a significant Homeric expression. When Odysseus, escaped from the briny deep, had bathed in the river to wash from his rugged body the ocean salt, he was given olive oil in a golden cruse wherewith to anoint himself, and Athena, befittingly enough, gave him deep curling locks and shed grace about his head and shoulders.

Nietzsche's requirement that good music shall prove itself in the physiological and emotional processes

which it occasions in the hearer is a reverberation of Homer. Words, says Homer, have no greater excellence than the graceful movement of hand and foot. Well-being is manifested in the way one breathes as well as in the way one thinks. This is why statuary is the principal form of Greek art. A modern photograph need only show the head and shoulders. Our rationalizing habit of mind singles out the face as the medium of thought, of the "soul," of the "personality." To the ancient Greek mind, the entire body was a necessary aspect of the living being. Life included the body, the entire body. Every part of the body had its necessary place in the whole psychophysical being. One of the highest functions of the intellect was to give adequate control and expression to bodily activities. The body as the symbol of emotion and action was not thrown into the background by the brain as the symbol of thought. The throwing of the discus to the pre-Socratic Greek mind was not an insignificant bodily act as compared to the transcendent reality of universal ideas; thought had its only conceivable function within the circle of bodily activities. Reason had not yet been set off against the vegetative and animal functions as a separate human or even divine reality. Reason meant the harmony, the unity, of life existing in and through the bodily organs, and expressing itself through the medium of a physical environment. We must remember that the later sharp differentiation between physical and mental had not taken place. Reason was a special means to the realization of the age-long life-affirming instincts. Dialectic had not yet become the enemy of the body which

was the focus of the energizing activities of life. These activities functioned spontaneously; their integrity had not yet been disturbed by introspection. Aristotle's orphic idea of purging the soul of emotion through contemplative imagination would have been unintelligible to the old classical Greek mind. The sculpture and architecture of the fifth century B.C. reflect this view at its best. The sculptured figures of this period show us an ideal which includes the inclinations, the impulses, the sentiments, of a full-orbed life. The ideal is not detached from but embodied in the body and its instincts. Hence there is no dualism. Impulse has not yet become detached from the molding and creative ideal. Nor has the body become merely physical, merely mechanical, because it has not yet become abstracted from mind.

The Body in the Early Hebrew Tradition

The account of the exploits of Samson in the book of Judges shows the estimate which the ancient Hebrews put upon bodily strength and skill. He carried off the gates of the city of Gaza; he pulled down the pillars of the house of the Philistine god, Dagon; he slew "heaps upon heaps" of the Philistines with the jawbone of an ass. But these exploits of Samson were not symbols of mere brute force. The secret of Samson's strength lay in the fact that he incarnated a powerful moral tradition. He was dedicated as a Nazarite to Yahweh by his parents before his birth. He incarnated the devotion of the conservative Israelite to the older pastoral tradition (Judg. 13:14). It

was his unshaven locks, his refraining from wine, his living in tents, his loyalty to the pastoral ideal of life, which gave the moral significance to Samson's unusual strength. Not only was Samson's great strength inseparable from a profound moral tradition, but it had its source and its very being in that tradition.

The account of Jonathan's attack on the Philistines reads like a page from Homer: "And his armourbearer said unto him: Behold, I am with thee according to thy heart . . . Then said Jonathan, Behold, we will pass over unto these men . . . And Jonathan climbed up . . . and his armourbearer after him . . . And the first slaughter, which Jonathan and his armourbearer made, was about twenty men, within as it were a half acre of land . . . And there was trembling in the host, in the field and among all the people; the garrison, and the spoilers, they also trembled, and the earth quaked . . . And the watchmen of Saul looked and, behold, the multitude melted away" (I Sam. 14). Jonathan inherited these qualities from his father as well as from his social environment. Saul's most outstanding characteristic was his striking physical appearance (I Sam. 9:1-2). David's grace and physical prowess, like Samson's great strength, were the medium through which Yahweh's presence was manifested in Israel (I Sam. 16:12-13).

Earlier peoples did not live so continuously on the level of consciousness as modern civilization tends to do. The mind of early peoples seemed more intimately linked with the body than the more reflective modern mind. Early man was in direct muscular con-

tact with animals, with his flocks, with plant life, with the soil, with streams, and rivers. The body as a "physical" thing in contradistinction to the mind was never made an object of attention in the Old Testament literature. All life was organized by a controlling moral tradition. David's dancing before Yahweh as the Ark was brought to Zion (II Sam. 6: 14) shows us how thoroughly a moral and religious tradition organized practically the entire field of conduct among the early Hebrew people.

Life after death was to the ancient Hebrews and Greeks a pale shadowy continuation of the bodily life. There is a bodily existence as is seen in the story of the Witch of Endor calling up the departed Samuel. But as the sentiment in the older strata of the Psalms makes clear, life in sheol after the death of the physical body is an existence continued without joy and happiness.

CHAPTER III

THE ANCIENT HEBREW FAMILY

In Genesis 16 we are told that when Sarah bore Abraham no sons she gave unto her husband Hagar her Egyptian maid that he might have a son through her. Sarah regarded herself as dishonored by her barrenness and Hagar was so exalted when she conceived that she despised Sarah.

When later Abraham was informed that Sarah herself was to bear a son he laughed and fell upon his face. Sarah was to be blessed and to become a mother of a nation (Gen. 17: 15-17).

The same ideal is repeated in the story of Rachel and Leah. Rachel is the favorite but her barrenness estranges her from Jacob. She accordingly gives her maid to Jacob to be his wife. "And she said, Behold my maid . . ; she shall bear upon my knees, that I may also have children by her" (Gen. 29: 30, 31; 30: 1-3).

The early Hebrews tell us not of the pain but of the joy of childbirth: "And Sarah said, 'God hath made me to laugh, so that all that hear will laugh with me!' And the child grew and was weaned: and Abraham made a great feast the same day that Isaac was weaned" (Gen. 21: 6, 8).

Modern individualism has taught us today to

think of ourselves as detached units; and we must free ourselves from this point of view if we would understand ancient moral ideals. The individual Hebrew could think of himself as existing only through family and race solidarity. This view is set forth in Deut. 25: 5-10: "If brethren dwell together, and one of them die, the wife of the dead shall not marry without unto a stranger: her husband's brother shall . . . take her . . . to wife . . . And . . . the firstborn . . . shall succeed in the name of his brother which is dead, that his name be not put out of Israel."

This idea recurs in the fourth chapter of Ruth. In redeeming Elimelech's parcel of land Boaz takes to wife Ruth the widow of his dead kinsman: "So Boaz took Ruth, and she was his wife: and . . . the Lord gave her conception and she bare a son. And the women said unto Naomi, Blessed be the Lord which hath not left thee this day without a kinsman. . . . And he shall be unto thee a restorer of thy life and a nourisher of thine old age."

It was a custom in Israel for the whole family to demand the life of anyone who slew his brother, "for the life of his brother whom he slew." But when the guilty person was the only son, the carrying out of this sacred law of blood revenge would quench the only coal which was left and would leave "neither name nor remainder upon the earth." "For we must needs die, and are as water spilt on the ground, which cannot be gathered up again." Hence a mother in Israel may expect that David will prevent even the avenger of blood from destroying both her and her son, "out of the inheritance of God" (II Sam. 14: 7, 14, 16).

In II Samuel (chap. 12) we read of the punishment of David for his misconduct in taking the wife of Uriah to be his own wife. This punishment consisted in the death of Bath-sheba's child. But this sad tale culminates in a pæan of joy: "But now he is dead, wherefore should I fast? can I bring him back again? . . . And David comforted Bath-sheba his wife, and went in unto her . . . and she bare a son and he called his name Solomon: and the Lord loved him" (vv. 23-24). David comforts his wife by enabling her to conceive and bare another son.

In the dramatic account (Judges 11: 30-40) of Jephthah's sacrifice of his daughter we come to the very heart of the morality of the family. Jephthah vows that if Yahweh will give him victory over the children of Ammon that whatever comes forth to meet him from the doors of his house shall be offered to Yahweh as a burnt offering. "And Jephthah came to Mizpeh unto his house, and behold, his daughter came out to meet him with timbrels and with dances: and she was his only child; beside her he had neither son nor daughter. And . . . he rent his clothes, and said, Alas, my daughter! . . . And she said unto her father, Let . . . me alone two months, that I may go up and down upon the mountains, and bewail my virginity, I and my fellows . . . And it was a custom in Israel, that the daughters of Israel went yearly to lament the daughter of Jephthah, the Gileadite four days in a year."

Here we have the early point of view. The tragedy of the death of Jephthah's daughter is not in the cessation of individual self-consciousness, as the modern

mind sees it and as the portrait of the individual is painted in Browning's Cleon. What this woman mourns is not her death but her virginity! The tragedy is not that her life ends but that it has not been fully lived! She is the only child and with her death the family line, her family tree of life, the blood stream of her father, is cut off from the inheritance of Israel. Not the death of a young girl but the running into the sands of oblivion of a family line which had come from an immemorial past,—this is what the daughters of Israel went to lament four days in a year.

The Psalms express in aphorisms the old Hebrew tradition: "Lo, children are a heritage of the Lord: and the fruit of the womb is his reward. As arrows are in the hand of a mighty man; so are children of the youth. Happy is the man that hath his quiver full of them: they shall not be ashamed, but they shall speak with the enemies in the gate. Happy shalt thou be that fearest the Lord. Thy wife shall be, as a fruitful vine by the sides of thine house: thy children like olive plants round about thy table. Yea, thou shalt see thy children's children and peace upon Israel" (Psalms 127 and 128; Prov. 17:6; 30: 16).

It was not harshness but reverence which wrote into Israel's earliest code: "And he that smiteth his father, or his mother shall be surely put to death." "And he that curseth his father or his mother shall surely be put to death" (Exodus 21: 15, 17; Prov. 20: 20; 23: 22; 30: 17).

In the evergreen, in the Easter lily, and the Easter egg we see the symbol of the process through which

the life of nature continually reproduces itself. In the human world this reproduction of life is carried on through the medium of sex. Early thought had not introduced any stark dualism between human volition and the life of nature. Hence in all early religions the sex life is treated as a sacrament because through it the individual participates in the undying life of the race. The cult of the Great Mother was prominent in the ancient Mediterranean civilizations. This Great Mother was the source of all life, the life of vegetation, the life of the animal, as well as of the human world.

The beautiful and lofty idealism of the morality of sex in the early Hebrew morality has a naturalism and directness which are impossible to us moderns. Our wills have gone through the terrible fire of mediæval asceticism. After the rise of the prophetic ideals a terrible sense of shame was associated with the pillar and the green tree of the older nature worship. But in the earlier stage there was no sense of shame associated with the idea of sex.

The instincts of sex and parenthood were organized into the structure of the family not by individual self-conscious reflection, but by minds saturated and controlled by group sentiment and tradition. The love of children, of wife, of family, is one of the deeper sources of conduct in the Old Testament (Prov. 18:22). The intervention of a reflective, dubious will between man's more instinctive, natural life and his moral conduct had not yet arisen. There was an unbroken, spontaneous coöperation of the moral will with the deeper life of nature. Nationality resting on the

solidarity of the clan-family furnished the basis of immortality. The consciousness of family was a permanent, inescapable, emotional drive underlying all behavior and all thought. There is a tendency in this direction in all agricultural forms of society and early Hebrew life was fundamentally pastoral and agricultural.

Better be without hands and feet, say the Japanese, than without a family. The funeral tablets dedicated to the dead in the Japanese home; the offerings of wine, of food, of speech, give to the departed a form of immortality which is concrete; it is experienced; it is realized in a family consciousness. It is not an immortality formally believed by a cold intellect. The Japanese and the Chinese still keep alive the family consciousness which was so fundamental in ancient Hebrew morality.

CHAPTER IV

THE FAMILY IN THE EARLY GREEK TRADITION

To give the reader the early Greek view of the family we may quote Plutarch's account of Lycurgus' legislation regarding the family, especially since it breathes the same spirit as Plato's Republic. Lycurgus, says Plutarch, "ordered the maidens to exercise themselves with wrestling, running, throwing the quoit, and casting the dart, to the end that the fruit they conceived might, in strong and healthy bodies, take firmer root and find better growth, and withal that they, with this greater vigor, might be the more able to undergo the pains of child-bearing . . . Hence it was natural for them to think and speak as Gorgo, for example, the wife of Leonidas, is said to have done, when some foreign lady, as it would seem, told her that the women of Lacedæmon were the only women in the world who could rule men: 'With good reason,' she said, 'for we are the only women who bring forth men!' " Bachelors "were denied that respect and observance which the younger men paid their elders; and no man, for example, found fault with what was said to Dercyllidas, though so eminent a commander, upon whose approach one day, a young man, instead of rising, retained his seat, remarking, 'No child of yours will make room for me.' And, indeed, Lycurgus was

of a persuasion that children were not so much the property of their parents as of the whole commonwealth . . ; the laws of other nations seemed to him very absurd and inconsistent, when people would be so solicitous for their dogs and horses as to exert interest and pay money to procure fine breeding; as if it were not apparent that children of a bad breed would prove their bad qualities . . . and well-born children, in a like manner, their good qualities."

When we study the Homeric family we find the same naturalness and directness which we have seen to obtain in the early Greek attitude toward the body and toward nature. Homer makes Diomedes say to Paris: When my sharp shaft "layeth low its man, torn are the cheeks of his wife, and fatherless his children." The Homeric citizen cannot be dealt with as an individual, this passage implies; wound a Homeric Greek and you wound a wife and children. Over the slain Sokos Odysseus exclaims: "Ah, wretch, thy father and lady mother shall not close thine eyes in death, but birds that eat flesh raw shall tear thee, shrouding thee in the multitude of their wings." How adequately do these passages portray the organic relation of the Homeric Greek to the family! Laertes, seeing his son, Odysseus, and his grandson, Telemachus, fighting in heavy armor against their common foe, exclaims: "What a day has dawned for me, kind gods; yea, a glad man am I! My son and my son's son vying with one another in valour." What a background of ethical sentiment is disclosed in such an exclamation! Judged by modern standards the position of woman was not high. Telemachus tells his mother that his is the lord-

ship of the house and that her business is to guide her handmaids in plying the loom and distaff; and Penelope accepts her position as right and wise. Nor need we be shocked that Agamemnon, to appease Achilles' wrath, offers him as a gift any one of his three daughters, for the Old Testament shows us the same custom. On the other hand Homer in describing Nausicaa's attitude toward her approaching wedding refers to the event as the time of "glad marriage." Odysseus asks that the gods grant Nausicaa's desire, —a home and a husband and a mind at one with his, for there is nothing nobler than this. The words of Nausicaa's father to Odysseus himself: "Would that so goodly a man as thou art, wouldst wed my daughter, and be called my son," show the Homeric mind on this question. And lest our modern minds misunderstand the attitude of the Homeric woman we need only recall the words of Nausicaa herself addressed to her maids concerning Odysseus: "Would that such an one might be called my husband, dwelling here."

There is no more tender paternal sentiment in literature than that which is expressed in Homer's description of the meeting of the Trojan Hector with his wife, the "white-armed" Andromache, and the little boy Astyanax. Andromache implores Hector to remain with her upon the tower lest she be made a widow and their little son an orphan. Hector replies that he would be ashamed to face Trojans and Trojan dames, if like a coward he shrank from battle; moreover his father's glory and his own valiant soul compel him to fight. Nevertheless his love for his wife is so strong that the imagined anguish of a defeated Trojan king

and people is not so bitter to him as the thought that some mail-clad Achaian might lead Andromache a weeping captive, robbed of the light of freedom. "Me in death," exclaims the Trojan hero, "may the heaped-up earth be covering, ere I hear thy crying and thy carrying into captivity." "So spake glorious Hector, and took up his horse-hair crested helmet; and his dear wife departed to her home, oft looking back and letting fall big tears."

Through the family, the individual was linked with past and coming generations. The family is the expression of the will to live in organized social form. Through the family the race guarantees its will to live in coming generations. The mediæval ideal of virginity and chastity would have been regarded as sheer madness by classical antiquity. Pride in blood, love of family, self-perpetuation through posterity, were central and dynamic ideals in the Greek mind.

CHAPTER V

PROPERTY IN ANCIENT HEBREW AND GREEK LIFE

Our tradition which treats religion and morals as dealing with inner states of mind and which regards material, economic interests as external to the "inner" mind, would have been totally incomprehensible to the ancient Hebrews. Property was one of the central interests of the moral life. "O give thanks unto the Lord who giveth food to all flesh" (Psalms 136:1, 25). The moral consciousness of the ancient Hebrew was developed in vital touch with his instincts of workmanship and ownership. "The earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof" (Psalm 24:1).

The right of property came through one's kinship group. The idea of an independent, self-centered individual who must be as free as possible from all social restraint in his economic life would have meant nothing to a member of the early Hebrew community. It was the kinship group through the favor of Yahweh that owned property. Outside this kinship group there were no property rights. The instincts of hunger, of acquisition, of ownership, of workmanship, were organized by a powerful social tradition.

With the conquest of Canaan the Hebrews entered upon an agricultural stage of development. Property began to center in the land. "Wilt thou not

possess that which thy God giveth thee to possess? So whomsoever the Lord our God shall drive out from before us, them will we possess" (Judg. 11:24). "I will give unto thee . . . the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession" (Gen. 17:8). "The land shall not be sold forever: for the land is mine; for ye are strangers and sojourners with me" (Lev. 25:23). Religion and morality are inseparable from the land: "The land which ye shall inhabit, wherein I dwell" are the words of Yahweh (Numbers 35:34) "Praise ye the Lord who smote great nations and gave their land for a heritage unto Israel his people" (Psalms 135:1, 10,12; Jer. 12:14).

When we read the account of the murder of the male children by Pharaoh in order the better to hold the Hebrews as slaves (Exod. 1), we can appreciate such a pæan of rejoicing as the one hundred and fourteenth Psalm.

Morals and economics are inseparable in the Old Testament. "Thou visitest the earth and waterest it: thou greatly enrichest it with the river of God which is full of water: thou preparest them corn when thou hast so provided for it. Thy paths drop fatness. They drop upon the pastures of the wilderness: and the little hills rejoice on every side. The pastures are clothed with flocks; the valleys also are covered over with corn; they shout for joy, they also sing" (Psalm 65:9-13).

Psalm 104 mentions the "wine that maketh glad the heart of man and oil to make his face to shine and bread which strengtheneth man's heart. The trees of

the Lord are full of sap; the cedars of Lebanon which he hath planted." "For thou shalt eat the labor of thy hands: happy shalt thou be" (Psalm 128:2).

The transition from the pastoral to the agricultural stage is accompanied by a profound moral strain. This conflict of ideals is crystallized in the story of Cain and Abel. Cain, the agriculturalist, brings to Yahweh the first fruits of the soil; Abel, the shepherd, brings the firstlings of the flock. It is Abel's offering which is pleasing to Yahweh; and it is this preference which occasions Cain's jealousy, a jealousy which prompts the murder of his brother.

In Jer. 35, there is mention of the Rechabites, who drink no wine, sow no seed, have no vineyards, and dwell in tents. Here is a group loyal to the old pastoral ideal. The character of Samson is a crystallization of this ideal. His mother ate nothing that came from the vine and no razor was to come on Samson's head (Judg. 13:5, 14). It was this old tradition wherein Samson's great strength lay (Judg. 16:5). And when Samson had told Delilah all his heart, that there had not come a razor on his head from his mother's womb, and that if he be shaven all his strength would go from him, "she made him sleep upon her knees; and she called for a man and she caused him to shave off the seven locks of his head . . . and his strength went from him . . . And he wist not that the Lord was departed from him" (Judg. 16: 17-20).

What a wonderful statement of the power of tradition as the necessary support of the human will!

What the agriculturalist produces is more saturated with a sense of his own will than what nature herself provides in the pastoral stage. A heifer that had not worked under the yoke, or soil that was virgin, was holier than a heifer or soil which had been associated with work. Hence the necessity of constant warning not to forget in Canaan that the land, the wealth, the crops, and life itself were gifts from Yahweh.

"The Lord thy God bringeth thee into . . . a land of wheat and barley and vines and fig trees and pomegranates; a land of oil, olive and honey; a land whose stones are iron and out of whose hills thou mayest dig brass. When thou hast eaten and art full and hast built goodly houses; and when thy herds and thy flocks multiply, and thy silver and thy gold is multiplied, and all that thou hast is multiplied, beware that thou forget not the Lord thy God who led thee through that great and terrible wilderness, wherein were fiery serpents and scorpions and drought; who fed thee in the wilderness with manna, which thy fathers knew not; and thou say in thine heart, My power and the might of mine hand hath gotten me this wealth. But thou shalt remember the Lord thy God; for it is he that giveth thee power to get wealth" (Deut. 8).

The statement in First Kings that during the reign of Solomon "Judah and Israel dwelt safely every man under his vine and under his fig tree" (4:25) reflects the economic status after Israel had become an agricultural people. Every man had his inheritance (Prov. 27:8). The social unit of Israel during this agricultural stage was the clan family (Prov. 19:

14). The kingship was instituted as a means of greater solidarity; it was a means of defense against Israel's foes from without. But the old local clans might well fear for their autonomy. Samuel had his fears regarding the institution of the office of king (I Sam. 8:10-20).

The revolt of 960 took place because Rehoboam listened to the young men who reflected the ideals of Solomon's court and rejected the ideals of the old men who preserved the more democratic moral and social traditions of David and Samuel. "If thou wilt be a servant unto this people . . . they will be thy servants forever" (I Kings 12:7). The fears of Samuel regarding the kingship were well founded. A moral cleavage separates the reign of Solomon from that of David.

The heavy taxes levied by Solomon endangered the "vine" and the "fig tree" and the "gate" of independent clan families. Indeed Ahab's house lost the throne because the traditions of a foreign wife brought the king into conflict with the established property traditions of an agricultural people (I Kings 21:5-10, 19, 20).

There was a conflict between the newer city life of Canaan and the agricultural tradition, as there had been an earlier conflict between the older, settled traditions of the pastoral life and the newer life of agriculture. "And the Lord was with Judah and he drave out the inhabitants of the mountain; but could not drive out the inhabitants of the valley, because they had chariots of iron . . . And the children of Benjamin did not drive out the Jebusites that inhabited Jeru-

salem; but the Jebusites dwell with the children of Benjamin in Jerusalem unto this day" (Judg. 1:19, 21). It was this city life which made possible Solomon's luxury (I Kings 4:7,26; 11:3), his conscript labor (I Kings, 5:13-14), and his increased taxation (I Kings 12:14).

The clan family with its unity of kinship had adapted itself to the territorial basis of the agricultural stage. Instead of the tent it had come to center around its own house and gate and vines and trees. But the luxury of the court, the extensive building operations, the levying of laborers, the increase in taxes, were coming into open conflict with the traditional morality of family solidarity.

"Naboth had a vineyard hard by the palace of Ahab. And Ahab spake unto Naboth, saying, Give me thy vineyard, that I may have it for a garden of herbs, because it is near unto my house: and I will give thee for it a better vineyard than it; or, if it seem good to thee, I will give thee the worth of it in money. And Naboth said to Ahab, The Lord forbid it me that I should give the inheritance of my fathers unto thee. And Ahab came unto his house heavy and displeased. But Jezebel his wife came to him and said: Dost thou now govern the kingdom of Israel? I will give thee the vineyard . . . And there come in two men, children of Belial, and they witnessed against Naboth, saying, Naboth did blaspheme God and the king. Then they stoned him with stones. And the word of the Lord came to Elijah, the Tishbite, saying, Arise, go down to meet Ahab, king of Israel. . And thou shalt speak unto him, saying, Hast thou killed

and also taken possession? In the place where dogs licked the blood of Naboth shall dogs lick thy blood, even thine" (I Kings 21:1-22).

The conflict between the ideal of property in the pastoral stage and the agricultural stage is fairly evident. That there was a conflict of ideals between the old agricultural life and the urban life in Canaan is not so evident, but it seems to have existed. It has been suggested that the Tower of Babel symbolizes the evils of city life in the eyes of moralists whose perspective was not adjusted to the life of the city. The commercial life of the city was conducive to an individualism which seemed to be at war with the social morality of the family. It was almost unavoidable that the individualism which runs through Jeremiah, Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, should not come into conflict with the older traditional social ideals. In the competitive commercial life of the city there was born a sense of individual initiative which could no longer express itself in and through the old social forms. Agriculture stresses inherited property in land; city life stresses individual acquisition of property.

The conflict between the ideals of the agricultural life and the morality of the city life in Canaan may underlie the account of the quarrel between Abraham who lived in the plain and Lot who "dwelt in the cities" and "pitched his tent toward Sodom" (Gen. 13:12).

Poverty had not come to be associated with knowledge: "Poverty and shame shall be to him that refuseth instruction" (Prov. 13:18). "Wealth maketh many friends, but the poor is separated from his

neighbor" (Prov. 19:4). Poverty is an evil. "Give me neither poverty nor riches; feed me with food convenient for me: lest I be full and deny thee and say, Who is the Lord? or lest I be poor and steal" (Prov. 30:8, 9).

That spiritualization, that internalization, of the will which make property a "means" or an "expression" of moral character is no part of the dominant Hebrew tradition. One could be happy only when he ate the labor of his hands (Psalms 128:2; Prov. 27:23-27). Genesis describes the increase of Jacob's property as an increase of the man himself (30:43). The necessity of providing for one's house is an axiom of morality (Gen. 30:30). A man's status in life is inseparable from "the gate of his place" (Ruth 4:10). The words of Luke: "Blessed be ye poor: for yours is the kingdom of God. Blessed are ye that hunger now: for ye shall be filled," preserve the old Hebrew tradition regarding the ethics of property. The words of Matthew: "Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness: for they shall be filled," express an ideal foreign to the Old Testament, an ideal which has disassociated property from a purely inner attitude of mind. Hebrew morality regarded property as a basic and inseparable aspect of a good and happy life.

The teaching of the great prophets gives a new basis for property. Only property acquired by justice and goodness meets the new test. This is the view of Isaiah and Jeremiah, and of Proverbs. But property is everywhere still a good; it is necessary to a good life.

In the Old Testament no dualism has arisen between the will and the material environment. Character and morals changed with a changing economic experience. The dualism between the will and things which we find in the New Testament does not exist. The different types of tools giving the will different objective interests are recognized in the Old Testament as playing a vital part in the moral life. There is the religion of the flock symbolized in the person of Abel, the keeper of sheep, and also in the worship of the bull. There is the religion of the field symbolized in the person of Cain, the tiller of the soil, and in the worship of the green tree. In the story of Naboth's vineyard, there is depicted the Hebrew tradition controlling the possession of property in land. With their entrance into Canaan the Hebrews were forced to cultivate a form of city life. The story of Samson embodies the protest of the pastoral conscience against Canaanitish civilization. Judges and Samuel tell us that Yahweh could not drive out the Canaanites because they had smiths who made tools and chariots of iron. Here we see the inadequacy of the traditional morality to deal with a changing economic process. But nowhere do we find in the Old Testament a dualism between the will and material objects, possessions, property, wealth. He who has an understanding heart will have more wealth; he will not lose interest in property, according to the teaching of Solomon's Prayer in the Book of Kings. Riches and honor go with an understanding heart (I Kgs. 3:12-13).

There is a close parallel to these Hebrew ideals in the Greek development. Aristotle, in his discussion

of property in his Politics, says that the acquisition of property is morally justifiable only as property is necessary material in household management. The acquisition of property through trade has no limits. Property in the household is organized with reference to the ideal of a good life. The state, according to Aristotle, should check those whose desire for property is not controlled by the ideal of a good life. There is no limit to the desire for wealth which arises from exchange. The good life is the ideal limit to the acquisition of property; in trade, as a distinct art, there is no limiting moral ideal. Therefore, the state should limit those individuals whose desire for property dominates their entire life.

There is in Plato the same dualism between the will and material objects which we find in the New Testament. Plato's virtues of justice, wisdom, courage, and temperance are organized in a hierarchy in which the control of property tends to be subordinated to the "higher" virtues. But this Platonic dualism is not representative of the Greek morality of the golden fifth century. In the classical types of architecture there was no dualism of form and matter. The ideal forms were literally incarnated in actual marble. In the same way statuary incarnated the ideal human form freed from its imperfections in individual cases. Greek thought at its best was not an ascetic subordination of lower to higher. It aimed at seeing something of the whole of life in the functioning of each part. The moral thought of the age of Pericles looked ahead; it did not look away. The moral dualism between the will and things by making an inner will an

end in itself set the world of property free from an organizing moral tradition. Thus a theoretical moral formalism led to a practical moral materialism. But this was a post-Socratic development.

CHAPTER VI

THE EARLY HEBREW CONSCIOUSNESS OF SOLIDARITY

The earliest bond of solidarity was the tie of blood. The Israelites regarded themselves as descended from one ancestor, Abraham. The Old Testament refers to the Hebrews as a flock, a vine. This blood solidarity expressed itself in the idea that the Hebrews were a chosen people; and this particularism survived even the universalism of the later prophets. It made intermarriage during the exile a very serious problem. The Hebrew slave was on a different basis from the slave of foreign descent. The early Hebrew family was not a family in our modern sense; it was a clan family. This clan family and the tribe were the fundamental social units of Hebrew life. When, after the murder of Abel, Cain was driven out of his blood-group, he exclaimed: "every one that findeth me shall slay me."

The solidarity between the individual and his various social groups strikes our individualistic minds with amazement. "And Joshua, and all Israel with him, took Achan, the son of Zerah, and the silver, and the garment, and the wedge of gold, and his sons, and his daughters, and his oxen, and his asses, and his sheep, and his tent and all that he had . . . and all Israel . . . burned them with fire" (Josh. 7). Not only Achan's family, but his inanimate possessions, were

infected with his guilt. The land where one lives shares the moral qualities of one's will: "Blood defileth the land: and the land cannot be cleansed of the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it" (Numbers 35:33). Even guilt which is undiscovered must be washed away from both people and land (Deut. 21:1-9).

Even Jehovah himself was mentally and morally attached to the land where his people dwelt. When David is driven by Saul from the sacred soil of Israel he is driven from "the inheritance of the Lord" where he must "serve other gods" (I Sam. 26:19).

The consciousness of solidarity which voices itself in the Song of Deborah moves the heart like the powerful harmony of a great orchestra (Judg. 5). One must read the whole song to feel its movement and its power. Jael is immortalized as a heroine because she enticed the Canaanite leader, Sisera, into her tent, and, when he fell asleep, took his life. Blessed—so runs the account—shall she be above women; when Sisera asked for water she gave him milk; she brought forth butter in a lordly dish. She put her hand to the nail, and her right hand to the workman's hammer; with the hammer she smote off Sisera's head; at her feet he bowed, and where he bowed, he fell down dead.

The source of Samson's strength was in his unshaven locks because they were the symbol of an earlier nomadic clan-brotherhood (Judg. 16:5, 16-20). The spirit of his will was broken when it was disassociated from the power of ancestral tradition. When he was in the grip of this ancestral tradi-

tion, he could slay his thousands even with the jawbone of an ass. He died obedient to the voice of the clan; and "the dead which he slew at his death were more than they which he slew in his life" (Judg. 16:30). And the loyalty and solidarity of these tent-dwellers who refused to plant fields and live in houses are held up by Jeremiah as an object lesson to his generation (Jer. 35).

The most powerful tabu the ancient Hebrew could utter was this: "No such thing ought to be done in Israel" (II Sam. 13:12). Solidarity was more real than individuality (Prov. 25:28).

As in China today, the ultimate source of authority in Israel was public opinion. In cases of dispute the individual went "up to the gate unto the elders" (Deut. 25:7-8). In the case of a rebellious son, "his father and his mother shall lay hold on him, and bring him out unto the elders of his city, and unto the gate of his place; and they shall say unto the elders of the city, 'This, our son, is stubborn and rebellious, he will not obey our voice' . . . And all Israel shall hear and fear" (Deut. 21:18-21).

The closing statement in Judges: "every man did that which was right in his own eyes," means that in the period of the Judges there was no central authority and that authority rested in the local kinship groups.

This consciousness of solidarity was greatly strengthened by the final conquest of Canaan and the centralization of the national life in the capital city of Zion, under the leadership of David. The Ark of Jehovah was taken by David to Jerusalem with dancing

and shouting and with the sound of the trumpet (II Sam. 6:12-16).

The quality of David's mind that made him the organizer of Israel's national consciousness can be read in the following: "And David longed and said, Oh, that one would give me drink of the water of the well of Bethlehem, which is by the gate! And the three mighty men brake through the host of the Philistines, and drew water out of the well of Bethlehem, that was by the gate, and took it, and brought it to David: nevertheless he would not drink thereof, but poured it out unto the Lord. And he said . . . is not this the blood of the men that went in jeopardy of their lives? Therefore, he would not drink it" (II Sam. 23:15-17).

Blood unity and moral solidarity we all feel between ourselves and our immediate families, but David experienced this consciousness of solidarity with all his people. "And king David sent to Zadok and to Abiathar the priests, saying, Speak unto the elders of Judah, saying, . . . Ye are my brethren, ye are my bones and my flesh . . . And he bowed the heart of all the men of Judah, even as the heart of one man" (II Sam. 19:11-14).

Even Jeremiah thought it better to be dead than to be without a country: Weep ye not for the dead, but weep sore for him who shall no more see his native country (22:10). In the seventh chapter of Second Samuel there is an account of David's passionate longing to build Jehovah a house on Mount Zion. And "the king said unto Nathan the prophet, See now I dwell in a house of cedar, but the ark of Jehovah

dwelleth within curtains." But the freedom from wars necessary to build the temple came not to David but to Solomon. "Then spake Solomon, I have surely built thee a house to dwell in . . . And the Lord said unto David my father, Whereas it was in thy heart to build a house unto my name, thou didst well that it was in thine heart. Nevertheless thou shalt not build the house; but thy son that shall come forth out of thy loins, he shall build the house unto my name. And I have set there a place for the ark, wherein is the covenant of the Lord. There was nothing in the ark save the two tables of stone which Moses put there at Horeb, when the Lord made a covenant with the children of Israel, when they came out of the land of Egypt" (I Kings 8:12, 13, 18, 19, 21, 9).

The emotions and ideas that went with this centralization of the nation's life on Mount Zion have their classic expression in the Psalms. "Lord, remember David . . . how he sware unto the Lord . . . : Surely I will not come into the tabernacle of my house, nor go up into my bed; I will not give sleep to mine eyes or slumber to mine eyelids, until I find out a place for the Lord, a habitation for the mighty God of Jacob. For the Lord hath chosen Zion. This is my rest forever: here will I dwell" (132:1-5, 13-14). "The Lord hath chosen Israel for his peculiar treasure" (135:4). "When the Lord shall build up Zion, he shall appear in his glory" (102:16). "Except the Lord build the house they labor in vain that build it: except the Lord keep the city the watchman waketh but in vain" (127:1). "Our feet shall stand within thy gates, O Jerusalem. Jerusalem is builded as a city

that is compact together: Whither the tribes go up, the tribes of the Lord" (122:2-4). "They that trust in the Lord shall be as Mount Zion, which cannot be removed, but abideth for ever. As the mountains are round about Jerusalem, so the Lord is round about his people from henceforth even for ever" (125:1-2). "Behold, how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity! As the dew of Hermon, and as the dew that descended upon the mountains of Zion: for there the Lord commanded the blessing, even life for evermore" (133:1, 3). "The Lord shall bless thee out of Zion: and thou shalt see the good of Jerusalem all the days of thy life" (128:5). "Let all be confounded and turned back that hate Zion" (129:5). "There is a river the streams whereof shall make glad the city of God, the holy place of the tabernacles of the Most High. God is in the midst of her; she shall not be moved: God shall help her, and that right early (46:4-5). "Walk about Zion, and go round about her: tell the towers thereof. Mark ye well her bulwarks, consider her palaces; that ye may tell it to the generation following" (48:12-13). "The Lord loveth the gates of Zion more than all the dwellings of Jacob. Glorious things are spoken of thee, O city of God. Of Zion it shall be said, This and that man was born in her" (87:2, 3, 5). "By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down, yea, we wept, when we remembered Zion. For there they that carried us away captive required of us a song . . . How shall we sing the Lord's song in a strange land? If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning. If I do not remember thee, let my

tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth; if I prefer not Jerusalem above my chief joy" (137:1-6). "When the Lord turned again the captivity of Zion, we were like them that dream. Then was our mouth filled with laughter and our tongue with singing" (126: 1-2). "The Lord that made heaven and earth bless thee out of Zion" (134:3).

At the death of Solomon, this national solidarity was broken at its very heart by the revolt of the northern tribes from the kingdom of Judah. David's work was the achieving of a national unity. His constant wars kept him from building the temple so dear to his heart. This building, this organization within a nation, made secure from without, was the work of Solomon. Men were conscripted in large numbers to furnish the material and to carry on the work of Solomon's extensive building operations. Solomon's oriental luxury, his foreign wives, his fraternizing with foreign religions, increased the dissatisfaction with his excessive taxes. Public opinion supported the earlier tradition incarnated in the older men who had survived from David's household. This Davidic tradition held Solomon on his throne, but at his death the dissatisfaction broke out into open revolt. This revolt ended the political solidarity which had reached its culmination in David's reign (I Kings 12:1-24). From henceforth there were two kingdoms instead of one. Here is a land-mark in Hebrew moral development.

This political division brought about a disassociation of the old prophetic will to righteousness from the solidarity of the nation.

The ancient Hebrews from Abraham to Isaiah ex-

perienced an immediacy and directness in their relation to the community and the nation which we moderns have lost. The instinct of gregariousness was organized by group sentiment and tradition into a dominant consciousness of solidarity. The energy of instinct gave momentum to the social attitudes of the will. The will shared the old, old energy of herd instinct. Here is the explanation of the joy and abandon with which the Hebrew participated in the life of his nation.

We have been taught to think of the will as limited by the instinct of gregariousness. This is because of the long period of conflict between a higher sense of self and the traditional state. In the ancient Hebrew morality tradition, custom, and knowledge aided in the development of the instinct of gregariousness into an intelligent social consciousness.

The early moral tradition centered in the family, the clan, and the tribe. After the conquest of Canaan it centered about the land; then it centered about the city of Zion. Then Solomon's temple was built and into this hallowed house where Yahweh dwelt went the Ark of the Covenant, with its tables of stone on which were engraved the Ten Laws of Moses. Over this Ark, this ancient source of sacred power, were the cherubim, overlaid with gold. Here, then, was a chosen people with a holy city and a holy temple, with its Ark and its tables of the law and its cherubim. This Ark was a source of national power. When David brought it to Zion, "he danced before the Lord with all his might;" so great a source of power was this Ark (II Sam. 6). This land, this city, this tem-

ple, this Ark, these tables of the law, constituted a tangible, objective center about which the mind, the will, the conscience, could revolve. They visibly embodied the traditional ethnic morality.

CHAPTER VII

PRE-SOCRATIC GREEK SOLIDARITY

The Homeric Greek was rooted in the world about him; he loved life; he was at home with nature; his family relationships were necessary to his existence; and finally he was organically related to his clan and tribe. Nestor advises Agamemnon to arrange his warriors by clans and tribes on the ground that they will fight better in this way. The Cyclops seem strange to Odysseus and his companions because "they have neither gatherings for council nor oracles of law, but each one utters the law to his own children and his wives, and they reck not one of another." In like manner Polyphemus, the giant, "was not conversant with others, but dwelt apart in lawlessness of mind"; he acted not with regard to other men, save as his own spirit moved him. This is strange, because it is so thoroughly out of accord with the Greek spirit. Partaking of wine and fruit, the Greek listened to public discourse, and the minstrel with his lyre kept fresh the memory of famous men and events. Rejecting the omens of birds, the Trojan Hector exclaims: "One omen is best, to fight for our own country." Constant wars abroad and political assemblies at home kept awake in the Greek mind a lively consciousness of his fellows. The Greek did not think of himself as first

existing as an individual and then becoming aware of the lives of his comrades. The Greek individual had never been abstracted in thought from that web of social relationships which bound him to his fellows. The very atmosphere in which he lived, on the battlefield, in the assembly, as a member of a patriarchal family and of a clan and a tribe, nourished a sense of self which was through and through social. There was no store of common possessions; the spoils of war fell to the various leaders. The Greek had a marked sense of individuality. Nevertheless, a sense of individuality abstracted from its social setting had never dawned on the pre-Socratic Greek mind. "What righteous man," said Odysseus to Circe, who invited him to feast and forget his companions in distress, "would have the heart to eat and drink ere he had redeemed his company and beheld them face to face?" The Homeric Greek led a truly gregarious life. How powerful and subtle this gregariousness was even we ourselves can feel in Homer's lines: "As the many tribes of feathered birds, wild geese or cranes or long necked swans . . . fly hither and thither joying in their plumage, and with loud cries settle ever onwards, and the mead resounds; even so poured forth the many tribes of warriors from ships and huts into the plain. And the earth echoed terribly beneath the tread of men and horses. So stood they in the flowery plain, unnumbered as are leaves and flowers in their season."

The old tie of kinship centered in the heads of families, but there developed later a new tie of a common land. This common interest of several families in land led to the formation of settled village com-

munities. When, still later, the fear of invasion led to the fortification of some commanding eminence, the older village communities were subordinated to the newer organization of the city-state. They survived as local brotherhoods within the larger unity of the city-state. The Greek city-state was therefore not the expression of individual wills; it was not a voluntary organization on the part of individual persons; it was the outgrowth of preëxisting organizations, each one of which retained its old constitution. When, as tradition reports, Romulus, the founder of Rome, and his companions, deposited a clod of earth, each from his native soil, in the trench dug at the founding of the city, they symbolized the unity which was to exist between the new city-state and the old local groups, and the same principle obtained at Athens.

In the early city-state, the king ruled by divine right or birth and was, like the patriarch of the preceding age, priest, judge, and warrior. There was of course the council of chieftains with whom the king deliberated on matters of common concern. Nevertheless we must not suppose that the early Greeks felt that the authority of their kings was imposed upon them as subjects. According to Homer, when the Trojan elders beheld Agamemnon before the walls of their city, although they knew him not, they pronounced him a kingly personage. In the early days kings were kings because they were able to lead. "Even as a bull," says Homer, "standeth out far foremost amid the herd, for he is preëminent amid the pasturing kine," even so did Zeus make Agamemnon "preëminent among many, and chief amid heroes."

This development of social solidarity, however, did not extend beyond the small groups of family, tribe, and local city-state. Within these groups was comradeship. There is nothing, says the Homeric Odysseus, sweeter than a man's own country. Outside these local groups, however, moral and social responsibility did not exist. The following sentence from Odysseus shows the strong moral sense within the group, and the lack of any responsibility beyond the definitely recognized social relationships: "I sacked their city and slew the people. And from out the city we took their wives and much substance, and divided them amongst us, that none through me might go lacking his proper share." Odysseus was surnamed "waster of cities." Warfare was as little excused as agriculture or commerce. Discus and javelin-throwing, running, leaping, wrestling, hunting, and the bearing of arms were a part of the educational training of the old Greek period. The chief aim of Spartan education—which remained conservative to the last—was to teach the youth to endure pain and to conquer in battle. Bravery in battle was a necessary element in the old Greek moral ideal. The absolute naturalness of warfare in the lines of Homer strikes us moderns with amazement: "There is neither pain nor grief of heart, when a man is smitten in battle fighting for his own possessions." The Homeric heroes have hearts set on war; their hands and their feet lust for battle! The Trojan Paris challenges the chiefs of Agamemnon. Hear Homer's description: "When Menelaos, dear to Ares, marked him coming in the forefront of the multitude with long strides, then even

as a lion is glad when he lighteth upon a great carcase, a horned stag or a wild goat that he hath found, being an hungered; and so devoureth it amain, even though the fleet hounds and lusty youths set upon him, even thus was Menelaos glad when his eyes beheld godlike Alexandros . . . So straightway he leapt in his armour from his chariot to the ground." Beautiful is the picture Plutarch portrays of the Spartans drawn up in battle array: "It was at once a magnificent and terrible sight to see them march on to the tune of their flutes without any disorder in their ranks, any discomposure in their minds, or change in their countenances, calmly and cheerfully moving with the music to the deadly fight. Men in this temper were not likely to be possessed with fear or any transport of fury, but with the deliberate valor of hope and assurance, as if some divinity were attending and conducting them."

This sense of divinity attending the Spartans performed the same moral and social function which was performed by the tribal and national religious consciousness of the Hebrew people. Early Greek religion, like early Hebrew religion, was inseparable from a definite tribal and national consciousness. The divine inspiration which gave courage to Odysseus and his companions to put out the eye of the giant Polyphemus is the same type of religious consciousness which inspired the Hebrew Jael to take the life of Sisera, the Canaanite leader. Odysseus' religiously kissing his native soil after years of forlorn wandering corresponds to the Hebrew's conception of his native land as the dwelling place of Yahweh. Helios, the sun-god and Earth, "the grain-giver," are Greek equivalents of the

Canaanitish baals representing the fertility of the earth, with whom the Hebrews found it easy to identify even Yahweh himself. Zeus had the same relation to the land and the people of Greece that Yahweh had to Palestine and the Hebrew people.

When, according to Plutarch, Solon told Crœsus that he had in mind a happier, if not a richer man than he, one who had been an honest man, who had had good children and a competent estate, and who had died bravely in battle for his country, he voiced the moral ideal of the pre-Socratic Greek civilization which was founded upon loyalty to kinship, patriotism, and property derived through war and slavery and inherited through blood relationship.

There is a striking sense of individuality in Homer, but the individual does not seem to be separated from his organic relations to the old kinship and local groups. The individual is not bound by blind custom and taboo. Intelligence and insight shine through the Homeric poems like clear sunlight. But this knowledge and vision do not weaken the individual's loyalty to the old kinship and social groups. The individuals in Homer have sad thoughts mixed with their golden wine and their exultant laughter, but they always keep their swords within easy reach, for they never forget their household gods and their native land.

CHAPTER VIII

THE HEBREW PROPHETIC SOLIDARITY

The eighth century prophets, Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Micah, marked a new epoch in the ethical thought of Israel. Kinship with Abraham or being a member of a chosen nation no longer made a man good. Amos taught that an unrighteous Israelite was no better than any other unrighteous individual (9:7). The nation, with its glorious history, its ethnic solidarity, its City of David, its holy temple at Jerusalem, had come to think of itself as a holy and good nation merely because it had the traditions of Abraham and Moses and David. But now, in the eighth century, these four great prophets arose with one common message. Ethnic morality, unbroken solidarity, expressing itself in national defense, in imposing and magnificent temple ritual, do not save a nation! Every great pagan nation has these things. The old ethnic consciousness looked forward toward national aggrandizement and the subjection of foreign nations merely because Israel was a holy nation,—holy because of her national god, her ancestral traditions, her kinship solidarity. This national ethnic ideal anticipated a "day of Yahweh" when the national god would overthrow the enemies of the chosen Israelitish people. But Amos declared (5:18) that the "day of Yahweh"

would be a time of darkness rather than light even to Israel unless she built her national life upon justice and righteousness (5:21). Not private wealth and wine and ointments and music and spacious palaces (6:4-8), but honesty and regard for the needy (8:3-6) were the only foundations of Israel's salvation. Instead of the old ethnic idea that Israel was a holy nation because of her kinship with Abraham and Moses and David, because of her ancestral traditions, her holy city of Zion, her possession of the sacred Law of Yahweh, Amos set forth the new doctrine that because of this very knowledge and this superior moral ideal of Moses and the prophets, an unrighteous Israel was more guilty than all the families of the earth (3:1-2). No, Abraham's blood and the Ark of the Covenant and the possession of Mount Zion and the inheritance of a chosen land no longer constituted a guarantee of national salvation. This higher morality of Amos rested upon character and conduct and not upon sacrifice and ritual. Custom was no longer synonymous with moral law; righteous conduct alone could make a nation "good." Under this inexorable ethical principle, the Israelites with their proud ethnic consciousness were to be judged by exactly the same standard as the Philistines, the Syrians and the Egyptians (9:7).

According to the more primitive view of morals, the god was thought of as the spirit of fertility. In partaking of the blood of a sacred animal the worshiper shared the life of his god. In Hosea this idea is explicitly rejected. Yahweh is no longer to be thought of as a baal or spirit of fertility. The morality of Israel is no longer to be regarded as centering in blood

relationship. The Mosaic tradition had introduced another element. The Yahweh of Moses was related to Israel not by blood but by voluntary compact. Here was a new ethical note; and this new element was emphasized by Hosea. Israel is related to Yahweh not through kinship but through voluntary loyalty, through will and choice. Sin is not a magical contagion; it is an act of will. Yahweh is not a baal; he is the husband of Israel, bound to Israel by ties of affection. Israel will no longer call Yahweh a baal; she will call him "husband" and he will betroth Israel unto him in righteousness, in loving-kindness, and in mercy (2:16-19).

This higher morality of Hosea in a striking passage (1:4) condemns Jehu's wholesale slaughter of all that remained of the house of Ahab (II Kings 10:11) in the previous century. Wholesale murder is no longer compatible with the type of conscience to be found in the book of Hosea.

Isaiah's moral teaching does not differ from that of Amos or Hosea. He condemns ritual as a substitute for good conduct (1:10-15). The land is full of wealth (2:7), but the poor are robbed (3:15). The princes of Judah despoil the poor; they love bribes; they do not judge the cause of the needy (3:14, 15; 1:23). The women of Judah have their hearts set on luxurious personal display (3:16-24). The men are greedy for gain. Against such Isaiah (5:8) in a powerful outburst exclaims: "Woe unto them that join house to house, that lay field to field, till there be no place, that they may be placed alone in the midst of the earth." The only salvation for Judah is (1:16,

17) to cease to do evil, to learn to do well. The only hope that Zion has is redemption through a righteous remnant (1:27).

The terrible slaughter of the worshipers of Baal by Jehu after he had tricked them by fraud is the result of the survival of the old type of solidarity which rested on relationship by blood (II Kings 10:15-28). The introduction of the will as a conscious factor in the experience of solidarity was the epoch-making work of the eighth century prophets. The solidarity resting on blood and national tradition is no longer sufficient. A nation's unity must rest on a conscious will to righteousness. A solidarity which rests on murder and deceit shall perish. "But I will have mercy upon the house of Judah, and will save them by the Lord their God, and will not save them by bow, nor by sword, nor by battle, by horses nor by horsemen" (Hosea 1:4, 7).

When Sennacherib, king of Assyria, demanded of Hezekiah, king of Judah, the surrender of Jerusalem, he counselled with Isaiah, the prophet. Isaiah's answer was: Zion is Jehovah's dwelling place and is therefore inviolable: "so shall the Lord of hosts come down to fight for Mount Zion and for the holy hill thereof" (Isaiah 31:4. II Kings. ch. 19). It never occurred to Isaiah to suppose that the destruction of Zion might make more real the indestructible character of a truly moral and religious will. It would have been impossible for Isaiah to think that a righteous moral life was possible apart from a politically organized state. Here Isaiah is in strict accord with the older tradition. He believes, as did Jephthah and

Samson and Jehu, that the individual can survive only when supported by the power and unity of solidarity. But there is a note in Isaiah and Hosea and Amos and Micah which did not exist before the eighth century. There is a clear-cut emphasis on the idea that doing good and being just are the most essential thing in life. Mount Zion as the symbol of solidarity remains in Isaiah and Amos and Hosea and Micah, and it is a solidarity which rests on blood and tradition, but there is added the idea that the solidarity of blood and custom and ritual, unless it be permeated with goodness and righteousness, differs not at all from the solidarity of blood and custom and ritual of Egypt or Assyria or any other nation (Amos 3:2;9:7). "Woe to them that . . . stay on horses and trust in chariots, because they are many; and in horsemen, because they are strong; but they look not unto the Holy One of Israel" (Isa. 31:1).

Most tenderly does Hosea describe the transition from the ideal of the Canaanitish Baal-worship to the ideal of the prophets. There was more mirth, more joy, more emotion, in the older ritual (2:11). But while the prophetic ideal was lacking in emotional drive and power, there was achieved by the prophets a higher level of morality, the level of the higher volitional attitudes. The earlier era emphasized a blood unity between nature and man, and between man and man: "for the blood is the life" (Deut. 12:23). On the other hand, the prophets emphasize the will. The solidarity which they teach does not already exist in nature; it is to be achieved by the will. Israel, says Hosea, shall no longer call Yahweh Baal

or Lord; she shall call him Husband (2:16). The Yahweh of the eighth century is not an animistic presence that dwells in an ark or an altar (Num. 10:33-36); nor is he the creative life of a green tree or a sacred bull (II Kings 17:16). He is the intellectual projection of a higher volitional consciousness in the Hebrew people. This new voluntary relationship is expressed by Hosea under the symbol of husband and wife: "I will betroth thee unto me in righteousness and in judgment and in loving-kindness" (2:19). The youthful joy of the Canaanitish nature-worship is viewed with suspicion (Amos 5:21-24, Isa. 22:12-13, Hosea 2:11). In the old days, the presence of Yahweh through emotional possession and group ritual was a sufficient standard of conduct. "Is not Yahweh among us? No evil can come upon us," exclaimed the traditionalists (Micah 3:11). Such a blind, instinctive consciousness of solidarity stood in the way of the prophetic ideal.

The prophets of the eighth century broke away from the earlier animistic tendency. Amos declares that he is not a prophet. By this, he means that he is not subject to the "possessions" and seizures and "inspirations" which characterized earlier prophecy. Religion in these prophets centers not in first fruits, in the first born, not in wild, emotional, inspired ecstasies which express themselves in the dance, lyric psalms, ritual, and music. Religion had come to center in the idea of social righteousness. Not in emotional seizures, but in a vision of a plumb-line as the symbol of justice does Amos find the source of his inspiration. Not in the old, tribal gregariousness which leads to war, which

seizes the land of other peoples; not in a blind solidarity of blood which leads to blood-revenge, but in a devotion and loyalty to the social good is the new center of gravity.

CHAPTER IX

GREEK SOLIDARITY BECOMES REFLECTIVE

The older, conservative ideal of the city-state, the ideal which is coming to be known as the pre-Socratic ideal, pulsates with living vitality throughout the pages of Æschylus (525-456). Every page of Æschylus is flooded with the clear light of Greek intelligence; but knowledge and reflection in Æschylus serve to interpret and to idealize the traditional view of the city-state. Æschylus is a realist; there is nothing in him of subjectivism and romanticism. The solidarity of the family, the sacred duty of blood-revenge, the doctrine of group-responsibility, is the central theme of Æschylus' dramas:

> In children's children recurrent appears
> The ancestral crime. (Eumenides, Blackie's Trans.)

But in spite of the overwhelming power of emotion and sentiment in Æschylus, he is represented as saying in the *Frogs of Aristophanes* (Frere's Trans.):

> Indeed, I should doubt if my drama throughout
> Exhibit an instance of woman in love.

And the reason is perfectly plain. In Japan or in China, it is immoral to love one's wife overmuch. Such sentimentalism is dangerous to the solidarity of

the family. The family as of old does not rest upon individual sentiment; it rests upon foundations far deeper than the changeable sentiments of individual lovers. Loyalty to the social whole, rather than individual sentiment, is the keynote of the morality of Æschylus. The reason women do not make love in the dramas of Æschylus he himself gives in the following lines:

> Your virgins, the fairest,
> To brave youths the rarest
> Be mated, glad life to prolong!

The happiness of the individual is not differentiated through introspection and set apart as an end in itself; it is found in loyalty to objective interests which have abiding institutional value.

In the Persians, Æschylus gave to his Athenian contemporaries his portrayal and interpretation of the battle of Salamis. We can imagine what effect it must have had on the Athenian stage in the fifth century. Here are portrayed the virtues which preserved Greece from Persian domination. The Persian herald reports that the Greeks enjoy freedom without a king:

> Slaves are they to no man living, subject to no earthly name.

But this very freedom is made possible only because of the unity and solidarity of the Athenian city-state. "High authority" and "holy fear" are the foundations of freedom.

The famous funeral oration of Pericles as reported by Thucydides is one of the immortal things in literature because it voices in such an adequate way the

moral ideal of the Greek city-state at the very zenith of its development. The spontaneous solidarity of the Athenian social consciousness is set in contrast to the unity of Sparta which is built on arduous and painful discipline. The Athenian democracy had not given place to a selfish individualism, for all Athenians, says Pericles, are experienced judges of sound public policies. The individual mind was disciplined and elevated and widened by participation in a common city life. Conscience was civic as well as individual. Indeed the Athenians had not yet come to suppose that individual and civic ideals might be opposed to each other. Æschylus, who had fought at Marathon and Salamis, and not Euripides, the first "study-poet," held sway on the Athenian stage. Philosophers had not yet retired into the privacy of their own self-constituted "schools." The Athenian lived in the open; he sat on juries; he listened attentively and long in order that he might be able to vote intelligently on public questions. Public buildings were large; private houses were correspondingly small. So Demosthenes later on declares with infinite pride. An open political forum, such as the Pnyx; a common religious "open-house," such as the Parthenon; a hill, the Acropolis, overlooking the sacred battlefields of the common country; what an atmosphere in which to breathe politics and ethics! Philip of Macedon, says Demosthenes in his speech On the Crown, lost an eye, broke a collar bone, had a hand and a leg mutilated, and was willing to sacrifice any part of his body that with the remainder he might live in honor and glory. If, he continues, a man born at Pella, an obscure place, possessed such magnanimity,

what ought to be expected of Athenians who, day after day, in speeches and in dramas, are reminded of the virtues of their ancestors! The Athenian of the fourth century was linked in mind and heart with his race, his land, his city, and his ancestral gods. The organic unity of the individual and the state has perhaps been nowhere more clearly stated than in the speech attributed to Pericles by Thucydides during the plague occasioned by the Peloponnesian War. "It would be better," he says, "for individuals themselves that the citizens should suffer and the state flourish than that the citizens should flourish and the state suffer. A private man, however successful in his own dealings, if his country perish, is involved in her destruction; but if he be an unprosperous citizen of a prosperous state, he is much more likely to recover. States can bear the misfortunes of individuals, but individuals cannot bear the misfortunes of the state."

Such a confluence of tradition and enlightenment is a rare occurrence in the history of the race. And in the age of Pericles, there was no break between the new and the old. Hence the phenomenal result. Rhetoric and oratory made possible a more effective form of public speech; they had not yet degenerated into pedantry and empty display. The Greek drama was an open school of public morals. Enlightenment had not paralyzed the old instinctive patterns of the mind on which rested the social and religious institutions of the race. Philosophy had not separated itself from the old traditions. Nay, it found its very nature in organizing, in directing, in giving proper objective significance to the old ancestral patterns of the mind.

This blending of intelligence and tradition is clearly illustrated in the pre-Socratic religious ideal. The religious initiation of the adolescent had not come to center about the salvation of the individual regarded as independent of the entire social structure. The life of the individual was not regarded as separable even in thought from the life of the state. At eighteen the Athenian youth was given a spear and a shield. He changed his dress. He was trained in a military camp and at twenty years of age he became a full citizen. The emotions and the will were disciplined through participation in a common religious ritual. Our familiar reproductions of Greek statues are generally isolated fragments. In their original setting they were parts of choral dances, of orderly processions, of organized community action. There were no private religious beliefs. Life was not regulated by individual "intuitions." Nor had the individual come to think of his religious life as centering in a world to come. The religious sentiments which we read so clearly in the grave reliefs that have come down to us are built around the concerns of life here and now.

The same ideal runs through the old Greek educational ideal. There was a definite moral tradition embodied in the teaching of Homer and Hesiod. Definite types of music were used in the attempt to organize in the mind of the youth a definite system of sentiment regarding the family and the city-state.

The private self with which we are acquainted today is the result of the Socratic tradition, of the Christian emphasis on the inner life, and of modern individualism. In the Athens of the fifth century

every moral virtue had its objective, social, public aspect. Morality was personal as well as social, but personality had never been defined in terms which excluded the state. Classical morality put emphasis on those aspects of experience which seemed to constitute the best foundation of society; and in the eyes of the ancients this was the only way in which the life of the individual could be given worth and security. And the soundness of this view must be rediscovered by modern ethical thought if western civilization is to endure.

The fifth century was characterized by phenomenal progress. It advanced in its conception of history from Herodotus to Thucydides, from superstition and blind tradition to a definite scientific interpretation of historical facts. In philosophy there was the definite transition from myth to the rational formulation of life's problems. In literature the drama in which are mirrored moral and intellectual problems has taken the place of the old epic with its portrayal of objective deeds and events. Democritus was laying the foundations of science in his atomic theory and his dispassionate objective description of facts. Whether every distinct advance in creative thought necessarily brings with it elements of social disorganization we need not attempt to answer. The fourth century furnishes the answer to this question so far as Greece is concerned. But the fifth century saw the old ideals illumined but not destroyed by the new enlightenment. And even those who came after the process of moral and social disintegration had set in—Euripides, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle—received their moral and political inspira-

tion from the old ideal of the city-state which was at its best in the age of Pericles. The halo about their heads comes from the golden glow of the setting sun of the old ideal. No other such group of geniuses ever lived in one historical setting. Democritus, Pericles, Phidias, Æschylus and Sophocles and, touching hands with them, Praxiteles, Euripides, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle—what a constellation! May it not be that the basis, the foundation, of their individual genius is to be found in the fact, which the Platonic Socrates emphasizes in the Crito and to which Demosthenes points with pride, that they were all children of one mother, the Athenian city-state?

Greek philosophy, which began in the seventh century, concerned itself with the question, What is ultimately real? Whether the answer was water or air, or some indefinite somewhat, out of which the phenomenal world arose, the underlying quest was the same. These philosophers were in search of the permanent substance of which the world was made. The material ground-plan which constituted the nature of things asked no assistance from man. Man, like any other phenomenal object, was regarded as the passive product of some ultimate world-substance.

Into this realistic philosophy Empedocles introduced a new and important element. He added to his four fundamental elements, fire, air, water, and earth, the qualities of love and hate. Whether these qualities of love and hate are to be interpreted in an idealistic sense as new additions to the old material elements, or whether they are themselves qualities or products of the four fundamental elements, Emped-

ocles has not made clear; hence his interpreters disagree. But there is an ethical aspect of the matter which seems to be clear: in his addition of love and hate to the underlying elements of which the world is ultimately composed, Empedocles distinctly recognized mind as actively or passively—according as we take the idealistic or the materialistic interpretation—playing its part in the creation of the world, in the on-going of the processes of nature. The mind secured recognition as playing a part in the scheme of things.

In Democritus, a further step is taken in the same direction, for, while all reality is reduced to atoms, nevertheless the matter which is ultimately real is not the matter which we experience as the objects of perception. Real matter is supersensible; the phenomenal matter of our world of sense perception is in part made what it is by the mental processes of the percipient. Primary qualities, like extension, belong to matter in itself, but secondary qualities, like color, are due to the presence of the mind itself. According to this view, even if mind is not a part of ultimate reality, it nevertheless plays a part in the determination of the character of the world as human beings know it. And newer theory mirrors newer social processes.

But it was left to Anaxagoras to bring to clear recognition the significance of the mind in the on-going of the world. According to this thinker, no amount of complexity in the structure of matter can produce a world. A cosmos can arise only as the material elements of reality are reduced to order by the synthesizing, form-giving activity of intelligence. It is no wonder that Aristotle singled out this theory of Anaxa-

goras as the most significant thing in the whole world of pre-Socratic philosophy.

There is reason for regarding this theory of a creative intelligence propounded by Anaxagoras, the counsellor of Pericles, the great leader of the Athenian city-state, as an unconscious symbol or index of the phenomenal development of the Greek mind in the age of Pericles. It mirrored in consciousness in the form of a philosophic theory the creative activity of the Greek mind in the fifth century B. C.

In the art of the Parthenon, built by Pericles in the middle of the fifth century, we see the Greek philosophy of life at its best. Athens had been victorious over Persia; she had not yet been defeated and humiliated by Sparta. The columns of the Parthenon were not Corinthian; it was not a period of luxury and refinement. Some of the columns on the Areopagus exhibited the elegance and frailty of the Ionic type. But those of the Parthenon were Doric; for the Parthenon was the symbol of ruggedness and strength. Philosophy and mathematics and science were in this wonderful temple; they were built into the very structure of the building. Philosophy interpreted and illuminated, but it had not yet begun to question, the instinctive ruggedness of the Greek moral consciousness. In the work of the school of Phidias, the counsellor of Pericles in the field of art, we see visualized in objective characters a sereneness of mind which is the result of a fusion of self-reliance and beauty, of ruggedness and intelligence, of instinctive strength and profound self-control. This fusion of the old ancestral tradition and the new enlightenment gives a unique majesty of

mind to the art of this period. The fulness of life of the Three Fates, the profound repose of the Dionysus, show the characteristics of this age. The rugged, dynamic grandeur of Æschylus and the Anaxagorean intelligence have interpenetrated. The old emotional abandon and brute strength of the religious choral dance still contribute their power. But science and philosophy have given more ideal objects, wider intellectual meanings, to the old ancestral energies. We see this in the sculptured choral movements of the school of Phidias. When we behold the Demeter of Cnidus or the Aphrodite of Melos, we understand the statement which Aristophanes puts into the mouth of Æschylus that there was no instance of a woman in love in his dramas. The worship of Aphrodite in the thought of an Æschylus meant reverence for the mother of life. The Athenian citizen chose his wife as a free man; he was not a mechanical part of a Spartan military system. But Venus as the nucleus of a romantic sentimentalism was not yet enthroned in the minds of the Greeks.

The theory that thought was a copy of some ideal standard existing beyond experience had not arisen. There was no dualism of life and action, soul and body, thought and reality, the ideal and the actual. This was born later in the reflective ferment of the Socratic age. Language had not become an algebraic symbolism of abstract speech. Homer was always set to music. The Greek drama was a part of "music." When Wagner set his philosophy to music, giving us logic and rhythm as aspects of one underlying art, he reincarnated the spirit of Sophocles. Greek thought

had not abstracted itself from life; it imaged experience in a concrete way. Thought was a piecing out in imagination of an incomplete experience; it was an ideal anticipation of reality. The gods were not ideal constructions which were "believed" to exist by the pious. They were personifications of the forces of nature. And nature included all that was human and divine. Nature meant what Nietzsche calls "golden nature." Ideas had not become the pure timeless and spaceless universals of Plato's Phaedo. They were instruments through which the mind controlled the world of men and things. We do not see in the sculptured figures of Phidias a soul imprisoned in a body. Muscles and mind, hands and feet and brain, feeling and will and thought, are all working together to produce a marvelous spontaneousness and fulness of life. Civilization has been made possible because the human mind has elaborated and operated with universal ideas. The mathematics, physics, ethics, drama, and art elaborated by the Greek mind laid the basis of western knowledge. The form given to the family, property, the state, and religion by the intelligent organization of behavior and sentiment and thought, especially among the Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans, practically constituted western civilization. Behind this world of form and order was chaos. The Doric, Ionic, and Corinthian columns, whose forms are still the axioms of architectural thought; the Parthenon, even in its ruins, the figures from the frieze of the Parthenon, the winged victories, the Hermes of Praxiteles, have become the universal forms and canons and standards of civilization. The poetry of Homer, the drama of Sophocles, have given

classic form to language and sentiment. These forms, as Aristotle declared, lifted the mind to the level of the good life.

When in the Crito Socrates is implored to flee from prison through the aid of his friends, he replies that he hears the laws of the state saying to him: "Was it not through our authority that your father received your mother in marriage and gave you life? Have we not nurtured and educated you and given you a share in the good things of life? We do not harshly require obedience; all matters are open for discussion. Have you not pledged your loyalty by remaining as a citizen throughout your life? If you break this tacit agreement, what good will result from all your discourses on justice?" Men can enjoy the new Socratic freedom only in the institution of the state; and it was the purpose of the Republic to show how this could be achieved. Religion, music, education, industry, the family, war, government, are all examined in the light of the Socratic reason. The Orphic emphasis on the inner life puts the state on a basis of volition and free self-expression in place of the old basis of tradition and kinship. Indeed, Plato's state is the institutional expression of the inner psychological structure of the individual himself. The nature of the state and the constitution of the individual are shown to be the objective and the subjective aspects of one and the same experience.

Plato and Aristotle belong to the fourth and not to the fifth century. They are rationalists. Each incarnates in a philosophic school an ideal of life which cannot be contained within the limits of the traditional

city-state. Plato confesses that his ideal state can exist only in heaven. Aristotle's royal pupil, Alexander, brought to an end the period of the Greek city-state by establishing a world-empire. If Plato's conscience centered in heaven, Aristotle is too cosmopolitan and too individualistic to feel any longer at home in the old order of things. Nevertheless, Plato, in his *Republic,* and Aristotle, in his Politics, give us a loyal and sympathetic interpretation of the classical ideal of the city-state.

In the second book of Plato's *Republic,* Socrates is unable to convince his friends that justice is better than injustice. "Therefore," says Socrates, "since I am not a clever person, I think we had better adopt a mode of inquiry which may be thus illustrated. Suppose we had been ordered to read small writing at a distance, not having very good eyesight, and that one of us discovered that the same writing was to be found somewhere else in larger letters, and upon a larger space, we should have looked upon it as a piece of luck, I imagine, that we could read the latter first, and then examine the smaller and observe whether the two were alike. Perhaps, then, justice may exist in larger proportions in the greater subject, and thus be easier to discover; so, if you please, let us first investigate its character in cities; afterwards let us apply the same inquiry to the individual, looking for the counterpart of the greater as it exists in the form of the less" (Trans. of Davies and Vaughan). Looking at this problem of ethics from the point of view of the state, a very definite perspective is immediately disclosed. Each individual has his own type of inclination and

capacity, but his needs are indeed many. The natural endowments of some predispose them toward intellectual pursuits; some are by nature better endowed for manual labor. Hence a division of labor is necessary for any form of developed human life; and this principle Plato makes the basis of organized society. The workman cannot make his own tools, if they are to be good ones. In the same way, some will serve the state with their own special gifts as legislators and some as soldiers. In other words, according to the first four books of the *Republic,* the virtues are unintelligible, except as viewed in relation to the city-state. There are no virtues in the abstract; there are no individual minds as such. Individuals are to be made happy only in so far as they are organic parts of a city-state which functions as a social unit. Artisans, merchants, soldiers, and legislators must have just those virtues which their functioning in the social whole demands. No painter of portraits would paint the eyes purple rather than black, because purple eyes are more beautiful than black eyes. Rather "by giving to every part what properly belongs to it, we make the whole beautiful." If farmers wore long robes and put golden coronets on their heads, if potters plied their trade reclining on soft couches, the farmer would be no farmer, the potter would be no potter. On such a basis, no profession would maintain its proper character. "We should examine then whether our object in constituting our guardians should be to secure to them the greatest possible amount of happiness, or whether our duty, as regards happiness, is to see if our state as a whole enjoys it, persuading or compelling these our auxiliaries and

guardians to study only how to make themselves the best possible workmen at their own occupation, and treating all the rest in like manner, and thus, while the whole city grows and becomes prosperously organized, permitting each class to partake of as much happiness as the nature of the case allows to it."

The virtues which Socrates and his friends are unable to define in the individual stand out in large characters in the city-state. Some members of the city have unusual intellectual ability; they furnish the thinkers and legislators. They have the virtue of wisdom. Others are endowed by nature with a strong sense of loyalty and with exceptional energy of spirited emotion or energy of action. This class exemplifies the virtue of courage; they constitute the military defense of the state. The rest of the state is composed of the working classes, whose chief moral virtue is temperance. Justice is that moral characteristic of the city-state which arises when the conduct of all classes is coördinated through the wisdom of the thinking class.

The four cardinal Greek virtues cannot even be understood in terms of "the individual." They imply an organic relation of the individual to the state. They presuppose rank, order, perspective, both in the individual and in the individual's relation to society. Wisdom, the chief virtue, is the organizing center not only of the individual mind but of the individual's relation to the social order. The good citizen must be a good soldier, a fair judge; he must know how to vote intelligently on matters which concern the state. Freedom to the Greek was not a theoretical presuppo-

sition but the result of masterful achievement. Only the state saved the individual from the wild, outlawed condition of unorganized savage life. The ill-constituted perished because the only right to life came through the state and the state needed the best.

Having found the four fundamental virtues, temperance, courage, wisdom, and justice, written in large letters in the very constitution of the state, Plato turns to the individual to see if the fundamental virtues discovered in the state apply equally well to the individual. And, says Plato, "if we should find something different in the case of the individual, we will again go back to our city, and put our theory to the test." Perhaps by considering the individual and the state at the same time "and rubbing them together" the truth may flash out from their contact, like fire from two sticks of wood!

Turning to the individual, then, Plato finds the same four fundamental virtues which he found in the state. There are in all minds sensuous desires, the desire for food and drink. In this lower world of sensation and desire the cardinal virtue is of course temperance. Higher than this mental level of sensation is the realm of spirit or spirited emotion. Its virtue is courage. Highest of all is reason with its corresponding virtue of wisdom. And just as in the state, so in the individual, when the spirited or willing element of the mind fights the battles of the reason, and when the sense life is organized by the reason, then we have a just or righteous individual person. Hence the divisions of the mind and their respective virtues correspond to the divisions of the state and their vir-

tues. Individual morality is in no way separable even in thought from political morality. The individual and the state are correlative aspects of one unbroken experience. They are the inner and the outer, the individual and the institutional, phases of life. They are the same experience looked at from two different points of view.

Now the psychology of the individual mind sheds a new light on Plato's theory of the state. We were told by Plato that the state does not exist in order that any individual or class of individuals may be happy; each individual or class of individuals is to secure just so much happiness as is compatible with a proper functioning in the state. This sounds like another way of saying that the state exists for itself and not for individuals. But when we turn to the psychological side of the matter we see that what is best for the state is best for the individual also, for "every individual ought to have some one occupation in the state, which should be that to which his natural capacity is best adapted."

The theory of the Greek city-state is set forth in scientific terms in Aristotle's *Politics*. The book lacks all the graces of Plato's literary style; it is cold and dry. On the other hand, it is direct; it is scientific; it goes to the very root of the Greek theory of the state.

There is, says Aristotle, in all persons, a natural tendency to associate with others. This tendency is deeper than the volition and conscious reasoning of the individual mind; it is inherent in the constitution of human nature. It is deeper still; it is an expression in the human mind of a purpose or plan of nature

herself. For the real nature of a thing, according to Aristotle, cannot be discovered by an analysis into its constituent, or material parts. We can understand anything when we can discover its purpose or end. We cannot understand human nature by going back to some primordial stuff, to some grouping of material atoms. The nature of anything can be understood only in terms of its final cause. Only when we see trees or animals or men at their best—only when we see the underlying purpose of things—can we be said to understand their nature.

Applying this theory to man, Aristotle tells us that since man can be at his best, since man can live a life of real moral worth only within the state, it follows that man's self-realization, man's real "nature," can come to light only as he functions as a member of the state. The individual and the state, in the mind of Aristotle, are correlative terms; the one can be defined only in and through the other. This means that the individual instead of being fixed in his nature independently of the state will find his "nature" actually varying according to the way in which he functions as a member of the state. A man might live as a brute, Aristotle admits—even this would be denied by many today—merely as an isolated individual; but a life of real worth, that is to say, a human life, can be lived only within and through the state. A good life, according to Aristotle, includes wealth, beauty, knowledge, health, and leisure, and these things are possible only within an organized political state.

PART II

THE DISASSOCIATION OF THE CONSCIENCE FROM THE FIRST EMPIRE

A

The Disassociation of the Greek Conscience from the Old Ethnic Order

CHAPTER X

DISASSOCIATION IN SOCRATES AND EURIPIDES

In the satires of Aristophanes the older ideals are seen in strong contrast to the new. Formerly men were of strong physique, and heroic in duty to the city-state in peace and war. Æschylus sang the love of country. The virtues were social in character, such as endurance in war, devotion to family, the giving of wealth to equip galleys for war. Heroes were men of action. Now, under the leadership of dramatists like Euripides and philosophers like Socrates, men think and do not act. The new virtues are individual in character, such as intellectual analysis and wit. Private wealth has taken the place of sacrifice in war; romantic love has superseded devotion to the family; discussion has taken the place of action. Men cultivate strong bodies for athletic display, not for service of the state. Instead of the symmetrically developed men of action, Aristophanes sees paunchy, puffing gentlemen sitting with Socrates, spinning out fine phrases and wrestling with fine-drawn quibbles.

In Plato's Apology Socrates states that he left the sphere of public life with its political parties, its demands of trained speech in the assembly, its military duties, because he could not have survived in public

life without sacrificing the fundamental principles of his teaching. He therefore dealt privately, he says, with individuals. Men do not want to examine themselves; they do not want to be continually under obligation to give an account of their lives.

This means that Socrates practically worked outside the official organization of the city-state. In the old days one could survive only through the state, but Socrates finds that to depart from the voice of conscience is worse than many deaths. No evil, he says, can happen to a good man. The soul in Socrates is bigger than the old city-state. He became the spokesman of an inner world which made itself independent of the foundations of the state. The city-state, by excluding Socrates, proved itself to be external to the newer inner life.

The moral supremacy of the reason speaking through Socrates brought to an end the external authority of the gods and the blood bond of the old ethnic morality. This was the greatest definite advance in the moral life of the race; it was the first great turning point in the evolution of human conduct. It was paralleled by Buddhism in India and the rise of the doctrine of individual responsibility in Deuteronomy, in Jeremiah, and in Ezekiel. A new moral order stood face to face with the old; the morality of kinship and custom was opposed to a newer ideal independent of birth, the morality of the "heart" and the will. When Solon, according to Plutarch, told Crœsus that being fabulously wealthy was inferior to being loyal to one's place in society, being the father of good children, owning a competent estate, and dying

valiantly for one's country, he voiced the ideal of the old Greek morality. How different, on the other hand, is the ideal set forth in the speech of Alcibiades in Plato's Symposium in which we are told that Socrates ignored beauty, wealth, and honorable station, and made men care for the needs of their soul! Out of a background of philosophic criticism, political reformation, and the growth of a religion of personal experience, we see looming upon the horizon of history a new moral order,—an order resting not on birth and "status" but on individual experience and achievement. The movement of enlightenment which culminated in the Socratic teaching did for the ethical thought of Greece what the teaching of the later prophets did for the moral development of Israel. It substituted will and reason for force and tradition; it brought the individual to self-consciousness; it disclosed the principles of objective morality within the individual's inner constitution and in this way replaced the older ethnic morality with a reflective morality as universal as the race itself. In the teaching of Socrates the old moral order was brought face to face with a new world. The Greek moral consciousness had outgrown its childhood of tradition and authority; it had reached the stage of racial adolescence. Blind obedience to a patriarchal family, a patrician city-state, a racial religion, was a thing of the past.

There is another great seer whose name Greek history has associated with that of Socrates; we refer to the great dramatist Euripides. In Æschylus the individual is thoroughly unified with the spirit of the state. The Greek soul, in the dramas of Æschylus, is at home

in the life of the city-state at its best. In Sophocles conflicts arise between the individual and the state. In Antigone, for example, the mind is torn with loyalties that are mutually antagonistic. The demands of the city-state conflict with the inner conscience of the individual. The inner conscience is declared to be higher than the voice of the state. In Euripides this struggle has been passed; the inner conscience is supremely independent of the old order of things. Euripides speaks of the delight of sitting alone and musing, which he calls a "deadly happiness." This quality in Euripides is responsible for his being called an individualist. Like Jeremiah he is given to introspection. He insists as did the Hebrew prophet on the distinction between the heart and outward deeds. In his Clouds Aristophanes states the case for Euripides by saying that Euripides taught the Athenians to think things through. Formerly folk were unsuspecting and religious in a conservative fashion. Each was "happy in his sheep-like way." Euripides taught not so much loyalty to the state as happiness and lofty friendship. During a pitiable crisis in his affairs the Hippolytus of Euripides exclaims:

> Would I could stand and watch this thing, and see
> My face, and weep for very pity of me!

And here is the essence of Euripides' teaching. The Greek mind in Euripides turns in on itself; it outgrows the old city-state. The soul of Euripides is too cosmopolitan, too individual, too universal, to be at home in the old order. How free and untrammeled

is the movement of the mind in the following words:[1]

> Whoe'er can know
> As the long days go,
> That to live is happy, hath found his Heaven!

How different is this world from that of Æschylus! How far from the traditional Greek patriarchal family the sympathies of Euripides are may be seen in the fact that woman is spoken of in his lines as a deadly thing, as a "poison-flower"! In the old days to bring a second wife into the home was not only proper but for the sake of offspring might be a moral duty since each individual has his or her being only in and through the patriarchal family system. But Euripides has his Theseus assure his wife that no other woman shall take her place when she is dead. The Orphic idea of purity, of abstinence from the eating of flesh, finds a voice in Euripides.

Of course Euripides was called an individualist.

> 'Sprang there from thy father's blood
> Thy little soul all lonely?

exclaims the Nurse to Phædra who is helplessly struggling with the darts of Aphrodite! In other words, are your gods, she asks, other than those that rule in the common human breast? Full of thyself as ever, with no thought of them that gave thee birth, exclaims Theseus to his son Hippolytus. How different from the old days when golden speech was the medium of a glorious public consciousness are the words of Hip-

[1] The quotations from Euripides are from Gilbert Murray's translation of the Bacchæ and the Hippolytus.

polytus who exclaims to his father that one can speak best only to the few that one knows well and that tongues which sound like music to the multitude are rude to the ears of the wise!

There was, to be sure, a universal city of reason in Euripides' writings to take the place of the old city-state, but this was a totally unexplored country to those who did not understand. And those who did not understand were the majority. Such lines as these:

> Thebes hath o'er me no sway!
> None save Him I obey,
> Dionysus,—

seemed to indicate a destructive individualism or at best a mysticism which would leave the old world of institutions to crumble into dust. To say, as Euripides does say, that we are all Love's brethren because born of one mother, Aphrodite, gives us a new god, under an old name, and a new conception of human brotherhood.

> The God no line hath told
> To mark what man shall dance, or young or old;
> But craves his honors from mortality
> All.

Here we have a humanitarian, universal, cosmopolitan, point of view. In Socrates and Euripides a dreamy, far away look came over the face of Greek thought. Aristophanes portrayed Socrates as living among the clouds. Socrates, so it was reported, used to stand for hours rooted to one spot in profound meditation. Dialectic pursuit of truth for truth's sake, the search for truth as an end in itself, took the place of the

older philosophic method which tested all philosophy by its effect on the city-state.

The unity of Æschylus' ideal that the Greeks should live

> Each to all lending
> And hating one-hearted the foe! (Eumenides, Blackie's Trans.)

is weakened by discords even in the dramas of his younger contemporary Sophocles. The moral and religious loyalty and faith of Æschylus saw all human conflicts reconciled. In Sophocles the traditional virtues are in open conflict with the newer inner conscience of the individual. Antigone buries her dead brother because her conscience leads her to defy the law of the state in whose eyes her brother is an outcast.

This changed point of view is reflected in the masterpieces of Greek art. If the philosophy of life of Æschylus and Pericles is portrayed in the statues of Phidias, so in like manner is the view of Euripides and Socrates chiseled into the marble forms of Praxiteles. The dreamy reverie, the subtlety of intellect, the abstracted gaze, of the Hermes of Praxiteles, reveal the change which has come over Greek thought and life since the days of Pericles and Phidias. The overhanging brow and deep-set eye of Praxiteles' Hermes is the symbol of the new life of meditation which the Socratic philosophy had brought into the Greek world.

The world of Plato was an objective, realistic world. It was interpreted in terms of ideas or universal essences. But the ideal personality—Socrates—

into which Plato injected the new ideal was given the cup of death by the representatives of the old régime. Hence it was natural that the heart of Plato should in the Phædo go out toward an Orphic world of pure thought which could be apprehended only by the intellectually elect. This is the explanation of the tendency in Plato to define the soul as belonging to a world of pure form which had no essential connection with the family, with property, with the state.

The way in which the Platonic forms tended to disassociate the will from the concrete objectives of the older ethnic order is illustrated in Plato's treatment of love. In the older tradition love was built around some object, wife, child, etc. But Platonic love is a universal form. It is not a love of particular persons. Love is universalized. The gymnasium had generated an affection between youths. Platonism in universalizing the feeling of love made it independent of woman. Love became detached from its normal object. When the affect or feeling became universalized one loved not the object or person; one loved love itself. Love became a universal form or essence. Platonic love therefore undermined the traditional bond which linked the citizen with wife and child.

In the older ethnic régime a determining form was paramount. There was limitation, quality, a dominant tradition. There was the pathos of exclusion. Every free individual was a citizen; he was a public character. He lived in the army, in the courts, at the theaters, in the public baths. His mind was directed to socially recognized objects. In the age of Pericles these objectives of the will were enriched by a mar-

velous development of individual intelligence in such characters as Sophocles, Phidias, and Democritus. But post-Socratic Greek thought, like post-Exilic Hebrew thought, exhibited a growing detachment and dissociation of mind and heart from the traditional cultus. What were the reasons for this estrangement?

There must have been many causes of this dissociation. We will name four. The deepening of the mind through culture tends of itself to weaken the directness of the will. Ideas always outrun fact. Slavery favored the development of ideals divorced from active intercourse with the physical world. Then there was the conflict of the newer conscience with the traditional state. And there was the influence in the West of Oriental thought. The Greeks kept Persia out. Marathon was fought in 490 and Salamis in 480. But the Persian ideas of guardian angels, spirit, purification, heaven, and immortality were let into Europe by Alexander's conquest of Persia.

In the history of the Hebrew people the destruction of the Hebrew state by the great world powers, Babylon, Persia, Greece, and Rome, brought about the differentiation of what, in modern phraseology, we term Church and State. The prophet, the sage, the priest, who represented the real conscience of the Hebrew people, were not so directly connected with the public or political life as before the Exile. The Wisdom Literature did not address itself to "Israel" but to individuals; the law finally came into the hands of the Pharisees, who openly yielded politics to the dominant world-power on condition that a religion of

the ceremonial type be left free; and even prophecy was compelled to change its spirit by becoming apocalyptic, that is by looking toward a miraculous interposition. The old unity of life had in fact given place to two worlds. The world of the state had become secular; it was controlled by foreign armies; it was subject to force. The world of religion and morals, on the other hand, falling into the hands of sects or parties, such as the Pharisees and Essenes, became more and more differentiated from the field of the state. All the old city-states were poured into the melting pot of Alexander's world-empire; and the same thing happened in Greek thought which had been going on for centuries in Jewish thought. As the Jewish Exile produced its Jeremiah, its Job, its Wisdom writings, its Priestly Law; as the Exile produced its philosophy, its ethics, its religion, of the inner life; so did the conflict of the morality of reflection with the old ethnic morality, the martyrdom of Socrates, the world-empire of Alexander, produce its philosophy, its ethics, its religion, of the inner life. Cynicism, eclecticism, scepticism, Epicureanism, Stoicism, individualism, world-citizenship, cosmopolitanism, were the ideals which men used to keep themselves afloat in the shipwreck of the old ethnic cultus. The old world-order was slowly passing away; a new moral order was even more slowly coming into existence.

Nietzsche is right in his statement (in his *Early Greek Philosophy*) that the Greek philosophers after Plato were "founders of sects and the sects founded by them are all institutions in direct opposition to the Hellenic culture and the unity of its style prevailing up

to that time. In their way they seek a redemption, but only for individuals or at the best for groups of friends and disciples closely connected with them."

After the death of Socrates, at the beginning of the fourth century, Athens was slowly surrendering her political leadership of the West for an even greater intellectual supremacy. In the fifth century, under the leadership of Pericles, the thought of Athens had as its prime function the organization and improvement of the civilization of the city-state. The typical Greek mind in the age of Pericles went out toward its world, toward the family, the state, the world of nature, in a positive and creative spirit. This was shown in the Doric and Ionic types of architecture, and in the statuary of the fifth century. When the mind is reorganizing its world, when it is recreating its social and material environment, it can have no doubts about itself. It knows itself to be real because it has a consciousness of power, because its ideals are being realized in objective ends. But this mental outlook on life does not exist in the fourth century. There is doubt, suspense, self-consciousness, introspection. The mind looks askance at its world. The will does not go through to the old social objectives.

It seems to be growing clearer that the elements of thought which distinguish the later more "spiritual" type of philosophy from the earlier ethnic type were imported into Greek (and Hebrew and Roman) thought from the Orient. The Pythagorean doctrine regarding number and form may have come from the Orient. This doctrine explains Plato's emphasis on mathematics. The doctrine that virtue is knowledge

is intelligible if virtue, like truth and goodness, is a pure form. Such pure knowledge is possible only in heaven when the mind is set free from the body. This Orphic doctrine that our earthly life is a fall from a purer world is certainly Oriental. The Persians regarded the sun as the source of purity. Fire, air, water, and earth mark the grades of the descent of the soul to earth. Socrates was thoroughly in earnest when he described himself as an intellectual midwife for no one, Socrates said, really lives until he is reborn. This is why Socrates at his death sends a cock to Asklepios because death will cure him of the disease of life. This is why before his death, like the swan, Apollo's bird, Socrates has clearer intuitions, being about to be freed from the prison of the body. Philosophy is a preparation for death. The function of music is to purify the soul. Socrates' insistence on the idea that no evil can come to a good man, that Anytos (or any statesman) can do him no harm, really means —although he never says so—that the state is not an essential part of himself. His contention that his friends will not bury him because they cannot catch him means that he himself is a pure form or divine idea. His daimonion, or demon, with its guiding voice, suggests the Persian idea of angels or guardian spirits. Instead of struggling to obtain knowledge, the love of knowledge seems to possess him as an ecstasy or a frenzy. This phenomenon is connected with that of his demon.

Now these ideas, the fall, rebirth, purification, union with a god, a guardian spirit, that life is a dying and dying is the beginning of life, that the soul cannot be

harmed, whether they be Socratic or Platonic, or both, are, no matter what the channel was through which they came into Greek thought, decidedly Oriental ideas. And what Socrates and Plato learned from the Pythagorean and Orphic mysteries, the whole Mediterranean world could learn when Alexander's conquest opened the way between the Orient and the West. Plato has much to say about death; so have Epicurus and Lucretius. In the case of Paul and Augustine the idea of death is an obsession. Perhaps the greatest single influence in the change from the earlier ethnic ideal to the new inner empire of the "spirit" is this new influx of Oriental thought.

CHAPTER XI

DISASSOCIATION IN THE CYNICS AND THE STOICS

Antisthenes (–366? B.C.) was the favorite pupil of Socrates. He brought into strong relief a certain phase of his master's teaching. Certain things present in Socrates were reduced to a system of defense against the world. These characteristics, independence of the world through the self-sufficiency of reason, endurance, apathy, contempt of pleasure, were woven into the philosophy of Cynicism. Nothing can deprive a man of virtue which is the only good. Thought is an impregnable fortress against the world.

In Antisthenes the will definitely disassociates itself from the classical social order. A good man, Antisthenes said, is better than a relative. He expressed contempt for wealth and noble birth. He was a cosmopolite. He taught that the only true government was knowledge and not the laws of the state.

Antisthenes was opposed to even civilization itself. Civilization is artificial. It is built upon wants and desires. What is needed, however, is not control over, but independence of, wants and desires.

Like all the disciples of Socrates he remained aloof from the physical sciences. Like his master he aimed to arrive at truth through dialectic, not through the manipulation of behavior or of physical objects.

The Cynic mind was more definitely introverted than the Cyrenaic mind, for the Cynic regarded pleasure and pain as binding the mind to objects, to things. The Cynic attempted to be independent not only of things, of objects, but of pleasures and pains as well.

Diogenes, the Cynic, pupil of Antisthenes, died, tradition said, in 323 on the day of Alexander's death. At the battle of Chaeronea, in 388, Philip defeated the Athenians and Boeotians and Diogenes was carried off as a spy. As the régime of the classical city-state was passing, the individual attempted through his reason to make himself omnipotent. According to Diogenes, the individual and not the state exists; virtue is the only good, and the contempt of pleasure is the truest pleasure.

When Diogenes was asked as to the time to marry, his answer was: For the young it is not yet time to marry; for the old it is no longer the time to marry. As to the state, the sage is the only king and he illustrated his self-rule by saying that Aristotle breakfasts when it pleases Philip, Diogenes breakfasts when it pleases Diogenes. His attitude toward property corresponded to his attitude toward the family and the state. Seeing a boy drinking out of his hands, he threw away his cup. He lived without a house in order that he might be free to move about.

Zeno (336–264) as a philosopher taught in the porch at Athens. In his youth Alexander was conquering the East and opening a way for the influx of Oriental thought. The independent city-states of Athens, Sparta, and Thebes no longer existed.

Zeno was born in Citium, in Cyprus, which was in-

habited by Greeks and Phœnicians. His father was a merchant and traveled from Tyre to Athens. He went to Athens and studied with Crates, the successor of Diogenes.

Zeno systematized the philosophy of the Cynics. In the Academic view certain things other than virtue were good. To the Cynic everything but virtue was indifferent. To the Stoic nothing but virtue was a good, but some things other than virtue, had a certain advantage. Wealth and health, for example, were not good, but they had a certain advantage. However, he can make the best use of wealth who needs it least.

Like Plato, Zeno wrote a Republic, but Zeno's citizens do not belong to a city-state; they are citizens of the world. There is one good, virtue; and there is but one class of citizens, wise men. The laws to be obeyed are not the conventional laws created by society, but the laws of nature.

The wise will have wives but will mate as they please. To some Stoics all sex relations except for the purpose of offspring were licentious. But Zeno was the pupil of Crates, and Crates' wife was the cultivated Hipparchia, who coöperated with her husband in the teaching of the stoic philosophy.

In opposition to the Socratic tradition, Zeno incorporated in his philosophy the theory of atoms of Democritus. From Persia he accepted the idea of a living and divine fire. Air, like fire, tends to rise from the earth, because it is higher and purer in nature. Earth and water are heavy and less divine. But all matter is alive.

In the Stoicism of Epictetus there is a tendency to

return to the simplicity of the Cynic. Epaphroditus, the master of Epictetus, was an officer of Nero's imperial guard. He assisted Nero in killing himself when he fled from Rome, for which service he was put to death by Domitian. Epictetus left Rome in 89 and went to Nicopolis in Epirus to teach when the philosophers were banished by Domitian. He died in 130. The relations of Seneca to Nero give one a sickening account of the adjustment or lack of adjustment between philosophy and politics. This history helps us to understand what Epictetus says concerning the state. Because, he says, the foot is a part of the body, it must step into mud or upon thorns, or it must even be cut off for the good of the body. In the same way man is not a unit; he is a part of the state, which is a whole. Therefore a man must be sick, must run into danger, and sometimes must die prematurely for the sake of the state. Seneca went through self-inflicted torture in committing suicide at Nero's command. And there are indications of bodily torture in the pages of Epictetus.

Under such circumstances, what should a Stoic do? Epictetus' answer is that one must get the right principle before he acts. And by the right principle he means that only the will is a good and what cannot be willed is indifferent. People have been in the habit of thinking that when their bodies are injured or their property or their state is damaged they suffer real harm, but when any harm has been done to the will or the mind there is little loss. We think of things as important; we think the will important only in lecture rooms. But the truth is just the opposite of this.

Achilles was ruined not when he lost his mistress, but when he forgot that he went to Troy, not to get mistresses but to fight. Menelaos was ruined not because he lost Helen, but because he did not know that it was a gain to lose such a wife. The real man does not perish in the loss of external things. This has been demonstrated in the life of Diogenes. He was free because he had cast off all the handles by which any one could lay hold on him. If you had seized his property, or his body, or his friends, or his country, you would not have grasped him. He had everything loosely hanging to him. His true parents, the gods, and his true country, the reason of Zeus, no one could take from him. He lived more happily without property, house, fine clothing, than those who had these things. Wealth did not make Crœsus happy, nor did political power make Agamemnon happy, nor did beautiful Helen make Menelaos happy. No one with all his wealth, his noble birth, his political power, is free if he calls anything but his inner will "master." In the world in which he lived, body, beauty, clothing, family, property, the state, were all beyond the power of the will as the Stoic understood the will. But this inner will, this inner reason of Zeus, is greater than all the objective interests of the old order. The only good life consists in being free to follow this inner reason. A life which can be impeded by obstacles, whether a fever or the will of Cæsar, is not a good life. The Stoic has found, says Epictetus, that the only way to be free is to declare everything to be external and indifferent which is beyond the control of the will. This is the Stoic's wall of defense behind which he

defends himself. The citizen of the old order had his house and his shut door guarded by his servant. This inner reason of Zeus is the citadel and the wall of defense and guardian of the Stoic. And why should one long for the old externals, like the Acropolis, the gymnasia, the statues of Phidias, when he carries within himself the universal reason which administers the whole?

Whoever is subject to externals is a slave; he must embrace his master's knees and groan. Life is indifferent; the way we live is not indifferent. There is no philosophy which will prevent one's being cast into prison by superior force, but philosophy can prevent the desire for the things which are subject to such tyranny. Masters are formidable through the control of the things which men desire. Remove the desire and the power of the masters is gone.

Does Epictetus then teach opposition to kings? By no means. The things over which Cæsar has control —life, the body, the family, property, the state—are not in the control of the Stoic's will. They are therefore indifferent; they are external. The Stoic makes no claim to the things over which Cæsar has power. The reason given us by Zeus is subject to no compulsion not even from himself. Hence this reason in us is not inferior to the gods. Cæsar has no control over the will. In this sphere Zeus has set men free. The things in Cæsar's power, death, pain, etc., are masks; when we look them in the face, they do not bite. And, besides, the exit from life is always open.

When men go to Olympia to see the statue of Phidias they can endure rain or a scorching sun, noise

and clamor, and go without proper means of bathing because they are beholding a god. But every man has within himself the image of Zeus. Zeus, like a good king and a true father, has put his divine faculty of reason in our power. Because of this god within us, we are able to bear whatever may happen. Here is an inner divine mind which gives the Stoic standing ground in his attack on the old order. The reason of Zeus does for Epictetus what Pythagoreanism and Orphism do for Socrates and Plato, what the Logos does for Philo, what the Platonic ideas do for Plotinus; it gives him strength through which to oppose a passing social order.

Stoicism is a militant philosophy. All can be happy. Every one can be a king. Each must train himself as an athlete trains himself for the games. One must watch oneself as one watches an enemy. Each must have his ruling principle in mind even in stretching out a finger. Who one's parents are, where one's city is, what one owns, are no longer the fundamentals in life. To find the reason of Zeus within oneself and to live in this divine power is the new ruling principle. Only as we find the good to be in this inner will is there a dependable basis for friendship and justice.

When we come to Marcus Aurelius we find the same general point of view as that of Epictetus, but there are things in Aurelius' philosophy which are not found in that of Epictetus. The social note is strong in Aurelius in contrast to the Cynic note in Epictetus. There is also a strong current of naturalism in Marcus Aurelius. Sometimes he seems to accept the view of Democritus and Epicurus. In many places he accepts

the doctrine of atoms, but interprets the atoms through a delightful hylozoism. The atoms are seminal principles. The body, like the soul, came from the deity. Matter and the air which have no sensation are held together by the intellectual principle. Death and generation and everything else in nature is as natural as the presence of juice in the fig-tree. We should drop like ripe fruit and thank the tree for the life we have had. All is alive; all is good; all is just. The universal nature changes into herself everything which appears to decay or to grow old, or to be useless. The ears of corn bending down, and the gaping jaws of wild beasts, and the foam which flows from the mouth of wild boars, the comeliness of an old man or an old woman, the loveliness of youth, give pleasure because they are consequent upon the things which are formed by nature.

But this delightful naturalism is not the predominant mood of Aurelius. The influence of the Orient, and particularly Persia, predominates more than the naturalism of Democritus. We are composed of four elements, the aerial and the fiery which tend upward, and the earthy and the watery which pull down the higher elements. The fiery element, which composes the sun and the stars, is the higher and purer part of the world. It composes the ruling principle in man which, when it discovers its own power, withdraws from the body, and does not mingle with the breath. This pure inner, ruling principle is our dæmon. It is the guardian of each soul. All except this ruling principle is ashes and smoke. The earthly body is the lowest grade of matter. It is corruption and death. Let

him who hates to die only consider with what he has to live. The poor body is blood and bone and nerves and seed; it is attached to us independently of our will. The elements above, below, all around, are in constant motion, but virtue is in none of these elements; it is something more divine. Here the Platonic ideas are higher than the Persian pure fire. We are poor souls bearing about corpses. We should never include the body as a part of ourselves. This is Aurelius' dominant mood, and when in this mood he tells us that we are not complex; we are not soul and body; our nature does not include the four elements; we are simple; we are only the higher, purer, rational element.

Sometimes Aurelius regards our ruling principle after the Persian fashion as a divine fire. Sometimes in the Platonic way he speaks of our ruling principle as the reason of Zeus. Zeus has given to every man a portion of himself. We are one with the deity because our reason is an efflux from the deity. Every man's intelligence is a god. Even if there be no order; if there be nothing but atoms and chance, the lamp of intelligence can shine in its full splendor until it is extinguished. But there is deity because we have him within ourselves. Therefore we may be unharmed by pain, uncontaminated by pleasure, untouched by insult, unmoved by passion. We are most ourselves in that quality wherein we differ from other creatures. Now the quality that differentiates us from all other animals is our reason. Therefore reason is our essence. Everything else is indifferent.

Intelligence gives all rational animals a common

nature, a common capacity for law. Reason, therefore, is the law of the most ancient city, not Athens, not Rome, but the city of Zeus, the world-state. Because we have a common reason we are all made for society. Whoever tears himself from other reasoning animals is guilty of mutiny. Philosophy taught Aurelius that there was one reason and therefore one law for all; and reason taught him that there was one polity in which all had equal rights and equal freedom. He says his adoptive father considered himself no more than any other citizen. Even in a palace a Stoic can live a virtuous life! "Take care," he says to himself, "that thou art not made into a Cæsar, that thou art not dyed with this dye." If a common law cannot make us equal, the elements themselves will do so. Alexander and his groom came to the same estate when they were dispersed among the atoms. The Stoic must be dutiful to the courts as a man must be dutiful to his stepmother. But one must constantly return to one's own mother who is philosophy through whom the courts become tolerable.

The core of Stoicism is in the doctrine that we should not attempt to change the objective world because it is external to, and beyond the power of, the will, and because the inner divine reason is self-sufficient and absolute. But there is another element in Aurelius' philosophy that makes for passivity. We refer to the notion, probably derived from Chaldæa, that there is a fate or necessity which determines everything. We are not creators in the drama of life; we are passively acting out an already determined play. Sometimes this idea in Aurelius sounds like

materialism, as when he tells us that moral qualities are not changed by praise, no more than an emerald or a flower. Sometimes we seem to be in the hands of fate. "Imagine every man who is grieved at anything, or discontented, to be like a pig which is sacrificed and kicks and screams. Like this pig, also, is he who on his bed in silence laments the bonds in which we are held. And consider that only to the rational animal is it given to follow voluntarily what happens; but simply to follow is a necessity imposed on all."

Since Aurelius wrote his *Meditations* for himself, he is under no obligation to be consistent. Along with his fatalism we find the same magnificent assertion of a triumphant will which we found in Epictetus. If anything is conformable to our nature it can be attained, not in some future social program, but by our very selves, and it can be attained now. If this were not true, says Aurelius, it would not be worth while to live. But the Stoic achieves his ideal not by introducing changes in the objective world, but by making absolute his inner world of reason. We should concern ourselves only with that which belongs to man as a rational being; the more we lose of everything else the better off we will be. Things do not touch the soul. They go by like birds in their flight, and to desire such things keeps the soul in constant perturbation. The Stoic learns to look upon the objects of life as he looks upon his dreams. "To the jaundiced honey tastes bitter and to those bitten by mad dogs water causes fear . . . Dost thou think that a false opinion has less power?" There must be impressions which correspond to our thought, but it is in our power

to fan our thought into such a flame that it mounts all the higher by the opposing material which it consumes. To the Stoic every possible object always presents itself as material for virtue. To bear nobly what seems to most people misfortune is to the Stoic a good fortune. Hindrance to sensation or to desire is an evil to our animal nature, but such hindrance is no impediment to our reason. When any event takes place, "add nothing thyself from within, and then nothing happens to thee."

We should pray the gods to give us the faculty of not fearing, of not desiring, of not feeling, pain. For these things are in our power. This is the only way to freedom. But to desire what is not in our power is to surrender freedom. We should control our minds and not attempt to control the world of things because this world is external to our wills and is not in our power.

Why does Aurelius, when he refers to the Christians, mention them unfavorably? The chief reason perhaps is to be found in the fact that the type of Christianity which conquered the world was not the Logos type of the Fourth Gospel but the mystery type of St. Paul. Aurelius follows the academic and not the mystical tradition in Greek philosophy. He lifts himself out of the old ethnic order not through ritual, not through emotion, but through cold, calm reason. On his return from the Orient he was initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries at Athens. His initiation however was probably a passive acceptance of religious ritual. He is absolutely true to the classical tradition in philosophy.

When we come to Plotinus in the third century (–269) we find a philosophy more Oriental than Greek. He was born in Egypt in 204. He studied in Alexandria. He visited the East, and in 243 he established a school at Rome.

The union of the soul and the body is an evil. Plotinus would not speak of his body or of his birthplace. He would not allow any portrait of himself to be made. It was bad enough to have a body without perpetuating its image. He would not even speak of his family. The function of philosophy was the purgation of the soul from the body. The barbarians were pouring in on the Empire. One should renounce his property, free his slaves, and refuse political office. True reality is beyond the world. The goal of philosophy is the identity of the soul with God. Plotinus at times reached this identity. In Plotinus one seems to be transplanted to India. The ideal is a mystical union of seer and seen in one undistinguishable reality. Ideas cease to be objective. The mind knows itself rather than objects. Indeed knowledge itself must be transcended, for the fall of the soul from God is produced by the subject seeing himself as an object. Family, property and state are now extraneous interests.

This is essentially the doctrine of the Upanishads, the orthodox philosophy of India. Ordinarily one sees another, one hears another, as another thing. But when one has become Brahma (God) there is no other outside oneself; one has become identical with the Absolute.

Goodness and temperance no longer mean a control

of sense and behavior. They mean the ability to be independent of bodily feelings. Courage means the loss of fear regarding the separation from the body.

In Plotinus an orientalized Platonism has brought about a complete disassociation of the mind from the classical pagan world.

CHAPTER XII

DISASSOCIATION IN THE CYRENAICS AND THE EPICUREANS

The founding of the Academy (about 380) and the Peripatetic school (about 350) were followed toward the end of the century by the Cyrenaics, the forerunners of the Epicureans, and the Cynics, the forerunners of the Stoics. These two opposing schools, the Cyrenaic and the Cynic, which grew out of the Socratic teaching, agreed in their indifference to the study of the objective sciences.

Aristippus of Cyrene (born about 435) held that we know only our sensations; we do not know the causes of our sensations. The object of life, therefore, to Aristippus is to grasp the pleasure as it goes by in the flux of time. This is no easy matter. How difficult was this extraction of pleasure from the flow of sensations may be inferred from the fact that the teaching of some of the Cyrenaics led to suicide. The Cyrenaics attempt to escape all the ties that bind the mind and the will to objective ends. The will no longer follows through to the old objects, wife, child, property, art, the state.

That the Cyrenaic philosophy is a defense reaction is evident from the saying of Aristippus: "Habeo, non habeor" (I possess, I am not possessed). The mind of

the Cyrenaic floats entirely free from the old ethnic objects and interests. It knows no objects. It knows only occurrences and these occurrences are painful and pleasurable sensations. In the language of modern psychology Aristippus attempts to abstract the pleasure element, which we now call the affect, from that total complex which includes a response of body and mind to some object. The Cyrenaic knows no object; he knows only subjective pleasures and pains. He commits his will to no objective world, physical or social. This is plainly a defense attitude.

The pleasure theory was worked out more systematically by Epicurus (341–270) who taught in his famous Garden at Athens. There was an attempt to get beyond the momentary pleasure of Aristippus. According to Epicurus "many pains are better than pleasures, when a greater pleasure follows them, if we endure the pain for a time." But the teaching of Epicurus is undoubtedly a philosophy of defense. He tells us that "those men enjoy luxury most completely who are best able to do without it;" that "everything which is natural is easily provided;" that to accustom oneself to simple habits renders one fearless with respect to fortune; that "the chief good is easily perfected and easily provided;" that "that which removes the pain which arises from want, and which makes the whole of life perfect, is easily procurable." Therefore we have no need of those things which can only be attained with trouble.

This defense character of Epicurus' philosophy is apparent in his treatment of death. Since the will of the Epicurean is disassociated from family and prop-

erty and state, since there is no going forth of the will into the traditional objectives of pagan life, there arises a painful loss of moral orientation. There is a nervous lack of perspective. This is the explanation of the feverish search for ataraxy, or undisturbedness. In the earlier ethnic cultus the individual identified himself with the ends of nature as she expressed them, through his coöperative will, in the family, in agriculture, in commerce, in state building, in art, in science. He was a part of a comparatively immortal life. But these objectives through which life was formerly enlarged were no longer vital. The old interests which had furnished objectives to the will were dead. The family was to be avoided. The state was to be absolutely eschewed. Friendship was emphasized because it was voluntary and because it seemed to be necessary for the individual's happiness. The old objects of the will were pulverized into pleasurable and painful sensations. The loss of objectives by frustrating the will forced the feelings and emotions to float free in a world of disoriented introspection. This is the explanation of the fears, the terrors, the mental confusion, mentioned by Epicurus. This is the explanation of every pleasure-pain philosophy. The will being detached from objective ends, pleasure and pain ceased to be elements in the reaction of the individual to his world. The mind was shut up in a world of pleasurable and painful sensations.

When life meant a realization of the will in all the richest possible objects of experience, pleasures and pains were incidental to the things done, the objects achieved. There was no dualism of inner and outer,

of mind and world. But the disassociation of the will from the family and the state, with its courts, its temples, produced an inner world which arrogated to itself an empire of its own. This "freedom of the body from pain and of the soul from confusion" is the Epicurean contribution to this inner empire.

This setting up of an inner world independent of the old ethnic world which rested on blood and land and nationality was a perilous undertaking. The army, heredity, sex, property, the state, were all on the other side. It is no wonder that the new pleasure philosophy was so difficult that it sometimes led to suicide. It required a new kind of courage to maintain this inner ideal of undisturbedness. This new inner ideal had to be absolute to enable it to overcome the older ethnic order. In the older régime if the individual failed or died the objective goods of life still endured. But the inner world of freedom from pain, of undisturbedness, has no objective support. To maintain such an inner empire of mind requires a terrible seriousness. The greatest danger to the new ideal is the ever-present threat of death. From Epicurus to Augustine the thought of death in the mind of the West was a veritable obsession. Even writers like Lucan, the nephew of Seneca, who could not believe in immortality experienced a painful sense of loss. To charm away this obsession was one of the chief tasks of Epicurus and of Lucretius (96–55 B.C.), his Roman interpreter. Since the end of our world threatens us momentarily, we must learn that there is no terror in ceasing to live. The insistence in Epicurus and Lucretius on the efficacy of their cure for this terror

is sufficient evidence of its failure. This is the formula: When death is, we are not; while we exist death does not exist. Therefore we are not at all concerned with death. Intense preoccupation of thought with death and immortality, in whatever type of philosophy it may be couched, is evidence of introversion of mind. A healthy organization by the will of the concerns of life precludes any morbid disassociation of the self from the objectives of life. To Homer and Hezekiah death was intolerable when it broke into the objective interests of the will. To Epicurus and Lucretius the fear of death was an intermittent obsession because the moral self, disassociated from the natural impulses toward life's objectives, was left in a condition of passive introspection.

When the intellect ceases to deal with the world as material for a reorganizing will—and the world is such material when civilizations are creative—the world seems to be independent of, seems even to run counter to, human concerns and interests. Such a situation predisposes the mind toward a mechanical theory of the world. A creative attitude of mind, such as we see in the sculpture, the architecture, the philosophy, the state-building, of the Athens of Pericles is incompatible with a mechanical theory of life. The mechanical explanation of the world given by Epicurus and Lucretius was due to their passive attitude of defense toward their world. When the will loses its nerve, when it loses its attitude of coöperation with nature, when thought becomes introspection, the world of nature, and even social institutions, seem to be in a condition of mechanical drift. A fearful, disorganized

will, by its very passivity and suspicion, allows a dualism to develop between the world of nature and any organizing human control.

But there was something new in the Epicurean philosophy. In the old ethnic ideal life was realistic; the mind went out so directly toward its customary objects that there was little awareness of motive and volition. They dared to do and die; they did not reason why. Epicureanism insisted that good conduct should make people happy; that men should not live under duties and loyalties to external objects. In this new discovery the mind lost its objectives. It thought of happiness, of pleasure, as a good separable from the objective ends of wife and child, farm and business and state-building. But it was a discovery just the same. The civilized mind can never again yield itself to painful external tasks and duties unless in the long run they make for happier lives. The old objectives can be willed again with freedom and power only when they have incorporated the elements of pleasure and happiness which were first focused for us by the philosophy of Epicurus.

B

The Disassociation of the Hebrew Conscience from the Old Social Order.

CHAPTER XIII

DISASSOCIATION AS REFLECTED IN THE PRIESTLY LAW

In the Babylonian Exile the Hebrews lost political control over their affairs; and this event marked a fundamental turning-point in the evolution of their moral and social ideals. It became clear that national salvation demanded a policy of political acquiescence, of subordination to the great world-powers. The petty governors of Judea were occasionally regarded as forerunners of the Messianic King, but more and more this political idea receded into the background. Set free from the old social order of the State, the Hebrew out of his very need began to create institutions that were not political. One of these institutions was the Priestly Law. It has been said that the Hebrews went to Babylon a nation and returned a church; but the change was not so sudden as this; the Priestly view was the outcome of a long growth. David made Jerusalem a national stronghold; Isaiah preached its inviolability; the Deuteronomic law of 621 made Zion the center of Hebrew religious life; Ezekiel in Babylon drew up a Priestly code of laws for the restored community of Zion. The Priestly codes cover the period from 600 to 400. Ezekiel's code (Chapters 40–48) was the beginning; he formulated the principles which afterwards became the basis of the

Priestly system. The importance of the priesthood and sacrifice (48:11); the holiness of Yahweh and the nation (36:20); the ritual distinction between clean and unclean (44:23), were all laid down by Ezekiel. In his ideal society the "prince" was merely a guardian of the temple! Ezekiel was thus the determining link between the Deuteronomic law of 621 and the Priestly law. There was the Holiness code of Leviticus (Chapters 17–26) (between 597 and 586, Kent); there was the Priestly Teaching;[1] and finally there was the Priestly Code proper, whose formulation began in Babylon about 500, and which in its completed form was brought from Babylon by Ezra, who together with Nehemiah secured its adoption by the Jewish Community about 400 B.C. (Neh. Chs. 8–10).

The Jews were subjugated by Assyria, by Babylonia, by Persia, by Greece, and by Rome; but it was their territory rather than their civilization that was conquered. Elijah withstood Canaan and her Baals; Deuteronomy was directed against the influence of Assyria over Manasseh; and the same policy of exclusiveness, with its doctrine of holiness, evolved the Priestly point of view. It was a protective measure against religious and social disintegration. Judaism incased itself in a hard shell of legalism, ritualism, ecclesiasticism; there was one place holier than other places, the temple; there was one ritualistic method of life,—other methods were profane. Nehemiah and Ezra denounced marriage with foreigners to the extent of driving the Samaritans off by themselves. It was

[1] Lev. 1-3; 5-7; 11-15; Numb. 5; 6; 15 and 19:14-22 (Kent).

against this Priestly exclusiveness that the book of Jonah was written; in the same way the book of Ruth was a protest against the Priestly attempt to annul foreign marriages. The ethical teaching of these two books is unexcelled in the Old Testament. Nevertheless when we see that Rome lives in her roads and her laws, that Greece lives in her philosophy and art; when we see that the Greek and Roman peoples ceased to exist because they lost their early sense of social and religious solidarity, we are prepared to see the protective value of the social and religious exclusiveness of the Priestly Law.

The Exile, culminating in the Priestly Law, was the means of differentiating Church and State among the Hebrew people. The Jews who were permitted by Cyrus to return to Zion in 538 were Persian subjects. Jewish governors like Zerubbabel and Nehemiah were only shadowy specters of kings like David and Josiah. David was high-priest as well as king; now the priest absorbed the remnants of civil power. The predominant idea of the old Hebrew order centered around the idea of a clan brotherhood; through the entire period from Moses to the Exile the conscience of the Hebrew was in the social order embodied in the State. The State was a divine institution; the conservatives in the days of Saul objected to a king on the ground that Jehovah was himself the head of his people. Moses and David, Elijah and Isaiah, were spokesmen of a national ideal. In the Exile all this was changed; Zion was no more; the outer, political order was gone; and there was left only the inner, moral and religious world over which the Hebrew had control. Then

arose, accordingly, that post-exilic form of Hebrew life which we call Judaism, a priestly type of life which was organized not for citizenship but for holiness. Foreign rulers having control over the State, the Jews gave their attention to "sacred" things, so that the state accordingly became a "secular" institution. Now the purpose of all this was good: it aimed at the integrity of Jewish life—just that at which Elijah and Deuteronomy had aimed. But here was a new way of attaining it absolutely opposed to the prophetic teaching. Isaiah (1:10-20), who was a statesman, warned his people against the priestly tendency. Amos was vehement on this point (5:21-25); Hosea (6:6) and Micah (6:7-8) preached mercy and justice and not sacrifice. Jeremiah was more explicit still (7:22,23; 31:33). But Ezekiel had marked out a new path; a separate ritualistic segment was marked out from the total circle of life which was regarded as good not with reference to the living unity of experience, not with reference to the family, or the state; it was good in itself. Goodness came to be a matter of ceremony and ritual. The old Hebrew conscience concerned all the affairs of life; now, having lost control of the State, Judaism made formal and exact the part of life left within its grasp; and into this formal, ritualistic side of life, with its emphasis on holiness, went the real conscience of the priestly development. In the pre-exilic period the prophet was the moral interpreter of the state; we need only mention Elijah and Amos and Isaiah. Through the entire period from Moses to the Exile the conscience of the Hebrew was in the social order, but the post-exilic priestly devel-

opment differentiated the religio-moral and the political aspects of life; the individual as a citizen, as a member of the state, was differentiated from the individual as a member of the religio-moral order. Zion was no more; the outer, political order was gone; morals and religion began to concern themselves with a special sphere in contrast to the wholeness and integrity of life. Montefiori (Hibbert Lectures, p. 510) admits that the ceremonial law kept Judaism from seeing that ritual had no moral value whatever, but he insists that Judaism never held that the Law had efficacy without morality. Nevertheless the Priestly Law mapped out for the religious life a sphere of experience outside the field of morality where the great prophets had agreed in placing it, and this differentiation in itself led to a form of ritualism indifferent to moral and social life. In this view of life, says Nietzsche, "every natural custom, every natural institution (the State, the administration of justice, marriage, the care of the sick and the poor), every demand inspired by the instinct of life, in short, everything that has a value in itself," the priest must denaturalize, or, in his language, "sanctify."

Now ritual has a place in the development of the moral life; the ideal of a Jeremiah, apart from some body of custom, is like the good intentions of an individual unsupported by a foundation of habit. Tribal ritual and taboo embodied group standards which were the earliest moral standards. Ritual and taboo, embodied in the priest, presented the institutional or social side of the moral life, just as the pure heart and will, embodied in the prophet, represented the

individual phase of conduct, and both aspects of morality are necessary to give balance and momentum to the intermittent volition of the individual.

Ritual is a form of custom; custom is the social equivalent of habit; habit is the foundation of the will. The higher morality of the prophets appealed to the individual's will; it was progressive. It looked to the future. But the morality of the prophets could never take the place of law, of custom, of tradition. The preservation of institutions is just as much a part of morality as the constant appeal to the heart and the individual conscience. The law guarantees honor to old age (Lev. 19:32). The law preserves the family and property. It is the law which forbids shrewd and selfish individuals to "join field to field" for their own purposes because the land is regarded as belonging to Yahweh (Lev. 25:23); that is to say: the land belongs to the individual only in so far as he shares the life of the community and the nation. This is the true function of the law,—to embody and to preserve those customs and institutions which lie at the foundations of society. At the same time, institutions and laws must be the objective embodiment of a growing and therefore a changing moral conscience. The law of the priest must be kept in vital touch with the inspiration of the prophet. But no such adjustment was possible between prophecy and the Priestly Law. It not only kept alive the old animistic view which regarded the blood as the life (Lev. 17:14) but it combined this view with the old notion of clan solidarity and made the blood of the sacrificial animal a substitute for the sin of the individual: "it is the blood

that maketh an atonement for the soul" (Lev. 17:11). Such a view flies in the face of all the great Hebrew prophets. To regard the blood of animals or the blood of one's first born as a substitute for righteous conduct had long ago become unthinkable to the prophets (Micah 6:6-8).

Montefiori is correct in asserting that the law did not regard ceremonial exactness as a moral standard apart from the morality of the prophets. The Law of Holiness (Lev. 17-26) contains the most advanced ethical ideal of the Old Testament. It is quoted by Jesus as one of the two fundamental laws: "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart . . . Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge, . . . but thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (Lev. 19:17,18). This is the very essence of the morality of the prophets. No one can minimize this fact. There is the highest Old Testament morality in the Priestly Law. But the point to which we are calling attention is the fact that ceremonial purity is not differentiated from moral purity; and this means that ritual and ceremonial observance is regarded as actually synonymous with moral right. There is such an emphasis on the idea of holiness that the Priestly Law seems more like a return to clan solidarity and animistic taboo than a step forward along the prophetic line of thought. A holy temple, a holy priesthood, a special mode of ritual, lead to the notion of a holy people who are "severed from other people" (Lev. 20:26). This is the ritualistic type of holiness of which Nietzsche speaks. It is this ritualistic distinction between clean and unclean which is repudiated by Jesus (Mark 7:15). It was

this legalistic type of holiness in contradistinction to the prophetic idea of righteousness which was developed by the Scribes and Pharisees. According to Charles, the authority of the Priestly Law was so powerful from the time of Ezra that no prophet again spoke in his own name. The little books of Ruth and Jonah are precious classics of humanism and cosmopolitanism. Their aim is to counteract the narrow particularistic ideal of the priestly movement. But they could get a hearing only under the guise of presenting traditional pre-exilic material. Their names and their atmosphere take the reader back to the old days. Only through this literary device could the inspirational, creative morality of the prophets express itself. Such was the authority of the Priestly Law from the middle of the fifth century. The true spirit of prophetic morality voices itself in Daniel, the later passages of Isaiah, in Second Zechariah, in some of the Psalms, in the Testaments of the XII Patriarchs. But all this literature is pseudonymous; even the Psalms must be attributed to David. So overwhelming is the influence of the Law! There are some astonishing words in Zechariah (13:2-6): "I will cause the prophets . . . to pass out of the land . . . When any shall yet prophesy . . . his father and his mother that begat him shall thrust him through . . . The prophets shall be ashamed every one of his vision . . . He shall say, I am no prophet, I am a husbandman." Do these words from the fourth century mean that prophetic vision has become not only meaningless but dangerous because there is one supreme holy Law which looks to the past and not to the future? In

Joel (fourth century) a holy Jerusalem (3:17) and solemn fasts and assemblies (2:15) are not incompatible with the morality of the heart (2:13) and prophecy and dreams and visions (2:28). Priestly ritual and prophetic righteousness are here on equal terms. Nevertheless, in the hands of the scribes and Pharisees the Law came to be the ruling authority in Judaism. As Charles observes, Jesus and eleven of his disciples came from Galilee. And the other disciple, who betrayed his master's cause, was the tool of the legalistic school centered at Jerusalem. The exile had destroyed the old Isaian ideal which centered in a unity of morals and the state. The priestly ideal consciously accepted this disassociation of the moral will from the state. This priestly disassociation was a protective reaction against an unyielding political situation. It was probably the determining influence in the crucifixion of Jesus. And it is the hidden and unsolved problem in the modern separation of Church and State.

CHAPTER XIV

THE DISASSOCIATION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE WISDOM LITERATURE

Jeremiah tells us that the law comes from the priest, the word from the prophet, and counsel from the wise. The emphasis on righteousness rather than on ritual in the eighth century prophets contained implicitly the recognition of the individual as a moral agent, but this view was not explicitly stated until the period of Jeremiah and Ezekiel. The Wisdom Literature, most of which is post-exilic, seems to have in mind primarily the experience of the individual; it is cosmopolitan, humanistic; it appeals to the facts of universal experience. The priest with his ritual dealt with the people as a whole; the prophet through his oracular word preached to his ideal community; the wise took counsel with individuals (Jeremiah 18:18). We shall see that the loss of the state was to Jeremiah the occasion of discovering the morality of the inner life, but the Wisdom writings constitute the field of Old Testament literature in which this inner world of reflective experience receives its clearest expression.

The problem of the book of Job was the result of a conflict between the new consciousness of individual responsibility set forth in Deuteronomy, Jeremiah and Ezekiel, and the old ethnic conception of responsi-

bility. The drama of Job is a portrayal of the conflict which arose in the Hebrew mind when the doctrine of Ezekiel that Yahweh treated each individual as a distinct moral agent came into opposition to the ethnic tradition which regarded every individual as organically related to the family, the community, and the nation. Under the old régime of "status" in which the individual was undifferentiated from his family and nation, suffering furnished no special problem. It was universally accepted as right that one individual or one generation should suffer for the deeds of another. In pre-exilic Hebrew morality the nation was the moral unit and the idea that suffering was the result of sin furnished no particular problem. But the new emphasis on the heart brought about a change in the notion of responsibility. Job approached the problem of suffering from the point of view of Ezekiel who taught that each individual was held accountable only for his own deeds, good or evil. The traditional view is excellently expressed in the Ninety-first Psalm. Thousands shall fall but no harm shall come to the righteous. Now it was possible to maintain this doctrine as long as the nation was the moral unit. But when the individual conscience was differentiated from the national conscience, when it was held that each individual was responsible only for his own deeds, the notion that suffering was always the result of one's own wrongdoing was evidently absurd. The individualism of Ezekiel led necessarily to the hopeless moral confusion of the book of Job.

Job has kept all the requirements of the law and the prophets yet he is literally consumed with suffer-

ing. Ezekiel's doctrine is declared to be untrue, the wicked prosper (21:7-15) while others never eat their bread with pleasure (21:25). Can a righteous Yahweh destroy a righteous man like Job (10:8)? The problem might receive a solution if the individual lived again, "but man wasteth away and dieth and where is he?" (14:7, 10). Against the traditional notion Job raises his moral protest. He is not daunted by tradition (by "great multitudes"); neither does the contempt of those who hold the old notion of the solidarity of the patriarchal family terrify him (31:34). Job appeals from the accepted traditions of society to an absolute judge (31:35). If only he knew where he might find such a judge (23:3, 4)! Indeed Job thinks there must be in heaven such a witness for the righteous man (16:19). He dares to believe that he shall be preserved from sheol long enough to see this absolute judge and be justified (19:27). He yields to none of the miserable counsellors of tradition; he will himself know, he will understand precisely wherein he is wrong in his search for absolute justice (6:24).

One of the boldest utterances of all literature is to be found in the drama of Job (13:15). Job not only appeals to an absolute justice against the traditional notion of justice, to an ideal judge against the ethics of custom; he presupposes in Yahweh himself a standard of justice which is above the traditional view: "Though he slay me yet will I trust him; but I will maintain mine own ways before him!" Here is a mountain peak in the moral progress of the race; its atmosphere can be breathed only by those of Job's type

of mind. Job is intellectually confused; he finds no solution of his fundamental problem. Nevertheless he will continue to think, to act, to live, in the high hope of a loftier righteousness, even if it involve death itself. This is the atmosphere of the Socratic Apology and of Golgotha. In this magnificent utterance the author of Job proves himself to be a Hebrew of the Hebrews. There is in this Promethean utterance the ring of an unconquerable will to righteous living. This moral will in the book of Job is too dynamic with creative energy to be paralyzed by any form of intellectual confusion. Job frankly confesses that he does not know where he might find his ideal judge; nevertheless this ideal judge knows Job even if Job does not know him (23:8-10). Knowledge according to Job is to be tested by the moral will; the moral will is not to be inhibited by the absence of perfect knowledge. The real test of knowledge is goodness, righteousness; the fear of Yahweh is wisdom and to depart from evil is understanding (28:28). It is not Job's will to live which is paralyzed; the difficulty is in the confusion of his moral insight. And the cause of the confusion is the hard and fast moral individualism of Ezekiel. Job's moral perspective has been disturbed by the overwhelming consciousness of a new truth, the truth of Jeremiah and Ezekiel that the individual has a will and a conscience of his own. But a new truth usually comes in the form of an obsession; it blots out for a time other equally important truths. Job, like Proverbs and Ecclesiastes, helped to bring to light the inner life, the individual conscience, but the problems of justice, of suffering, of righteousness, will always remain in

just the confusion in which they are left in the book of Job wherever the individual is abstracted from those living, organic social relationships that make him a part of the world of institutions. Nevertheless the intensifying and deepening of the individual life symbolized in the drama of Job will in the future mean a deeper and a richer conception both of the individual and of society. And with this larger view of life the problem of human suffering will not seem so confused as it seems in the book of Job.

Ecclesiastes is the most individualistic book in the Old Testament. It was written in a time of confusion and turmoil. The author, perchance a half-hellenized Jew of Alexandria, was practically overwhelmed by Greek scepticism. There is no vision of a righteous kingdom; there is no enthusiastic loyalty to the temple and the law. The Greek influence in the book and the absence of any antagonism to Greek thought make it probable that it belongs in the Greek period somewhere before 168 when the Jews attempted to free themselves from Greek oppression. The book shows what might have become of Hebrew thought had there been no Priestly Law and no prophetic ideal. Having lost the old sense of national solidarity and not having acquired the hope of a righteous kingdom to come the Preacher's chief interest centers around the individual and his concerns. But justice on an individualistic basis breaks down in Ecclesiastes as it did in Job. The righteous man perishes and the wicked man prolongs his life (7:15). "All things come alike to all: there is one event to the righteous and to the wicked" (9:2, 11, 12).

Job, like Ecclesiastes, was unable to discover absolute justice in the case of each individual, but Job had the indomitable Hebrew urge towards righteousness. Job's intellectual confusion does not destroy his faith in righteousness. But in Ecclesiastes there is a different relation of knowledge to the moral will. Job desires knowledge in order that he may act righteously; Ecclesiastes desires knowledge of an absolute sort. Knowledge for Job is an instrument in the service of a righteous, justice-loving will; "to depart from evil is understanding." Job lacks the social interests and ideals of Second-Isaiah and Daniel; this is why he fails to see why at times the righteous man suffers. But in Ecclesiastes the intellect is not only abstracted from a social or national background but there is lacking a dynamic will to live righteously even in the individual himself. The will is analyzed into a series of images and pictures of doubtful moral significance. As we know not how the bones of the body grow, so we know not how all things are made. We know not "whether shall prosper, either this or that." But we have to live and so in the morning we must sow our seed and withhold not our hand (11:5, 6). Knowledge is not a lamp to guide the feet of the righteous, as in the book of Job; it is an impersonal scrutiny of the facts of experience. The search for knowledge, like the search for wealth, ends in sorrow (1:18). The eye is not satisfied with seeing nor the ear with hearing (1:8). The world is unintelligible (3:11).

Here we see a thoroughly hellenized view of life. Job's intellectual confusion is the occasion for the development of a Promethean moral heroism. In Ec-

clesiastes intellectual scepticism results in Epicureanism. Be not righteous over much neither be thou very wicked, "why shouldest thou die before thy time?" (7:16, 17). All one can do is to eat and drink and enjoy the good of one's labor all the days of one's life for that is one's portion on earth (5:18). "Eat thy bread with joy and drink thy wine with a merry heart. Let thy garments be white. Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might, for there is no work . . . in the grave whither thou goest" (9:7-10). One must rejoice in his own works for one knows not what shall be after him (3:22).

Pleasure is not the object of life. A really great will moves forward even where, as in the case of Job, there is confusion as to the ultimate outcome of life. It is this type of will that creates new levels of reality in the moral world. Nevertheless, pleasure, happiness, the sense of individuality, the right to think, the insistent demand for rationality, are elements of experience which were not recognized in the older ethnic morality. Ecclesiastes helped to add these new elements of ethical thought. And a growing moral ideal must include within its scope the intellectual freedom and dispassionate outlook of the Book of Ecclesiastes.

The Book of Proverbs is the best expression of the Wisdom Literature. It is thought that these proverbs came from the scribes who were associated with the post-exilic service in the synagogue. The State was gone, but the temple and synagogue were left, and there was time to think. Proverbs was to the Old Testament what Stoicism was to Greek philosophy; as the conscience of the Stoic was in the universal life

of reason and not in the small city-state, so, according to Proverbs, the real city is not the city of Zion, but the inner kingdom of wisdom. The law in its moral rather than its ceremonial significance is emphasized (29:18). The prophetic idea of justice is declared to be better than sacrifice (21:3); righteousness is the law of life (21:21; 15:19). This prophetic idea of righteousness includes the care of the poor (29:7); oppression of the poor is a reproach to their Creator (14:31). Likewise the teaching of Proverbs regarding riches is the teaching of the great prophets. The only justifiable wealth is that which is acquired through righteousness (28:6; 22:16; 16:8; 13:7). These truths are the older truths of the prophets, but they do not move us in Proverbs as they do when we read them in Amos or Isaiah. The prophets were always in the grasp of a dynamic social ideal; we feel it, we are stirred by it when we read their utterances. In Proverbs these truths are seen through the dry light of a reflective experience. We are not moved to these truths by the dynamic grasp of a sympathetic social spirit; these truths in Proverbs are the precipitation of a universal experience. We must hearken to the fathers that begat us and we must not despise our mothers when they are old (23:22; 20:20). This is the old truth of family loyalty. Yet experience shows that some friends are closer than brothers (18:24); that a neighbor who is near is better than a brother who is far off (27:10), and that some servants are better to inherit and to rule than some sons (17:2). How different the Prophetic and the Wisdom points of view! The attitude toward enemies is almost that

of the New Testament; one can live so that his enemies will be at peace with him (16:7); we are not to recompense evil (20:22; 24:17; 25:21). But this is not because we are members one of another as the Prophets and the Gospel teach; it is because it "is not good to have respect of persons in judgment!" (24:23). The keynote of Proverbs is given in the following verses (7:4): "Say unto Wisdom, Thou art my sister; and call Understanding thy kinswoman;" "with all thy getting get understanding" (4:7); it is the way of life (4:18, 19, 26). The atmosphere of Proverbs is the atmosphere of introspection (29:11); contemplation, reflection, is the heart of this book, as it is of all the Wisdom Literature. As one thinks in his heart, so is he (23:7). The truth that states of mind are the underlying springs of action is the fundamental note of Proverbs (12:5). Out of the heart are the issues of life (4:23); a clean and pure heart is the source of good conduct (20:9; 17:20); self-rule is the foundation of government (25:28). The modern psychologist is surprised to find so many things traced back to states of mind; gladness, strife, the movements of the eyes, feet, and fingers, length of days and years, grace of body, the life of the flesh, are traced back to mental states as their origin (12:25; 10:12; 6:13; 9:10, 11; 1:8, 9; 14:30). The heart maketh the countenance; "a good report maketh the bones fat;" a merry heart is a continual feast; it is like medicine, but "a broken spirit drieth the bones" (15:13, 15, 30; 17:22). In Proverbs the individual becomes clearly conscious of his own mental and moral personality; in these meditations of the synagogue the Hebrew soul became

clearly self-conscious. As gold is tried in the furnace, so is the heart tried in experience (17:3); and this experience is the inner life of the individual. It is very subtle: "even in laughter the heart is sorrowful" (14:13); "the heart knoweth its own bitterness, and a stranger does not intermeddle with its joy" (14:10). Over and over again we are told that he who follows wisdom saves his own soul (19:8; 8:36; 15:32; 11:17, 19; 16:17; 13:3, 14, 20). Him who calls the wicked righteous, people will curse (24:24; 11:26). If a man is wise he is wise for himself (9:12); every man shall receive according to his own works (24:12); and clearest of all: "His own iniquities shall take the wicked himself" (5:22). Here the individual is singled out and in his bare naked individuality is made to feel the truth of the universal law that to do evil is to suffer and that to work righteousness is to find the way of life (13:21; 14:22). When Isaiah discusses the immorality of women, we are made to see that it involves the fall of men and of cities, for women must bear men's names (Isa. 3:16; 4:1); but when Proverbs discusses this same evil it sets forth the abstract principle that such conduct leads to destruction and death (7:27; 9:18); "whoso committeth adultery lacketh understanding: he that doeth it destroyeth his own soul" (6:32). The Book of Proverbs reflects primarily the experience of the individual; not the individual in a subjective sense or in a selfish sense; the point of view is cosmopolitan, universal. It reflects experience in general; and in an atmosphere of this kind the individual is apt to float free from his old network of relations which bind him to social institutions. The

state was gone; the individual was thrown back on himself. We have here, accordingly, what we might call the ethics of reflection, or the ethics of experience. There is lacking the dynamic social consciousness of the prophets which carries the individual along with its militant energy. Nevertheless the Wisdom Literature has its ethical contribution; the very strength of the old social consciousness was due to a sympathy born of the social instincts, to imitation and group suggestion-factors of experience which do not involve the personal center of the individual's life, the center from which arise the attitudes of reflection and volition. These characteristics of experience were lacking in the old group consciousness; and the uniqueness of the Wisdom Literature is in the fact that it brought to light these elements in the Hebrew moral consciousness. It lacked the dynamic of the older social ideal; but it brought to light the newer, higher reflective and volitional processes which later on were to be the means of transforming the old narrow group consciousness —with its national god, its local shrines, its kinship groups—into a social consciousness involving the heart, and will, and personal initiative, of a richer self-conscious life. This is the permanent ethical contribution of the ethics of "the heart," the ethics of the Wisdom Literature. Without this introspection, this self-analysis, bringing to light the inner springs of conduct, there could not have been later on the deeper and richer social consciousness of the Nazarene.

In the Song of Solomon Greek influence helps to bring about the recognition of the individual without the disintegrating tendency so noticeable in Ecclesias-

tes. We saw at the beginning of the Hebrew moral development that the group, not the individual, was the unit of moral and social life. Woman as a mother was idealized; as an individual she received no recognition. Now since the downfall of the State and the development of the reflective point of view, especially in the Wisdom Literature, the individual was coming to a gradual recognition. Greek influence was very strong in this direction. The treatment of love in the Song of Solomon is an excellent illustration of this process. To think too much of one's wife in the Orient is immoral, for the family and not the individual is the unit of morality; and so it was in ancient Israel. But in this wedding poem of the Greek period the love of the individual comes to the fullest recognition; love is strong as death (8:6); wealth can in no way buy it (8:7). It is implied that true love is monogamous: "My beloved is mine, and I am his" (6:3; 2:16). The beloved is "the chiefest among ten thousand" (5:10). Buddhe [1] translates (6:8, 9):

> Solomon had sixty queens,
> And eighty concubines,
> And maidens numberless;
> My dove, the faultless, is one.

The Wisdom Literature brings to clear consciousness the inner, subjective elements of the Hebrew conscience. Job, following the individualism of Ezekiel, which held that Yahweh rewarded each man according to his own deeds, raises the question as to why the righteous man should suffer. Proverbs lays bare the

[1] Mitchell, *Ethics of the Old Testament,* page 348.

inner motives and desires which underlie the cardinal sins of the human heart. Ecclesiastes raises the question of the individual's happiness. The pessimism of Ecclesiastes and the moral confusion of Job arise from the fact that the individual with which they deal, unlike the pre-exilic individual, is no longer organically related to a holy, inspiring, dynamic state. Such a consciousness as the Psalmist had who found "all his springs" in Zion; such an ideal as Isaiah's righteous state; such a hope as Jeremiah's kingdom of righteousness held together by Yahweh's law written in the heart, are nowhere taught by the wisdom writers. The post-exilic age saw the downfall of the Hebrew state; the righteous state of Isaiah was no longer a living reality. The task of the Wisdom writers was not a political one; we find in them no plan for the restoration of the national life. The Wisdom writers do not inspire us with public, national, political ideals. With the nation in control of foreign overlords Judaism turned its attention to the part of experience over which it still had control, its personal, inner life. The passing of the state emphasized in their minds the reality of the inner life of the individual. The root-principles of conduct brought to light in Proverbs, the cold, clear light of the disinterested intellect in Ecclesiastes, the unsurpassable directness of the moral appeal in the book of Job, would never have been stated with the same intensity and clearness had not the Hebrew conscience been abruptly shaken loose from its old ethnic foundations.

To do one thing well is all that should be expected from any one school of thought. And the development

of the morality of the inner life was the one thing which the Wisdom-literature accomplished. That it did not synthesize the newer reflective morality with the older ethnic social patterns—the family, the city, the nation—is due to the fact that human progress is a piecemeal process. We must rejoice that Proverbs uncovered the sources of human conduct; we must not lament the fact that the personal morality of Proverbs is not harmonized with the political ideal of Isaiah. We must profit by the intellectual freedom, the cosmopolitanism, the humanism, of Ecclesiastes; these characteristics will liberalize the old narrow ethnic national consciousness. We must rejoice in the titanic moral consciousness of the book of Job, even if there is intellectual confusion. Such a Promethean conscience will help to create a national conscience on a much higher level than that of any pre-exilic national ideal.

CHAPTER XV

THE DISASSOCIATION OF THE PROPHETIC CONSCIENCE

The ideal of the great eighth century prophets was that of a righteous nation whose rulers and teachers should be guided by the loftiest conceptions of justice and righteousness. Religious and moral ideals did not center in the future, but in the present order of society. The function of the great pre-exilic prophets was that of interpreting the social consciousness of Israel in terms of the lofty morality of an Amos, an Isaiah, a Hosea. The work of Moses, of Elijah, of Isaiah, was, in modern terms, as political as it was religious. Moses and Isaiah were in the truest sense eminent statesmen as well as religious teachers. The old Hebrew religion, like all early religions, was an ethnic religion; it belonged to a particular nation. This ethnic ideal was the predominant point of view down to the eighth century prophets, who introduced a new way of thinking in Hebrew morals and religion. Their moral standard was not ethnic, not national; right and wrong ceased to mean conformity with or disobedience to a national cult. Right had lost its old ceremonial significance; it had come to mean justice and mercy. To build one's house by righteousness; to care for the widow and the poor; to cease to do evil and to learn to do good,—this was the new moral ideal.

Now the significance of this new ideal of goodness did not come to clear consciousness until the Exile (in 586); it was Jeremiah who gave this prophetic ideal its clearest formulation. Amos and Hosea and Micah and Isaiah had taught that true goodness consisted in justice and mercy, and not in obedience to the national cultus of sacrificial ritual and group custom. And Jeremiah seeing the temple in ruins and the Holy City desolate gave immortal expression to a type of morality which centered not in local customs and group traditions, but in the will and in the "heart." So far was Jeremiah's moral ideal from being overwhelmed by the destruction of the Hebrew state that it seemed to need such an occasion to reveal its true meaning! Here then we see a new type of prophecy. In the pre-exilic period morality was the handmaid of the Hebrew monarchy; it was the organ of a national cultus. Now through the exile and the teaching of Jeremiah prophecy became universalistic; it became independent of the nation; it began to speak the universal language of the human "heart" and will.

The significance of Jeremiah is due to the fact that he rang the death-knell of ethnic morality. The Northern Kingdom had already fallen in the eighth century and Micah who lived in that century had foretold the fall of Zion as well (Micah 3:12). And now over a century later Jeremiah, in accord with Micah and in opposition to what Isaiah had taught, sees and declares the fall of Jerusalem, the holy city of David. "Then will I make this house like Shiloh, and will make this city a curse to all the nations of the earth" (26:6). Regarding the temple of Solomon, the building of

which David carried so deep in his heart, Jeremiah declared: "Trust ye not in lying words, saying, The temple of the Lord, The temple of the Lord." "I will do unto this house, which is called by my name, wherein ye trust . . . as I have done to Shiloh" (7:4, 14). Concerning the Ark which David found so full of power, when he took it to Zion, Jeremiah declares that the children of Israel "shall say no more, The ark of the covenant of the Lord: neither shall it come to mind: neither shall they remember it" (3:16). With his vision of the impending exile of the nation and the destruction of Jerusalem and the temple there was evolved in the mind of Jeremiah a revolutionary interpretation of morals and religion. For with the destruction of the nation, the city, the temple, the Ark, and cherubim, there will be left an inner world. It is the impending exile and destruction of Zion which are making clear to Jeremiah the reality of this inner world of the will and the heart.

The tablets of stone deposited in the ark will pass away but "I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts" (31:33). The temple of Solomon will be destroyed but—this is Paul's phraseology but it is Jeremiah's idea—the hearts of men will be the temples of God. The nation will be driven from the land (which was in David's mind the abode of Yahweh) but Israel will continue to be one people for Yahweh will draw them with loving kindness (31:3); he will "give them one heart and one way" (32:39).

Jeremiah certainly did not intend to disassociate the new world of the heart from the old world of the state,

of property, of the family, but, by bringing the mind to focus on the inner world at a time when the state and the city of Jerusalem and the temple seemed to be passing away, he unconsciously started a movement of thought which tended to make the inner world of the heart an end in itself, and which after centuries of development regarded the state and property and the family as external accidents, if not actual hindrances to the inner world of the heart and the will. In the exile there began a movement in which the will was forced to disassociate itself from the entire system of relationships in which it had developed and in which it had functioned from an immemorial past.

The moral ideal of the eighth century prophets, reinterpreted through the teaching of Jeremiah and the influence of the Babylonian Exile, developed in the mind of Deutero-Isaiah into a moral ideal that was majestically universal in its scope. While Ezra and his party of the Priestly Law became a holy, separate community, the Great Unknown or Second-Isaiah found in the exile (Isa. 40-55) an opportunity of moral and social service. While the priestly party was building a wall of separation about the Jewish people, Second-Isaiah saw in the Persian Cyrus the servant of God (Isa. 45:1). The Exile, which to the separatists was an occasion for ritualistic isolation and ceremonial purification, was to the Great Unknown the sending of a "light to the Gentiles" (49:6). And in the fifty-third chapter this ideal of suffering for social service received such an adequate statement that scholars through the centuries have found in it a portrait of the Nazarene.

The priestly reform forbade marriage with non-Jewish persons; but prophetism had outgrown this group conception of morals. This larger prophetic ideal voiced itself in the book of Ruth. In the old days of group ethics the horizon of one's moral and religious ideal was limited by one's geographical boundaries. Yahweh was the God of his land and people. But in the book of Ruth a woman from Moab leaves her land and people and gods because of her love for Naomi, her Hebrew mother-in-law. Here we see humanism triumphing over legalism; universalism over nationalism; moral worth over the limitations of blood relationship; the ethics of experience over the ethics of "status."

Another brilliant portrayal of this universalistic view is in the book of Jonah. Yahweh calls Jonah to preach in Nineveh; but Jonah goes to Tarshish "from the presence of the Lord." In a storm the foreigners all pray! Not only are they religious, but they care for Jonah who did not care for foreigners; they prayed that they might not be led to throw him into the sea. Jonah is swallowed by a great fish, in which some see symbolized the carrying away of the priesthood into captivity. After such an experience one would expect the passing of the old particularistic ethics! So it seemed to the author of Jonah. When Jonah preaches to the Ninevites they repent and Yahweh saves the city. Yahweh finds Jonah loving even plant life (4: 10); must not then Yahweh himself care for the thousands of Ninevites who are too ignorant to know the law? Yes, he loves even their cattle! So universal is the sweep of this moral ideal. Here is sympathy as

tender as that of Burns, but it is taken up as an element of a universal moral and social ideal.

In making the principle of righteousness the basis of conduct the prophets made inevitable a conception of morality that was universal, that was freed from the local and particularistic morality of "status." But no pre-exilic prophet ever dreamed of a type of morality which was not to be embodied in the organized social life of the nation through the ordinary political functions of the state. The ideal of a righteous order to be set up by divine interposition, with a loss of faith in the old Hebrew state is known as Apocalypticism. And its development marked a turning point in Hebrew thought.

The Persian supremacy which began in 538 was terminated by Alexander the Great. Palestine came under Greek rule in 332. After the death of Alexander and the division of his empire Palestine was a bone of contention between Egypt and Syria. In 198 B. C. Antiochus III gained control of Palestine. But there still remained the old Ptolemaic party in Jerusalem which adhered to Egypt. The Jews, accordingly, were divided into two conflicting parties; Judea was in the control of Syria but there were many Jews in Egypt and therefore there remained in Palestine the Ptolemaic party. And the political situation led to a cultural cleavage, a moral and religious division, among the Jews. There were the Hellenists, whose ideal was both very old and very new. They held to the old idea of David and Isaiah which did not separate political from religious life; they were also in sympathy with Hellenic culture. This party later on gave rise to the

Sadducees. The opposing party, the Chasidim or the pious, were separatists, who opposed the ideal of political independence, who adhered to the idea of the separation of religion from the political turmoil of the time. This party gave rise later to the Pharisees.

Nor were these parties divided over academic issues. In 168 Antiochus Epiphanes, king of Syria, who at Rome had learned to love Hellenism, undertook the hellenization of Jerusalem. He erected a temple to Zeus and decreed death to the worshipers of Yahweh. This led to the Maccabean revolt carried on with phenomenal success by the Maccabean leaders who gave their name to this period of Jewish history,—Judas Maccabeus, Jonathan, Simon, and John Hyrcanus. In 165 the Jews gained control of the temple services. But religious independence was followed by a desire for political independence. Not only did the hellenization of Judaism fail but the Maccabean leaders succeeded in establishing an independent Jewish state which lasted from 165 to the Roman conquest of Jerusalem in 63 B. C.

Such is the historical setting of the remarkable prophecy of Daniel. In this book the prophetic ideal of a kingdom of righteousness expressed itself with indomitable faith in the face of Greek opposition and oppression. With the immovable purpose of Job, Daniel declared: Even though we be not delivered from the fiery furnace of the times, yet will we not give up our faith in this righteous kingdom (3:17, 18). There is in Daniel an indomitable loyalty to a kingdom of righteousness which is soon to be established, which shall never be destroyed (2:44) and which shall fill

the whole earth (2:35). This is the true Hebrew note of heroic loyalty to righteousness which is so conspicuous in the drama of Job. Nevertheless, alike as these two books are in their devotion to righteousness there is a world of difference in their points of view. Job presupposes the individualistic point of view of Ezekiel. The righteous man suffers or prospers precisely as he himself as an individual moral agent wills to do wrong or to do right. On the other hand, the book of Daniel is absolutely opposed to the individualism of Ezekiel. The keynote of the book is the universal kingdom of righteousness of Second-Isaiah. But the recognition of the individual in Jeremiah and Ezekiel, the doctrine of the inner life in the Wisdom-literature, and the prophetic idea of a righteous social kingdom are synthesized in the book of Daniel. At the establishment of the Messianic kingdom especially righteous individuals who have labored for the kingdom will come forth from Sheol and will shine as the stars for ever and ever (12:3). Here, as Charles points out, the character of the individual is measured by the extent of his organic relationship to the ideal kingdom.

In Daniel we have an account of a great image whose head of gold symbolizes Babylon (5:30), whose breast and arms of silver symbolize the Medes (5:31), whose belly and thighs of brass symbolize the Persians (6:28; 8:3-4; 8:20), and whose legs of iron and feet of clay and iron symbolize the Greeks (8:5-11, 21; 11:31, 36, 38). These are the four world-empires (2:31-45). "And the king shall do according to his will . . . In his estate shall he honor the God of forces" (11:36, 38). "Thou, O king, hast made a de-

cree, that every man that shall hear the sound of the cornet . . . and all kinds of music shall fall down and worship the golden image: and whoso falleth not down and worshippeth, that he should be cast into the midst of a burning fiery furnace" (3:10-11). "If it be so, our God whom we serve is able to deliver us from the burning fiery furnace, and he will deliver us out of thy hand, O king. But if not, be it known unto thee, O king, that we will not serve thy gods, nor worship the golden image which thou hast set up" (3:17, 18). "And in the days of these kings shall the God of heaven set up a kingdom, which shall never be destroyed . . . but it shall break in pieces and consume all these kingdoms, and it shall stand forever" (2:44). "And the kingdom . . . shall be given to the people of the saints of the Most High" (7:27).

The kingdom of righteousness of Daniel unlike that of Amos and Isaiah will come at a definite time. The kingdom becomes an expected event (9:25). The social solidarity which so triumphantly asserted itself in the Davidic state and in the political consciousness of Isaiah is seen in the book of Daniel to have undergone an eclipse. There is no Moses, no David, to support and guarantee the ideals of true prophecy. In its spirit and content the book of Daniel belongs on the highest level of Hebrew prophecy, but in its method it marks a radical departure. Since the strong hand of the pre-exilic state is gone the consciousness of solidarity must find some non-political method of realization. This surrender of the state as the mode through which a righteous society is to be realized, this belief that at a definite time a righteous society will be inaugurated

by non-political means is known as Apocalypticism. This movement is the continuation of a process which we have seen in Jeremiah through which the moral consciousness began to project itself outside the sphere of the state.

In Daniel the old consciousness of solidarity is undimmed; those who enjoy immortality have earned this experience through their loyal service of the kingdom of righteousness. But in Daniel this kingdom is not to be brought about through a king like David, through statesmanship like Isaiah's but through a non-political divine interference. The inner world of the heart and the will, of which the Hebrew became conscious in Jeremiah, in Ezekiel, in the reflective Psalms, in Job, in Ecclesiastes, is becoming disassociated from the organization of the state. The moral organization of life in Daniel is one with that of Isaiah but in the attitude toward the state the book shows us that the Hebrew is losing faith in the political form of organization. The political organization of Hebrew life is falling into non-Jewish hands. The political structure which has supported the prophetic ideal of a righteous society is going to pieces. This is the political significance of the book of Daniel in which is reflected the prophetic consciousness of the second century B. C.

The Book of Daniel is a book that grips and fascinates the mind. Israel fell captive to Assyria in 722; Judah fell in the Babylonian captivity of 586; then followed the period of Persian supremacy, and now Hellenism was actually attempting to substitute Zeus and his temple for Yahweh and his temple in Mount Zion itself! This is the meaning of the Maccabean

struggle. This is the historical condition which constituted the fiery furnace into which the heroes of Daniel were thrown for their loyalty to Yahweh. And yet where, in the Old Testament, do we find a vision of the kingdom of righteousness which burns itself as deep into the imagination of the reader as in this book?

The author of the prophecy of Daniel belongs to the genuine line of Hebrew prophets. His mind sweeps through the centuries which gave rise to the great world-empires of Babylon, Persia, and Greece. The first two are already fallen; the third is partly broken. Then with the true inspiration of an Amos and a Jeremiah, he declares that all empires built upon "forces" and not upon righteousness shall pass away. Herein is the author of Daniel one in spirit with the great Hebrew prophets. But Daniel differs in a fundamental and epoch-making fashion from the long line of Hebrew prophets. The prophet worked with the king; he was a statesman; he was a political reformer. He predicted national success wherever it was based on righteousness. His ideal kingdom was absolutely dependent upon righteous conduct. In Daniel the introduction of the kingdom of righteousness is not conditioned by the ethical character of man; it is the direct intervention of Yahweh. The kingdom, so far as its introduction is concerned, is catastrophic, not moral. And this point of view is summed up in the statement that Daniel is apocalyptic and not prophetic in his teaching. Of course the content of Daniel's ideal is prophetic, is ethical; but the introduction of his ideal kingdom is extraneous, non-ethical, catastrophic. This means, of course, that the author of the book of Dan-

iel belonged to the party of the pious, of the separatists, who had given up the old idea of David, of Amos, of Isaiah, that the kingdom of righteousness must express itself through the state. He was opposed to the ideal of political independence. We have seen that the separation of religion from the state in the Exile converted the followers of the Law into a body of separatists. We have seen the post-exilic development of the Wisdom-literature as the expression of an inner reflective experience. And now in the book of Daniel we see the ideal kingdom of the prophet independent of the arm of the state. The ideal kingdom is no longer dependent on a righteous state; it will be introduced in an immediate, extraneous, catastrophic manner. The message of the prophet has become an apocalypse.

As the exile brought about a profound change in the point of view of the Wisdom-literature and of the Law, it likewise brought about a reconstruction of the moral ideal of the prophets. Before the exile the prophet always attempted to secure the embodiment of his ideal of righteousness in the Hebrew state. The promulgation of the Deuteronomic Law was brought about in 621 through the coöperation of the king, Josiah, and the prophetic party. The Deuteronomic code breathes the atmosphere of the great eighth century prophets. When however, in the Exile the Hebrew lost control of his government, the strong right arm of the state which in the old pre-exilic days embodied in an authoritative way the ideals of the prophet was no longer available as an instrument of the Hebrew conscience. There was no king to give effective backing to the prophet's ideal. This changed political condition occasioned a

reconstruction of the prophetic ideal of a society of righteousness. As the post-exilic Wisdom-literature discovered a world of reflective introspection which is individual and therefore cosmopolitan, and which is practically independent of the fortunes of politics; as the priestly movement marked out a sphere of ritual holiness over which the Jew alone could have control; so likewise the prophetic ideal underwent a change in order to preserve itself under the new conditions. As the state under foreign control became a "secular" institution in contrast to the "holiness" of the Law; as the world of the state became more external to the inner reflective life of the wise; in like manner the prophetic ideal embodied in the righteous state of Amos and Isaiah was transformed into a moral ideal which was independent of the arm of the state. It is possible that all the Messianic prophecies were post-exilic in origin; for why should a Messiah be desired as long as there was a Hebrew king to embody the ideals of the prophets in a definite, organized state? The Exile transformed the pre-exilic prophetic ideal, which embraced in its sphere of morality all public concerns, including those of the state, into an ideal of a righteous society independent of the state,—now recognized as "secular" and administered by representatives of foreign governments. This secular state in the post-exilic prophetic consciousness came to be contrasted with a transcendent spiritual power which would in the near future introduce a kingdom of righteousness by an immediate divine interposition. This post-exilic prophetic kingdom did not differ in ethical content from the ideal kingdom of Jeremiah; but there

was a world of difference in the manner in which it was to be achieved. The pre-exilic prophetic ideal could be embodied in a state; but now the state as the principal public instrument of Yahweh's righteous will no longer existed. Only one thing remained: Yahweh would himself introduce the kingdom in an immediate, spiritual, non-political fashion. Prophetism became Apocalypticism!

The apocalyptic point of view concerned itself with the manner in which the kingdom of righteousness was to be introduced; because there was no longer a king there arose the Messianic ideal; because the Jew lost control over his government there arose the belief in a divine interference from without. It was the work of the prophets to transform the old ethnic, group morality into a morality of experience; the morality of nationalism, of "status," into a morality of righteousness which was universal in its scope. The development of Apocalypticism was a distinct departure from the work of an Amos or an Isaiah, but it seemed the only way in which to keep alive the old prophetic ideal. Apocalypticism was a natural point of view for the deistic Jewish mind when the old prophetic ideal of a righteous society lost the support of the Hebrew state.

And at about one hundred B. C. there is reflected in the Book of Enoch another distinct change in the attitude toward the state. The Maccabean rulers have disappointed the hope of those who embody the prophetic ideal. So that the Hebrew mind turned from the old hope of a righteous state to a new and revolutionary ideal of an inner realm of souls which could be realized only after death. The prophetic kingdom,

the ideal of a righteous state to be realized on earth, which had been a dominant ideal of conduct, now became a temporary earthly prelude to an eternal kingdom of angelic souls in heaven. This is the political significance of the Book of Enoch.

We are following here Charles' interpretation and translation of Enoch. In chapters 1-36 we find the old Messianic kingdom on earth. We find the same ideal in chapters 83-90 where the Maccabean princes are portrayed as the righteous supporters of the prophetic ideal. But chapters 91-104 Charles regards as having been written about 100 B. C. We find in these chapters an eternal world of souls which overshadows the earlier prophetic kingdom to be set up on earth. He regards this change as due to the opposition of the Maccabean princes to the ideal of the prophetic teaching. The righteous have "attained not to the fruit of their toil" (103:11). But the righteous after the eternal judgment "will have great joy as the angels of heaven" (104:4-5). Here is projected an eternal realm of souls after death in which the suppressed political consciousness of the Hebrew people may find expression. And the sense of justice creates a corresponding world of spirits wherein evil-doers are punished. The wicked who prosper now shall be punished in sheol (103:7-8). Sheol has been transformed into hell, just as the prophetic ideal has been transformed into heaven. Hell is the moral complement of heaven and both are symbols of ideals suppressed by the present world order. They are the results of the projection into the beyond of an ideal unrealizable in the actual social system.

There is in Enoch in a few passages a stoical denial of the world, the world which has attempted to destroy the ideal of a righteous state. There are those, says Enoch, who gave their bodies to torture and loved not the goods of the world, regarding them as a breath that passeth away. They loved heaven more than their life in the world (108:8, 9, 10). Here Persian dualism has furnished the philosophical scaffolding on which a broken faith in a righteous state begins to climb to a heavenly world.

This eternal kingdom tends to become an inner kingdom of souls; it begins to obscure the older prophetic ideal which built itself into the structure of the state, and all the objective concerns of life.

The ethical significance of Apocalypticism is in the fact that it attempted to preserve the social aspects of experience which had been incorporated in the state. This division of experience into an internal inner world and a temporary outer political world which began at this time in the Hebrew branch of our spiritual ancestors was called out by the social situation in which the moral and religious will found itself. Our business is to interpret this dualism, not to criticize its method of meeting the situation.

This is the same development of other-worldliness which shows itself in Greek thought in the Orphic emphasis on the soul, on death, on the future life, so familiar in some of the dialogues of Plato. However, this development among the Hebrews does not become so individualistic as the Orphic circle of ideas among the Greeks. The Hebrew retains his ideal of a righteous kingdom, but he transfers it from the earth to a

future, heavenly world. The old prophetic ideal kingdom on earth becomes a temporary prelude to an eternal celestial kingdom. The ideal of an Isaiah shakes from its feet the dust of earth. The ethical ideal of the Old Testament takes its departure from earth. The world of the New Testament looms on the horizon. The Hebrew's relation to the family and the state was as natural as his devotion to nature, his attachment to his own body, or his love of life itself. Now in the first century B. C. loyalty to these ancient institutions begins to disappear. The conscience begins to differentiate the sphere of morality and religion from that of the state. Chastity begins to take the place of conjugal loyalty. The soul, in the Book of Wisdom, is independent of and even in opposition to the body; the body drags down the soul! The earthly, righteous state of Isaiah becomes a future, heavenly ideal.

Now there were many reasons for this change. There was first of all a split between the Pharisaic party and the Maccabean princes. It was possible to hope for a righteous society when the political leadership of the nation was directly influenced by the prophetic conscience. Some scholars see in the 110th Psalm a reference to one of the Maccabean princes. But with a new rupture between the political and the religious leaders of the nation, there was lost the growing hope of an earthly kingdom of righteousness which had, for example, expressed itself with such confidence in the book of Daniel.

Another reason for this change was the growing inapplicability of the more lofty moral ideal to social and political conditions. In Isaiah 65:17, 18, and 66:22

(the fifth century, according to Charles), the Hebrew seer looked toward the creation of a new heaven and a new earth. The world as it was seemed hopelessly opposed to the prophetic moral ideal. The command of Leviticus (19:17, 18) to love one's neighbor as one's self; the moral ideal of Job (31:29) which forbids us to rejoice at the destruction of an enemy; the teaching of Proverbs (20:22) which forbids us to recompense evil; the injunction of Ben Sira (28:6): forgive thy neighbor and then thyself wilt be forgiven, are milestones in the evolution of a moral ideal whose realization in the state seemed quite impossible in the first century B. C. In the Testaments of the XII Patriarchs which Charles places in the second century B. C. we find practically the New Testament ideal of conduct. We read: "He that is just and humble is ashamed to do wrong, being reproved not of another, but of his own heart, because the Lord vieweth his intent" (Testament of Gad, 5). As to the relation of the individual to others, we read: "Love ye one another from your heart; and if a man sin against thee, tell him of it gently, and drive out the poison of hatred. If he confess and repent forgive him. But if he be shameless, and abideth in his wrong doing, even then forgive him from the heart" (Test. Gad, 6). Surely such ideal morality found itself at a baffling distance from the traditional codes of conduct incorporated in the state. Since it was natural to suppose that the state could never be adjusted to such an ideal morality, it was logical to hold that only in a heavenly kingdom could the moral ideal be realized.

Another reason for the retreat of the Hebrew ideal

to a future heavenly world was the increased emphasis put upon the immortality of the soul. Job was almost driven at times to postulate immortality. Daniel (12:3) distinctly taught the immortality of the individual but only because of the individual's relation to the ideal kingdom. Sections of Isaiah (26:19) present the same view. But with the growing influence of Greek thought on Hebrew thought, there was laid more and more stress on the individual and less and less emphasis was put upon the state. Sheol ceased to mean a non-moral sphere of lifeless ghosts as in the old days; it came to mean hell, a place of punishment.

How much Persian influence was responsible for this transformation of an earthly into a heavenly kingdom of righteousness it is impossible to say; but we may feel sure that with its absolute opposition between good and evil, with its emphasis on the devil, with its tendency to regard the present world as under the influence of evil spirits, Persian dualism must have had a powerful influence on the development of Hebrew thought. The evil influence which came intermittently over Saul was ascribed to Yahweh himself. In the Book of Job we have the devil as an evil spirit but he is under the control of Yahweh. In the Persian and Greek periods, however, sickness and disease and sin are attributed to evil spirits. At the beginning of the Christian era man is regarded as tainted with original sin through the sin of Adam.

Of the Greek influence on Jewish thought the literature leaves us in no doubt. The Book of Wisdom (first century B. C.) shows unmistakable evidence of Orphic ideas. The soul exists before the body and the body

is regarded as a weight which drags down the soul. The Logos theory of Philo (30 A. D.) is an attempt to bridge the chasm between an evil material world and the immaterial purity of the divine spirit. Even in the Testaments of the XII Patriarchs (second century B. C. according to Charles) there is the beginning of a decidedly dualistic manner of thought. In the Testament of Benjamin we read: "The good man gazeth not passionately on corruptible things;" "The pure mind constrained among the defilements of the earth, rather edifieth, and itself suffereth no defilement." But the essential goodness of human nature so thoroughly rooted in pre-exilic Hebrew thought—as it was in pre-Socratic Greek thought—has not yet been extinguished in the second century. "As the potter knoweth the vessel, what it containeth, and bringeth clay thereto, so also doth the Lord make the body in accordance with the spirit, and according to the capacity of the body doth He implant the spirit, and the one is not deficient from the other by a third part of a hair; for by weight, and measure, and rule is every creature of the Most High." But the influence of orientalized Greek thought won in the long run. Alexandrian Judaism, as we see in Wisdom and in Philo, was fast losing its devotion to an earthly kingdom of righteousness. It was more and more influenced by the Persian and Orphic idea of the soul as a reality only incidentally attached to the body, to the family, and to the state. An inner world was conquering the old pagan order.

This point of view is brought to light also in the theories of conduct which differentiated the three leading parties of the Jewish people in the first century

B. C., the Pharisees, the Sadducees, and the Essenes. The issue which divided the Pharisees and the Sadducees was the problem as to the relation of religion to politics, of morality and religion to the state. The Pharisees, with their new idea of individual immortality, and their interest in the future world, were content to leave the state in the hands of foreign overlords. The Sadducees, on the other hand, held to the older, more "worldly" view of religion. And the view of the Essenes embodied a further change which took place in Hebrew thought. If the Pharisees were separatists who transferred their interests from an earthly kingdom to a future spiritual world, the Essenes were still further removed in their ideal from the pre-exilic Hebrew ideals. For the Essenes with their emphasis on chastity, their abstinence from animal foods, etc., seem to reproduce the circle of Pythagorean ideas. The Orphic and Pythagorean elements of Greek puritanism seem the best explanation of the tenets of the Essenes. They fit in with the dualistic, world-denying, ascetic type of Greek thought which culminated later in what is known as neo-Platonism.

The fusion of this dualistic development with Greek individualism resulted in the Alexandrian form of Judaism of which the Fourth Gospel is an expression. The individual by a process of inner spiritual knowledge identifies himself with an eternal inner kingdom. Here we have an inner realm of souls disassociated from the old political structure of experience.

An introverted will floats free from the old ethnic morality in which, from an immemorial past, it had functioned through the medium of the family, property,

and the state. Nor has the mind of western civilization to this day succeeded in getting itself adjusted to those objective interests from which it was divorced at the beginning of the Christian era.

CHAPTER XVI

THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF THE TEACHING OF JESUS

The teaching of Jesus has come down to us through several traditions. These traditions have assumed three outstanding forms. There is the Jewish tradition, to be seen in the first three Gospels and in Revelation; there is the Pauline tradition; and there is the Greek tradition in the Fourth Gospel. It is difficult—some think it is impossible—to distinguish the original teaching of Jesus from these later traditional interpretations. Can we differentiate the original core of Jesus' moral teaching? Can we find such a nucleus in the Beatitudes and the Parables? It is our belief that we can.

We have seen that after the loss of the state in the Exile there developed the ideal of a Messianic kingdom. To some the Messiah was to be a political leader; to others, the Messiah was to be a prophetic, moral leader. Then there was the apocalyptic hope. Both these ideals are attributed to Jesus in the Gospels. It is possible that both ideals belong to a process of Jewish reconstruction.

Then there is the Pauline interpretation, which centered about the crucifixion. It became the dominant ecclesiastical tradition. The death of Jesus did for Christian thought what the death of Socrates did for Platonism. Paul became the spokesman of an out-

standing stage of western civilization. This was the type of thought to be seen in the mystery religions which captivated the mind of the West from 200 B.C. to 300 A.D. The object of this movement was to acquire immortality for an inner life. An inner world crystallized into a world of "spirit." It became the realm of morals and religion. The old pagan objective social ends of life were sloughed off and were left as extraneous accidents.

Finally there is the Greek interpretation of the teaching of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel. It became the traditional academic philosophy of the West. In this view Jesus became the symbol of an inner spiritual state of knowledge. He became the Logos, the incarnation of Platonic reason. Passages in the Gospels concerning the Son of God reflect the Pauline or the Greek interpretation.

These are the outstanding interpretations of the teaching of Jesus. But there is in the Gospels a stratum of moral tradition which is the continuation of the Hebrew prophetic ideal. It is possible to regard this prophetic stratum as a later Jewish transformation of the teaching of Jesus. We believe, however, that it is the original social teaching of Jesus himself, and that the disassociation of inner motive and outer social objective was the result of the crucifixion as interpreted by the tradition of the mystery religions. The state, the family, the property system of the traditional Hebrew cultus were disassociated from the newer conscience. But the newer ideal in the mind of Jesus did not retreat into an inner mystical realm. It remained an objective social ideal.

The personal, individual life in the teaching of Jesus is not to be achieved by selfishly trying to escape from a bad world. The individual can be saved only in so far as there is established a righteous social order. In the ideal of Jesus salvation comes through the achievement of a better world.

Jesus' teaching focuses the inner life as truly as Job or Proverbs, but Jesus retains the objectives of the great prophets. He is not a stoic. He does not teach a self-sufficient inner ideal disassociated from social concerns. We are to cleanse the inside of life that the outside may be clean also. One who says: "I go not," and goes is a better man than one who says: "I go" and goes not. The heart is emphasized because it is the source of good or bad deeds. A man, like a tree, is known by his fruits. We are to look after the heart but also not to leave matters of ritual and custom undone. When the kingdom of righteousness is practiced individuals will realize new dimensions of life. In the kingdom the least will be greater than was John the Baptist.

The words which Luke puts into the mouth of Mary: "He hath put down the mighty from their seats and exalted them of low degree," announce a social program and not an inner retreat from the world. The story of the flight to Egypt to save the infant Jesus from Herod is indicative of a tradition which made Jesus the promulgator of a kingdom which might be in opposition to that of Rome. Upon their return Mary and Joseph do not go to the capital with the child but remain in Galilee. John the Baptist, the forerunner of Jesus, preaches the moral and social gospel of the

prophets. The Lord's Prayer mentions a kingdom to come and a Father's will to be done on earth. Luke teaches that the kingdom is for those who hunger and are poor. At the trial and crucifixion there is a royal robe, a crown, albeit of thorns, a scepter, and an announcement of Jesus as king. All these things are incompatible with an inner, otherworldly, interpretation of the ideal of Jesus. On the cross—according to Matthew and in stark antithesis to the Fourth Gospel —Jesus feels forsaken, for how can the kingdom be realized by a dying leader! These things do not indicate the self-sufficient inner ideal of the Cynic or the Stoic. Their ideal is the universal reason of Zeus in the minds of men. The ideal of Jesus is a new Jerusalem.

Jesus taught a kingdom that was to grind to powder all other kingdoms. He contrasted the rôle of the Roman state with his own prophetic ideal. The one was built on domination; the other on love and service. He did not set up a permanent inner ideal of life as a defense against the Roman state. He did not say that the state was external and indifferent. He did not say that there was an inner kingdom which was absolute in itself and self-sufficient. But he did say that the Roman type of state would pass away and that the prophetic kingdom of righteousness would reign on the earth.

Jesus' tender lamentation over Jerusalem shows how he loved his city and his people. But the city which he loved was not the walled city of a pagan nation that longed to turn its political subjection into political dominance. To be given all the kingdoms of

the world is an ideal that is ascribed to the Devil in the story of the temptation. The city over which he wept was the ideal city of Second-Isaiah that was to be a light to the Gentiles.

Jesus' kingdom of righteousness is no inner oriental condition of mind. Those who made sacrifices for the kingdom would receive a hundredfold. He taught us to pray for our daily bread and for the forgiveness of our debts. He said that we have need of food and clothing and the things after which men in general seek. And he taught that all these things would be added with the realization of the prophetic ideal. The things he says of property hold true only of property as functioning in his ideal kingdom. The bread and debts which he mentions in his prayer are not the bread and the debts of a pagan feudal society or of a competitive individualistic society, but of his ideal society of righteousness. He does not say that it is more blessed to give than to receive in a feudal or a competitive society. He says it is more blessed to give than to receive when we give to those who will coöperate with us in achieving a kingdom of righteousness. It might not be impossible to give and forgive in such a society.

From this point of view the command to give all that one has becomes intelligible; for, if the individual is to live in a kingdom of righteousness there will be no necessity of hoarding. In a society of brothers, of friends, in which each gives his best, in a society in which there is the prophetic will to righteousness, all things that are needed will be added. Every one's life

will be a moral vocation in which he will be as productive, as creative, as his ability allows.

In the teaching of Jesus the ideal of the family is thrown around the whole scheme of living. One is our Father and all are our brothers. We are to be merciful and to love even our enemies because our common Father sends his sunshine and his rain on the evil as well as the good.

It was not that Jesus did not love woman and had no place for the family in his ideal kingdom. The Gospel stories—of the woman who anointed Jesus just before his death, of Mary and Martha, of Mary Magdalene, of his mother—reveal the most profound love of woman of which we have record. But Jesus could not love Magdalene as a prostitute, nor Martha as a domestic drudge, nor could he obey his own mother because of her position in a pagan feudal family system. Jesus' love of woman was determined by his idea of the new kingdom. He loved woman with an unutterable love, but the woman he loved was woman as he interpreted her in the light of the new ideal. One must be able to hate father and mother and even his own life if he would enter the kingdom of righteousness.

Jesus loved children, but children in the kingdom of Jesus could be born only through love. This, however, was an ideal which in the ancient world could be embodied only in the form of myth. The birth stories in the gospels were an outgrowth of the teaching of Jesus.

It was not that Jesus did not love woman and child, property and city and nation. He loved them more

deeply, but he loved them in a new way. He could not love in the old way and the world was not ready to love in his way. It was only as aspects of his ideal kingdom that family and property and state could be loved by Jesus.

Wherever the philosophy of the Orient—Egypt, Persia, India,—influenced European philosophy, we find a tendency to depreciate ordinary life and everyday conduct. There is a contempt of life, of the world, of human industry, of politics. There must have been a certain amount of Oriental influence in the thought of Jesus. His ideas of evil, of spirit, of purity, and of death suggest Oriental influence. But Jesus did not surrender the great social objective of a kingdom of righteousness which was the world's legacy from the prophets. The ideal of Jesus did not center in national glory and salvation, the Jewish ideal; it was not a fixed inner mental world, the Stoic ideal; it was not a salvation from the world through ecstasy or sacrament; his ideal was the old objective social ideal of the prophets, deepened and spiritualized through Oriental influence and rendered more subtle through conflict with Rome.

This objective social interest gave the will something to strive for. There was still something to live for, and it was this social objective—reorganized, to be sure, by the newer inner life—that gave the teaching of Jesus its power over all its rivals.

Jesus accepted the new idea of immortality but it did not subordinate the idea of a kingdom of righteousness to be set up on earth. The coming of the kingdom

and its reorganization of the objectives of the will kept the mind of Jesus true to the prophetic ideal.

There is in the teaching of Jesus no salvation for the inner life of the individual except in and through a life in a righteous kingdom.

The inner aspect of life, the heart, the will, the motive, is clearly stressed by Jesus. But it is not an end; it is not abstracted from the outward deed and transformed into an independent, absolute, ethical reality. We are not to become conscious of our inner world to make ourselves independent of the objectives which we share as social beings. The real value of an inner world of motive and thought is to raise the objectives of the will to a higher level of moral life.

In modern Christian ethics there is an unconscious synthesizing of the objective ethics of the earlier classical period and the inner universalistic ethics of historic Christianity. Our inner life can be made real only by being expressed in objective social ends. The objective ends of family, property, vocation, state, projected into an apocalyptic ideal and suppressed and interiorized and projected into an otherworldly ideal by the tragedy of the crucifixion, must again become with full consciousness the objectives of our will and conscience. Such a conception of the inner life implies a reorganization of the traditional moral objectives of family, property, state, vocation. And such a reorganization will create fresh and free fields for the expression and enlargement of individuality. This is a genuine second coming of Jesus and of his kingdom.

PART III

THE SECOND EMPIRE

CHAPTER XVII

THE NEW TESTAMENT AND THE RISE OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH

The Jewish Christianity presided over by Peter was the earliest form of Christianity. Peter was converted from Judaism to universalism, but being a genuine Jew he was not converted from a social to an inner mystical Gospel. The ideal of Jewish Christianity is the New Jerusalem of Revelation. Jesus is the Messiah. There is to be a Messianic kingdom and after that a permanent kingdom of heaven.

The next type of Christianity to develop was the mystery religion of St. Paul. Jesus is the risen Lord. The believer dies with his Lord and is reborn through the rebirth of his Lord. There is a definite break with the prophetic ideal. This type of Christianity is Oriental, and spiritualistic. The believer becomes through his new birth, of which baptism is a symbol, an immortal being. Adam represents the old natural man, the ψυχή, the soul or principle of life in animals and in man. Christ the risen Lord represents the principle of life, the πνευμα, which is higher than the natural life common to animals and men. This pneumatic or spiritual life comes from living through faith the life of the risen Lord. In the classical tradition we are one with Zeus through νοῦς or reason. This

is the view of Plato and the Stoics. In the mystery tradition we become divine and immortal through union with a divine risen Lord. We are divine not through νοῦς or reason, we become spiritual or pneumatic beings through a mystical union with a risen Lord. In Adam we all die because the natural or physical man has only the principle of natural life. But the Christian becomes immortal, becomes a new spiritual or pneumatic creature through a mystic union with his risen Lord. This mystery type of Christianity which began at Antioch was "foolishness" to the classical mind.

The Phrygio-Thracian cult of Dionysus was the basis of Euripides' Bacchæ. Immortality through Dionysus is not a continuation of a normal human life. One is lifted out of the old natural life through ecstasy. The taboo which the mysteries put on eggs and beans was a taboo on the old Chthonian or underground deities, the principles of natural growth and life. Plutarch of Chæronea in Boeotia (50-125 A.D.), who studied at Athens, visited Alexandria and lectured at Rome, held that sleep was the lesser mystery and the initiation into the greater mystery of death. Death recalls an earlier state of union with God. Here in the body the soul, like an oyster in its shell, is shut in from its original element, the divine being.

The mystery religions were personal, cosmopolitan. They had nothing to do with the family or the state. They were an expression of a new inner aspect of experience which could get no adequate outlet in the traditional social system.

Celsus tells the Christians that if they persist in

keeping their hearts and minds detached from the Roman system, they will help to weaken the Empire in its conflict with barbarism. In this way Christianity may bring about the collapse of civilization itself.

The older pagan régime limited the good life to those who had blue blood and an aristocratic type of education; to those who had property and a wife and children and who could serve their state in war and peace. The ideal of the Christ removed all these limitations. The Christ spirit is the key of admission to this second empire and this spirit knows no race, no sex, no property qualifications, no social status. Any one who can appropriate the Christ spirit can enter this new kingdom. Paul rejoices that he is able to beget new men in Christ. Through baptism, through the Lord's Supper, individuals find the symbols of their unity with this new spirit. The limitations of a feudal social system are removed. The spirit of this new world bloweth where it listeth. Men feel themselves to be new creatures.

In the Fourth Gospel the kingdom is not to come as in Jewish Christianity, nor is it due to a mystical rebirth as in Paul; it is the result of a gnosis, a spiritual form of knowledge. This knowledge is the divine light that illumines every one that comes into the world. This divine knowledge, this Logos, had been worked out by Philo at Alexandria in the middle of the first century A.D. Philo lived among his fellows but he lived secluded in soul. He regarded the body as a corpse and the soul as the only principle of life. The world of Philo could not have been created by God himself. Some intermediate being was neces-

sary between God and the world. This intermediate being was the Logos. The author of the Fourth Gospel regards Christ as the true Logos.

On the whole, the Old Testament depicts an objective, ethnic, social order. On the other hand, the New Testament, the teaching of Jesus, the Jewish Christianity of Peter and James, the mystery type of Christianity of Paul and the Greek Christianity of the Fourth Gospel,—present in its different aspects a new kingdom, a new moral empire. This new empire was embodied in the Christian Church, whose chief founders were Paul and Augustine.

Under Constantine Rome became Christian. He founded a Christian Rome on the Bosphorus. The old Rome on the Tiber vainly attempted to reëstablish the old pagan cultus. This is the significance of Julian the Apostate. But the edict of Theodosius in 393 proscribed the practice of paganism. In 410 the city of Rome was sacked by barbarians. Roman civilization seemed doomed. Augustine began to write his City of God. He had no pride in the Empire. Its policy was contrary to the Christian ideal. His book was the announcement to the world that the Christian Church was to supersede the classical Roman world. Such was the historical background of Augustine's life.

Augustine (354–430), a native of Africa, lived at Carthage, Rome, and Milan, and was bishop of Hippo. He was influenced by the life of St. Anthony (about 251-about 356) the anchorite of Egypt. (St. Jerome was also a contemporary of Augustine.) He was converted to Christianity by Ambrose, bishop of Milan, in 387. He rejected his mother's advice to marry,

giving up his concubine and his political office at Milan. The recognition of sex as the basis of the family was the foundation of the old ethnic morality. To have wife and children, to be able to vote intelligently, and to have military training, were the basis of a good life. But Augustine had been a Manichæan and a neo-Platonist before he became a Christian. According to his Persian creed the world is evil. According to his neo-Platonism one must escape from the world to find God. To these views Augustine added his own doctrine that the fall of the race took place in Adam's experience of sex. This fall in the theory of Augustine is overcome in the sacramental mysteries of Baptism and the Lord's Supper. The morality of the family was recognized as a lower type of lay morality. Augustine furnished the theory on which was founded the monastic ideal of the Church. The City of God superseded the pagan city-state.

In 529 Justinian gave to the world his famous Codex of Roman Law. But he was a Christian and not a pagan Emperor; he closed the philosophic schools of Athens in the same year. Even these so-called Greek schools were, like the Church itself, more Oriental than Greek. In this same year, 529, St. Benedict founded near Naples the Monastery of Monte Cassino, the home of the famous Benedictine order. Thus did the pagan classical world pass away as the monastic Christian world arose to take its place.

As the barbarian hordes poured down into the tottering Roman Empire, the philosophic and religious conscience of the West swung over to the ideal depicted in Plato's Phædo and in the Epistles of Paul.

Western thought took the inner aspect of experience—the will, the attitude, the heart—and reified it into a metaphysical inner reality and conceived it as existing independently of the socially approved objective pagan interests of family, property, and state. This is the essence of mediævalism. The objective ideal order of Plato and Jesus became an inner world of pure spirit. The ideal world no longer attempted to enrich the objective social order; it made the family, property, and the state taboo, and set itself up as an independent world.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE WORLD OF THE INNER LIFE

The inner world of the heart and the will, the intellect, the conscience; the world of Jeremiah, of Socrates, ruled the thought empire of the Mediterranean world from Alexander the Great to Constantine, who made Christianity the religion of the Roman Empire. Before Socrates the Greek had been taught that he was a soul, that he had a divine nature, that he was one with Zeus. Later on the old nature religions in Asia Minor, in Greece, in Persia, in Egypt, with their nature rituals, with their interpretation of the life and apparent death of plant and animal and man, became mystery religions. The Phrygian bull-sacrament was no longer an identification of the worshiper with the life-giving energies of the bull which symbolized the life of nature. The taurobolium had become a baptism of blood through which the initiate rid himself of all that was temporal, worldly, all that had to do with the physical life of nature, and took upon himself the immortality of the god. The worship of Mithra was no longer an identification of the individual with the sun as the source of heat and light and food. Dualism had entered. The sun was above the physical things of earth; he was ethereal, spiritual. To be identified with the sun was to become

unworldly and immortal. The Egyptian Osiris likewise ceased to be the god of corn and green plants and trees; he was no longer the life-giving energy which seemed to die in winter and come to life in the spring. He too was now the symbol of a changeless, purely spiritual, eternal life. To be one with Osiris was no longer to live in the world. Even a Greek like Plato wrote the Phædo to teach a philosophy not of life but of death.

The ritual in these Oriental religions survived, but it no longer symbolized the life of nature expressing itself in plant and animal and man; it had come to symbolize an inner purified heart and will, a renunciation of man's natural life. These ritualistic ablutions cleansed the will and the heart; they brought about a rejuvenation of the inner life; they made men capable of immortality. Even Greece herself, the very incarnation of reason in the ancient world, Greece whose religion and morality were embodied in the state, in the family, in the human body, and the pulsating life of nature, abjured her gods of self-control, of measure, of form in matter. She too sought immortality through the mystical route of Oriental ritual. She forsook the gods of the state, of the family, of agriculture, of commerce, of the drama, and of art. Instead of Zeus and Apollo and Demeter and Hermes she set up Dionysus. Instead of the old ritual of war and marriage and state building, there was set up a new ritual of man's inner life. Thought and emotion and sentiment broke away from the old social and political moorings. Ideas and emotions and sentiments were treated as purely inner states of mind. They were

regarded as absolute, independent forms of experience. By possessing, or rather by being possessed by, such absolute forms of emotion and thought, men became endowed with immortality. Such experiences were independent of race and nationality. The devotee of Dionysus and Isis and Mithra belonged not to the ethnic cult of the Greek, the Roman, the Hebrew, or any other state; they were members of a new empire, the Empire of the Spirit.

Now the life and the teaching and the death of Jesus of Nazareth made him preëminently the representative of this new Empire of the Spirit. The universal empire of moral and spiritual life, independent of race and nationality, whose founders were Jeremiah and Socrates, Zoroaster, and the priests of Isis and Mithra, and we can now add the names of Buddha and Confucius, this universal moral empire seemed to culminate in the life, the personality, the kingdom of righteousness, of the Nazarene. This new empire of the heart, the will, the conscience, which was the great moral achievement of the Greeks and the Romans and the Hebrews, and which was embodied in the mystery religions of Asia Minor and Persia and Egypt, seemed to be embodied in its fullness in the mind of Jesus of Nazareth. The inner universal moral conscience of the Mediterranean world was driven to find its representative in the Nazarene by the dramatic character of his death. This Jesus of Nazareth who was to have been the realization, the incarnation, of the new conscience, was done to death by the legal representatives, Roman and Jewish, of the old ethnic cultus, of the morality of the authoritative state and family-

system. The new conscience went down in an inglorious defeat. Its standard-bearer had bled to death on a shameful cross.

What was the mind of the Hebrew and the Greco-Roman world, trained to think in terms of the mystery religions, to make of the death of him who seemed to be the leader of this new inner moral empire? Even after the death of vegetation the worshiper of Osiris could see in the sprouting corn the awakening of a new life in nature. In all the mystery religions the worshiper by identifying himself with his god seemed to die but in reality achieved a new inner immortal life. Men everywhere believed that the life of nature which seemed to die in the winter would surely return in the spring. This was the meaning of the green trees, the sacred bulls, the sprouting grain, of the mystery religions. Was it possible that the life of him who so completely typified, who so fully incarnated, the newer inner moral kingdom which was so universally coming to consciousness in men's minds, was it possible that his life really came to an end on the cross? Had not the mystery religions taught the Mediterranean world to believe in, to actually identify itself with, the undying life of Adonis, of Osiris, of Mithra? Did not Jesus of Nazareth embody a more universal moral ideal than Osiris, or Dionysus, or Mithra? And had not his crucifixion on Golgotha raised him to a position of unique universality?

The New Testament and the Christian Church are the answer to this question. A world that was trained to believe in the undying life of Dionysus and Mithra and Osiris could not acquiesce in the brutal attempt

to annihilate the new moral kingdom through the crucifixion of its leader. The terrible spectacle on Golgotha so burnt itself into the imagination and the conscience of the world that the cross raised the teaching and the life of the Nazarene to a position of unconquerable power. The cross augmented the reality of the inner moral kingdom. As in the mystery religions the life of nature was actually reborn through its apparent death, the mind and spirit of the Galilean through his death on the cross was reborn in the minds of those who went with him in spirit to Golgotha. The crucified Jesus was reborn as the conquering Christ of a new moral empire. The sense of the inner life became an overpowering reality; Jesus the Christ became the indwelling, creative mind of a new order of life.

By identifying himself with Jesus on the cross the Christian died with the Galilean to the old order which had crucified him. By dying to the old order the Christian was reborn to a new universal inner kingdom. This representative character of the Nazarene constituted him the Christ, the leader of the new empire.

In baptism the Christian died through a mystical burial to the old order and arose to a new order of life. In the Lord's Supper the Christian symbolically appropriated the body and blood of the leader of this new inner universal kingdom.

The crimson badge of the cross became the mystic sign of membership in this society of the inner life. Is it any wonder that some sensitive Christians felt that they bore in their own bodies the stigmata, the

marks, of their crucified leader? Is it any surprise that some who were visually minded had recurrent visions of their beloved leader on his cross?

When the will goes over into objective ends there is no occasion for the development of an inner world to be set up in opposition to an objective social order. But when the mind is confronted with an unyielding environment, it is driven to develop defense mechanisms. It treats the resisting objective order as external, as but an outward expression of true morality. The new ideal because of inhibition and repression deepens, thickens, becomes internalized. In a religious consciousness this introverted will becomes a form of absolute spirit. It becomes identical with the divine will. This is the explanation of the Christ ideal. The spirit of Hebrew prophecy, enlightened by Greek philosophy, internalized itself as a defense against an unyielding pagan order. This was the only way in which the new ideal could make itself supreme over the old pagan régime. The Christ ideal is the historic symbol of this process in western civilization. Traditional theology has regarded this process as representing an objective, universal truth. To us it is a turning point in the development of the psychology of the race.

The deeper the emotion, the more internalized it becomes when it is thwarted. Monks and nuns do not become monks and nuns because they do not feel the power of sex. There has been a deepening of life and this new dimension of life does not get expressed in the traditional family. With this new deepening of life, sex can be willed only if it expresses this newer,

inner mind. But no such synthesis was ever dreamed of by the early Christian mind. Instead of a synthesis, therefore, the conflict of the newer conscience with the ethnic social objectives of family, property, and state, led to a disassociation of image, idea, attitude, from the objective ends of life. This is the explanation of the mediæval dualism between chastity and sex, between poverty and property, between an inner empire of spirit and the world of the state.

In the modern revolutionary movement, men like Locke, Hobbes, Milton, and Rousseau used the fiction of an original state of nature in which men were free from the restraints of society. This fiction of a state of nature was an unconscious mechanism of defense which the modern revolutionary conscience used in its attack on autocratic political authority. This state of nature was the ideal of a type of mind obsessed with the desire for freedom. The state of nature was not an objective existence; it was real and dynamic because it met a psychological need. It was the result of an ethical compulsion. If this was true of the idea of the state of nature in modern revolutionary thought, a similar explanation would seem to hold of the idea of the inner life at the downfall of paganism. It was the psychological construction of a revolutionary type of thought. It was an inner wall of defense against the old ethnic order which refused to incorporate the newer intellectual and moral ideas of Plato and of Jesus.

A dualism of subject and object is the necessary accompaniment of conscious intelligence. But a dualism which treats the mind as an inner entity, a spiritual existence which is independent of the objects of the

normal moral will, such as wife, child, country, scientific knowledge, art, is the result of a blocked mental process. God or soul, as an inner reality, with no necessary correlation with the moral interests of the world, is the theological symbol of a human mind dissociated through conflict from the normal objective interests of family, state, and vocation.

When the objective end is impossible, a process of compensation, of substitution, takes place. The more the objective end is denied the more the mind is driven to find satisfaction in an inner realm which claims to be independent of objective social and political ends. Reasoning gives place to rationalization. The inner world of motive which should issue in objective ends comes to regard itself as an end in itself. Since the only realizable moral objects are those which belong to an outgrown moral order, these objects are declared to be indifferent and external to a world of will and conscience, which feels itself to be on a higher moral plane. Since the newer objectives are not immediately realizable, the mind tends to suffer an introversion. Such an introverted mind tends to identify itself with God and to reify itself into a world of absolute reality.

When a superior mind is made to develop a consciousness of inferiority because of organized power, social and political, if it is impelled by a creative ideal, it develops a sense of its own superiority in the sphere in which the ideal holds. This is what happened in the development of the empire of the inner life. The new conscience, which was inferior in regard to political power and social recognition, developed a defense

mechanism by cultivating a conscience, an inner mind, a moral will, which was superior to the world of political power. Jesus was a king, a real king, a king of hearts and wills and consciences. His kingdom will grind to powder the crumbling empire of external authority and tradition. Such a state of mind tends to explain away as external to true morality the traditional feudal régime of paganism. The cup of Socrates was becoming, for example, in Stoicism, a symbol not of death and defeat but of an intellectual new birth. The cross of Jesus became in the Pauline school a symbol of death, but it was the death of the "old man." In baptism and in the Lord's Supper the Christian experienced a new birth through the recreating spirit of the Christ. We are not stating here a theological belief; we are interpreting a chapter in the actual psychology of the western mind.

In the ancient world the instincts had not become disassociated from the will. The will had a directness, a singleness of aim, a power, an enthusiasm, unknown to us moderns. Ancient knowledge and science and art served to illumine and to spiritualize the deeper instincts, emotions, and sentiments. Life was ruled by a wisdom which knew no break between instinct and will.

Now the destruction of the state in the Exile, the loss of faith in the prophetic ideal of a righteous society to be set up on the earth, and finally the crucifixion itself, brought about such a conflict between the newer inner conscience and the old order that the western mind mistook the strategy of its own inner retreat for a permanent condition of life. The mind

thickened, deepened, until it thought of itself as an inner metaphysical "soul" over against an external unreal "world." The differentiation and reification of the inner aspect of experience was brought about by abstracting the will and the intellect from the complex of instincts, emotions, and sentiments, in which they had functioned since the dawn of the human mind.

The old loyalty to the instincts of sex and gregariousness, of workmanship and curiosity, was dying in men's hearts. Higher and more refined aspects of experience were coming to light. A new sense of personality was being developed in human experience. And this new sense of personality did not fit in with the traditional social patterns of civilization. There was a new height and depth in human personality. For example, the Stoic had taught the world that they who could think Zeus's thoughts bore the marks of divinity. These new qualities of personality might appear in a slave and be absent in those whom the old order regarded as well-born. How, then, could this new sense of personality find itself at home in a social order which was blindly loyal to the old solidarities? How could the newer sense of self, the newer virtues of the "inner" life, ever adjust themselves without a break to the old instincts, the old loyalties, the old order? The golden fullness of the life of nature was an idea that no longer gripped the will. The ideals of measure, order, harmony, integrity, were gone. Of the Greek virtues, temperance, courage, wisdom, and justice, only the first two retained their vitality and even these two had an entirely changed content.

They were transformed into virtues of the "inner" life. The virtues of faith, hope, and love expressed the vital ideals of the newer conscience. These were the virtues of a will and conscience struggling to bring forth a new world. The disassociation of the will from the patterns of action and feeling which had been established on the instincts and fostered by a long tradition produced a painful emotional stress. Newer feelings, richer sentiments, rather than clear conceptions, characterized this transition. When will and emotion are finding their way into a new world, measure, balance, proportion, are hardly to be expected. When a sense of personality is evolving which is too new to adjust itself to established patterns of conduct, there is sure to arise an appeal to some beyond, some other sphere of experience. This accounts for the air of eternity, the breath of infinity, in the newer consciousness of personality. The lack of coördination between the newer sense of personality and the moral traditions organized about the older instincts, drove the will and the reason and the higher sense of self into an inner, mystical sphere of experience. When the Roman Government nailed to the cross on Golgotha him in whom was incarnated the newer conscience, it drove the Christian mind in on itself. Here it lived in catacombs, in monasteries, in churches, in cathedrals. Here it evolved its philosophy of the inner life.

States of mind became ends in themselves. This turning in on itself of the mind was not for greater strength in realizing itself in the normal objective interests of life, wife, husband, child, profession, science,

state. Reason was no longer an instrument for controlling the stubborn processes of life; it was an end in itself. It was a purely formal operation of the mind detached from the conflicting sensuous interests of life.

Not being able to express itself through the old objective channels of the state, the family, property, etc., the newer, inner Christian conscience became disassociated from these objective interests and became itself the end of life. In the old days there was a group of virtues, each of which symbolized the control of some objective system of behavior, according to certain socially accepted standards. But for centuries there had been developing a lack of adjustment between the newer, inner life and the old pagan instincts. And there was slowly developing a new virtue, namely, the ability to repress those instincts which directly underlay the pagan régime. This terrible self-renunciation was at the same time an affirmation of the newer Christian self. The man became differentiated from the citizen, the husband, the consumer of goods; he came to be regarded as a purely inner spiritual entity. This inner spiritual man was good or bad, not because his will was realized or was not realized in certain objective ends, such as the state, or the family, or property; he was good or bad absolutely or intrinsically. The man became synonymous with a purely interior quality of soul. This was his essential, his interior nature; the old objective ends in which the pagan instincts had found their realization were now regarded as external, worldly accidents, or encumbrances.

The kingdom of righteousness on earth became a kingdom of heaven because of the hopeless dualism between the newer ideals of the inner life and the older primal instincts as organized and expressed in the Roman Empire. The imagination of the primitive Christian community anticipated an immediate outlet of its suppressed ideals in the approaching realization of the kingdom of heaven. As the kingdom was delayed, the dualism between the traditional mental patterns and the newer Christian conscience became more accentuated. Instead of a repression brought about by a deferred realization, instead of a conflict between the existing social order and the more ideal community of Hebrew prophecy, there began to form in the Christian consciousness a dualism of a static ultimate type.

The heavenly kingdom came to mean not an ideal as yet unrealized in human society, but an ideal by its very nature incompatible with the natural pagan foundations of the human mind itself. The ideal kingdom was no longer to be a further moralization of the instinctive and emotional equipment of human nature; it was no longer to be a fulfillment and transformation of man's life. Repression had created such an abnormal sense of the value of man's interior life that this interior life became an end in itself. Man's interior life as reflected in the new ideal had actually become independent of the old pagan impulses of sex, possession, gregariousness, etc. The old instinctive outgo of the mind into the natural objective interests of woman, child, property, state-building, had become taboo. Moral control which had once been a means of linking

the mind and the world of objective interests, became an end in itself. Moral control became renunciation. The intellectual and moral organization of the instinctive and emotional life gave way to an introverted consciousness of pure spirit. This inner mind lived in attitudes, in feelings, in faith, in love, in hope. Such an inner world was absolute, just because it was internal, subjective; it was beyond the control of the old world order. This world of attitude was at first projected into a coming kingdom, but prolonged repression resulted in making this inner world absolute in itself.

The newer conscience, unable to reorganize the bases of the old order, is driven unconsciously to disassociate itself from the old order in order to preserve itself. The conflict brought the inner attitudes to the focus of consciousness and made them the central thing in life. A will which is out of harmony with the ruling social program of the world is a suppressed and thwarted will. Since the objects of the newer conscience were beyond its control, there resulted a brooding introversion which was new in the history of the western mind. Such a condition is the necessary result of a loss of control over the fundamental interests in life. The institution of the Christian Church was the device which this introverted mind evolved in order that the newer ideal might be housed and perpetuated.

The mediæval mind gave form to a broken world. It was all that was left of Rome, Greece, and the Old Testament. Its law, its universal language, its architecture, its formal philosophy, gave unity and order

to civilization for a thousand years. The monastery was a laboratory in which a profound inner life was generated. The world literally acquired a soul in the Middle Ages. This internalizing of the mind signified a new epoch. This inner soul was greater than father or citizen or worker or soldier. It survived Cæsar. There was evolved in the Middle Ages a dominant consciousness of form, or soul, which did not exist before. In pre-reflective ethics there was a tendency for a certain ritual, for the act itself, to become synonymous with right; but after knowing Dante, an act without a motive seems to us like a corpse without a soul.

The throwing of the mind back upon itself gives depth and profundity. Isaiah is more objective and social than Jeremiah, but Jeremiah is deeper; Job is deeper than Amos. In the strain and suffering and introspection of the mediæval development there was achieved a terrible and majestic consciousness of the value of an interior life which to this very day towers above all the older institutions of society. It was the majesty of an over-towering interior life which created the great cathedrals. And this lofty sense of inner moral values will continue to be the ultimate condemnation of all forms of social organization unleavened by its own transforming idealism.

CHAPTER XIX

THE DISASSOCIATION OF THE INNER LIFE FROM THE STATE, THE FAMILY, PROPERTY AND THE BODY

The Inner Life and the State

The Cynic and Cyrenaic schools of philosophy, both springing from the immediate disciples of Socrates, were negative in their relations toward society. The Cynic philosophy, founded by Antisthenes, regarded intellectual possessions as the only good. Everyone is familiar with the example of Diogenes. The family, property, the state, the wise man could do without; for the wise have as few wants as possible. According to Aristippus, who founded the Cyrenaic school, pleasure was the end of life; this the reason of the Cyrenaic school declared to be the only object of conduct. About one hundred years after Socrates' death, these two schools or tendencies were developed into definite systems, for Stoicism, founded by Zeno, was an outgrowth of the Cynic teaching; and the philosophy of Epicurus had its source in Aristippus. In the Epicurean view of life, pleasure, through rational self-control, was the object of all endeavor. The only necessary form of social life was friendship; family ties and political offices were affairs that threatened the individual's pleasure. The Stoic, finding in reason the

standard of life, was not so much an individualist; he at least tried to remain a citizen. But the Cynic teaching was strong within him; his real conscience was not in the state but in the universal kingdom of reason, of which the state at its best was but a very partial expression. The great schools of Greek philosophy were expressions of a newer type of individuality which had outgrown its old organic relation to the social order in which it existed.

The unity of moral tradition underwent a profound change in western civilization about the time of Socrates. With the passing of the Hebrew state in the Babylonian Exile and of the Greek city-states in the Alexandrian empire, the moral and social ideal no longer included the world of the state in its scope. With the development of the Christian Church a divorce took place between the newer moral conscience and the traditional world of the state. The scope of the moral ideal was definitely differentiated from "secular" affairs.

There arose a dualism between man as the representative of the newer inner life and the citizen or man as he was adjusted to the old order. All the higher, newer, more advanced systems of religion and morality after Socrates dealt with man as a member of a rational or spiritual order which was regarded as universal. Membership in this newer spiritual world made the old life of citizenship seem insignificant. The instinct of gregariousness had in the past lifted the individual out of himself; it had flooded his will with the invigorating energies of tribal and community life. But the breath of eternity, the conscious-

ness of rational and spiritual universality, made the old solidarities, the old energies, which had their sources in pugnacity, in kinship, seem pitifully unreal. Anger and pugnacity and gregariousness had once furnished the energies through which social justice had been maintained. But the newer ideal of the love of one's enemies was attempting to turn the old instincts into highly spiritualized channels. The state, with its army and its religion of kinship, was dead.

The crown of thorns, the purple robe, and the inscription over the cross: This is Jesus of Nazareth, the king of the Jews, symbolized the final expulsion of the state from the deepest moral consciousness. It was the prelude to the development of an organization in which this newer moral consciousness could preserve itself. When, as in the days of David, men's hearts were in the state, it could survive any opposition. But when the conscience has been disassociated from the state, when the moral personality is outside the state, as in the mystery religions of Greece and Rome, and in the book of Revelation, the state is left to fall a prey to its enemies. The state declined as the monastery grew in power. The Christian must rely upon the public opinion of his community; his conscience will find no support in the state (Matt. 18:17). The stone which the builders rejected will grind the state to powder (Matt. 21:44). What has been first shall be last. The authority of those who dominate will be as nothing to the power of those who serve (Matt. 20:25, 26).

Here we see the most powerful organization of antiquity disassociated from the will and the heart,

from what was coming to be the ruling moral consciousness of the world.

Now if gregariousness be an instinct, if we are unhappy when solitary, if our wills need witnesses for their moral support, then the repression in the newer consciousness of the sense of solidarity which had been associated with the state for a thousand years must have brought into the mind of Christendom a moral dualism which shook the will to its very foundations.

The Inner Life and the Family

This newer consciousness that man is an inner spirit found itself in open antithesis to the old ideal of the family. The naturalism and objectivity of the older ethics were in stark opposition to the inner life. The old family system was founded on a tradition of inheritance and property and kinship which was the antithesis of the ideal of the inner life. This inner life could make men brothers in spite of property and kinship and tradition. The moral consciousness actually attempted to slough off the instinct of sex.

We moderns have this sense of reverence which the ancients had toward sex, as we behold the processes of reproduction in plants and in the lower animal organisms. We too see in the evergreen and in the lily and in the egg the symbol of an undying life.

When, however, we come to the sexual life of the mammals, there arises in our minds a consciousness of shame. The sex processes of the mammal are as necessary to the perpetuation of life as the sex processes

of plants; but we experience toward the former a sense of shame which is wholly lacking in our attitude toward the latter.

This sense of shame is due to the fact that we read into the sex processes of the higher animals elements of will and reason and self-consciousness which are necessarily present in our minds but which do not exist in the animal mind.

Here, then, we find the secret of the sense of shame which we experience toward the instinct of sex. The instinct of sex in man is just as necessary, just as close to the heart of mother nature, as the processes of reproduction in plants. But in the evergreen, the lily, the egg, we see the immediate life and will of mother nature herself. Our own lives, on the contrary, cannot be so immediately one with the life of mother nature. Will, reason, and self-consciousness have come in to disturb the unity of mother nature's processes. A dualism arises between nature's processes and man's will. In the animal kingdom the processes of sex issue in the birth of the young, whose presence stimulates the instinct of parenthood. These instincts in primitive man and in the most ancient civilizations are organized by group sentiment and tradition into the institution of the family. Religion and art and morality all enter into the organization and control of the instinct of sex.

With the development, however, of introspection and self-consciousness, a dualism arises between man's will and the processes of nature. The worship of Apollo, the god of pure reason, supplants the worship of mother nature. In the sphere of pure reason sex

is an unbearable intrusion. It is a denial of this inner will; it is an affront to a lofty spiritual consciousness.

It is as a protest against any form of the degradation of sex that the ideal of chastity arose. This is the explanation of the worship of the Virgin. After the development of introspection and self-consciousness, the old attitude of unconscious relaxation in the arms of mother nature became forever impossible. The old objectivity was gone. Man could no longer be emotionally one with the flow of nature's life. From the garden of unity with nature man had been expelled by his own self-consciousness. He had entered a new era, an era of self-control, of "individual integration."

Rationalism, which has been the prevailing orthodox ethical philosophy, drawing its sources largely from Plato and the scholastics of the Middle Ages, has regarded the instincts, and especially the sex instinct, as belonging to the animal plane of life and positively opposed to the higher rational and voluntary life. This has led to a chronic repression by the ego-complex or rational self of the whole sexual life. This repression of the sex life has led to a divided consciousness. Sex has become taboo; the very consciousness of sex, deepened and strengthened by repression, has become associated with shame. The exaggerated sense of sin of the Church Fathers and mediæval scholastics was undoubtedly connected with their devotion to celibacy. The early church, that gave final form to the New Testament, discouraged marriage, despised the body, and had as little as possible to do with the industrial and political world. To Paul the body and

the instinct of sex have no place in the Christian man's ideal. This completely reversed the ethics of parenthood expressed in the Old Testament. And not only has this Pauline tradition entered into our philosophy of life, but we have added to this ideal of an inner life, independent of the instincts and the animal body, our modern self-conscious individualism which thinks of the individual will as independent of the race and as an end in itself. In the plant and animal, the sexual life in the male spontaneously responds to that of the female. And in the early life of mankind this spontaneity of the sex life still exists. But with the conflict of the inner life and the instincts, the will is actually disassociated from the sexual life. This is especially true in the case of women. The dualism between will and sex which the western world has inherited from Paul and Augustine has become a part of our dominant tradition. In this way we have associated a terrible sense of shame with the sexual life. This sense of shame has brought about a repression of the sexual life. This repression of the sex life has, in the case of some women, produced such a dualism of will and instinct, they have so identified their ego with this purely interior life, that they have acquired a double personality. The chief emphasis of the moral and religious life is laid on the subjection of sex and the exaltation of an inner life.

In the old morality sex meant the birth of children, the prolongation of the family, the continuity of the race. Sex was accordingly a part of the dominant moral and religious tradition. It was associated with joy and pride and the furthering of life. Into this

ancient pattern of feeling and thought the dogma of an inner life brought confusion and chaos. The ideal woman of the mediæval world was a virgin; the ideal child was born without a father. The urge of sex was the temptation of the devil.

The ideal which had led men to marry and beget children to carry on their family line had lost its power. The meaning of fatherhood and motherhood was absorbed and lost in the very profundity of the inner life. To be a person was infinitely greater than to be a father or a mother. The old virtue of loyalty to family paled into insignificance before the rising virtue of chastity. The family of spirit took the place of the family of blood. In the Old Testament days a woman without a son was morally disgraced. Now a purely interior life, with chastity as a virtue, had become an end in itself.

Sabatier, in his *Life of St. Francis,* describes an experience of the saint in a little cabin in a retired spot near Sartiano. "There," he says, "he passed one of the most agonizing nights of his life. The thought that he had exaggerated the virtue of asceticism . . . assailed him and suddenly he came to regret the use he had made of his life. A picture of what he might have been, of the tranquil and happy home that might have been his, rose up before him in such living colors that he felt himself giving way. In vain he disciplined himself with his hempen girdle until the blood came; the vision would not depart. It was mid-winter; a heavy fall of snow covered the ground; he rushed out without his garment, and gathering up great heaps of snow began to make a row of images. 'See,' he said,

'here is thy wife and behind her are two sons and two daughters, with the servant and the maid carrying all the baggage.' With this childlike representation of the tyranny of material cares which he had escaped, he finally put away the temptation" (P. 274).

The Inner Life and Property

There was another group of instincts, the instincts of hunger, of acquisitiveness, of ownership, and workmanship, which lay at the root of the institution of property. This group of instincts was also taboo. What had the ethics of the Inner Life, with its new sense of personality, in common with a group of instincts which crystallized into a disposition to get, to hold, to win? As the new conscience substituted for the love of family the virtue of chastity, so it substituted for the whole group of instincts which underlie property, the love of poverty. The best way to break with a social order which was wrong seemed to be to set up a different order with its own independent virtues.

The field of economics was influenced by the Christian conception of personality in the same way as that of the state or the family. In the classical Greek and Roman world there was a divorce between the instinct of workmanship and the ethics of personality. The explanation of this fact is, of course, the existence of the institution of slavery. In the sphere of economics the world was divided into free citizens and slaves. The citizen acted from his own personality as a center. The sense of power, the incentive of gain,

the romantic elements involved in military conquest, stimulate the emotions; they involve one's sentiments and ideals. Fighting one's enemies and lording it over one's slaves partake psychologically of the nature of a game. The citizen was free because he was an end in himself. He was a rational personality. The slave, on the other hand, was a part of the state not through himself, but through his master. All those economic interests which gave spontaneity and joy to the free citizen were impossible to the slave. His work was not determined by a system of ideals. His brain, his will, his sentiments, were instruments, tools, through which the free citizen expressed himself.

Now there was no less a conflict between the disposition to own and possess and the new sense of personality in the Hebrew tradition. It was an economic question that separated the North from the South and made two kingdoms at the death of Solomon. David, who would not accept a drink of cold water secured at the risk of the lives of his men, who could say to his comrades: Ye are my bones and my flesh, was the true spokesman of the ethics of solidarity. In Solomon this old ideal was threatened at its very foundations. Oriental slavery was the basis of the great wealth and luxury of the few. It was a question of taxation that split the kingdom at Solomon's death. It was the soul of Prophecy which voiced itself in the words of Jehovah to Solomon: "Because thou hast not asked for riches but hast asked for understanding; behold I have given thee a wise and an understanding heart and also both riches and honor." But the competitive trade life of the Canaanite cities was at war

with the prophetic morality of property. Under the Persians, the Greeks, and the Romans, the old pagan view of property held sway. It was as hard for a man of wealth to enter the kingdom of moral values as it was for a camel to go through the eye of a needle. The Son of Man had not where to lay his head. He became poor for others' sakes. It is better, he taught, to give than to receive. The pagan instinct to possess lay at the basis of an immoral materialism.

With a conception of labor so completely at war with the Christian view of personality, a dualism, a disassociation, psychological and ethical, was unavoidable between the instinct of workmanship and the new sense of personality. No one who held the newer view of personality could exploit his fellow human beings for his own economic gain or for the aggrandizement of a select few. The result was a radical disassociation between that entire group of instincts which underlie the struggle for food and property and the newer Christian conscience. Along with the differentiation of Church and State, along with the development of the virtue of chastity, there developed as the corresponding virtue in the economic sphere the new ideal of poverty. To do without property, to be independent of material things, was to prove the sufficiency of the newer ideal of the inner life. Why build temples and pyramids when it has to be done with slaves? Why not set free these laborers, these workers in wood and stone, these toilers on land and sea, with the message that the inner world alone has value, that the virtue of poverty can set men's hearts free from the tyranny of property? The inner state of mind, the

attitudes, the will, the heart, are of infinitely more value than the things men may possess.

The Inner Life and the Human Body

As Taine, in his *Lectures on Greek Art* has pointed out, sculpture is preëminently the form of art best suited to express the spirit of Greek life. Excluding the asceticism and orphic elements in such writers as Pythagoras and Plato, the Greek mind is predominantly naturalistic. The soul is the spirit, the "form," the meaning, which gives value to the body; the body is the stuff, the content, the "matter," through which the soul embodies itself. There is no asceticism. Arms and legs and shoulders are in Homer just as essential to the expression of personality as the face. Mediæval rationalism, building on the rationalism of Plato, and on that of Aristotle as well, has brought the physical body into disrepute. The face as the godlike abode of the reason has become the chief medium through which personality expresses itself. Emotion and bodily activity are regarded as animal processes; reason alone man shares with the divine. All this is foreign to the naturalism of the Greek mind. There is no "pure" intellect, no Platonic universal truth, which disdains the concrete movements of the physical body. It is a genuine function of an idea, as Taine points out, to control bodily movement. Sensations and muscular responses and emotions are the natural medium for the expression of intellect and soul. This is why classical nude art is never vulgar. It is vulgar only to the dualistic consciousness which we have in-

herited from the Middle Ages. The Greek soul is at home in its body. The Greek intellect does not despise the body with its sensations and its emotions. This is why sculpture is the natural medium of Greek art.

Civilization with its growing emphasis on reflection disturbed the unity of mind and body which existed among all the earlier forms of human life. In the face of the Hermes of Praxiteles there is a baffling look, an abstracted gaze, a mental detachment, which is not seen in the earlier Greek statues. It is the reflection in art of the Socratic spirit. The world had begun to look within. Aristotle speaks of the new epoch that was opened when reflection brought to light intelligence or knowledge as the greatest thing in the world.

This Socratic point of view resulted in a new estimate of man. Men ceased to describe and estimate the shoulders, thighs, chests, arms, and legs after the manner of Homer. They ceased to go to the gymnasium to improve and train the body. They went rather to the mental gymnasium of Plato or Aristotle. They estimated their fellows not by their ability to overcome their enemies in physical combat but by their superiority in reasoning. Not in one's use of the spear and the sword but in one's manipulation of the truths of mathematics and logic was to be found the proper criterion of value. Men began to think of themselves as primarily mental beings.

The old days when a religious group could dance itself into an overpowering consciousness of its god (II Sam. 6:16, Psa. 18:29) were in a distant past.

Not through instinct and emotion but through an inner spiritual knowledge, through the universal truths of the reason, had men come to find God.

This focusing of the mind on reason shifted the place of the bodily life in thought and conduct. Greek thought influenced by the Orient reorganized Roman and Christian and, in part, the Old Testament thought. The Book of Wisdom declares that the body weighs down the soul. The Christian conscience turned from the ideals incarnated in Greek statuary because the consciousness of the body had come to be associated with a sense of shame. St. Paul declares that in the flesh dwelleth no good thing. The marble baths which were symbolic of the glory of Greek and Roman life were taboo to the Christian mind. The philosopher Plotinus would not recognize his birthday because it symbolized his association with his body. Even Plato shared this mood at times and spoke of the body as the prison of the soul.

Perugino painted arrows in the beautiful body of his St. Sebastian thereby symbolizing the mediæval contempt for the flesh. An orientalized Greek philosophy had taught the world to find the real man in a spiritualized form of mind. The body had come to be a piece of coarse and vulgar clay.

Since the conscience of the West had professedly identified itself with the mind which was in Christ, since it had identified itself with the dying and bleeding body of its Lord, how could it dance like David or like the pagan Pan? If the hands and feet of the Lord of the new conscience were pierced with nails, if his breast was pierced with a spear, how could the Chris-

tian world think of their bodies as did the pre-Christian Hebrew or Greek world? St. Paul boasted that he always carried about in his own body the dying of the Lord. And St. Francis with his blessed stigmata only experienced more gloriously what every sensitive Christian in his poor way felt to be true.

The art of Fra Angelico in which the mediæval spiritualization of the body reached its culmination aimed to express the ideal of pure form with the least possible concession to the physical body. Dürer's "Praying Hands" portrays the ideal of a soul struggling through asceticism to climb above the limitations of the flesh.

But the mediæval dualism only served to augment an already accentuated consciousness of the human body. The brain that organizes the relation of the organism to its environment without a consciousness of strain has very little awareness of body as a physical thing. But consciousness, knowledge, art, arise only where a screen of imagery intervenes between the mind and its world. The brooding introversion of the mediævalists polished the mirror of introspection until the problem of mind and body was reflected with a clearness not known before.

CHAPTER XX

THE INNER LIFE COMPROMISES WITH THE FIRST EMPIRE

The Newer Conscience Compromises with the State

From the fourth century to the Reformation the organized Catholic Church was the official religious organ of western civilization as embodied in states and empires. While the earlier world-denying type of Christianity lived on in the monastery there arose in the papacy an organization whose function it was to infuse the new Christian ideal into the institutions of society transmitted through Greek and Roman civilization. The Catholic Church was all that was left of the Roman Empire in which was conserved the culture of the ages.

Christianity with its abstract spirituality logically would have kept aloof from the forms of organized society, the state, the family, science and industry, because the predominant Greco-Roman bases of these social forms were contrary to the inner, spiritual freedom of the Christian man. This would have been the logical ideal; but this did not happen. The separation of the Christian Church from the actual social and political world could only be theoretical. What really happened was that the great historical civiliza-

tions of the Greeks, Romans, and Germans furnished the mediæval church with the forms through which it could partially interpret and express its new ideal. Christianity did not remain aloof from the social and political world as it did in the days of Paul, when it looked for the immediate coming of an inner spiritual kingdom. The Christian world soon came to be largely controlled by the intellectualistic type of Greek philosophy which was associated with the downfall of the Greek state. The ideal of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle was the social good, but their dialectic method was disintegratory in its bearing on the old social ideal. And the later Greek philosophic schools, the Stoics, the Epicureans and Sceptics, emphasized the doctrine of the independence of the so-called external world. It was this type of Greek philosophy that so largely controlled the ideal of early Christian thought. But as the Christian community gradually evolved into the Christian Church as an organization, this abstract separation from the social and political world became more theoretical than actual. Christianity was unable to maintain its attitude of independence of the world. The passage of these early centuries shows that the Christian Church was simply overawed by Roman law and by Greek culture, and that later on she received new vigor from the fresh, strong, social life of the Germanic people. "When Christianity [1] began to develop as a permanent historical form of life, when the expectation of an early end of the world failed to be realized, the positive elements were unfolded." The Christian ideal began to permeate the forms of the

[1] Paulsen's Ethics, p. 168.

secular world, art, science, the family, industry. Greek philosophy, the Hebrew prophets, and the teaching of the Nazarene began to fashion the life and ideals of the western races.

The chief forms which the Christian ideal acquired were Roman organization, Greek philosophy, and the Germanic idea of the social group. We will take up first the Roman contribution of the idea of organization.

For three centuries the Roman state was the great enemy of the Christian religion; in the Book of Revelation Rome is pictured as a beast that devours the saints. In the fourth century Christianity was made the state religion; the State and the Church were coordinate powers. The Church, overawed by the majesty of the Roman political organization, gladly welcomed the authority of the Empire now placed at her disposal. Roman citizenship had been extended to all subjects of the Empire, and this citizenship gave definite social status and protection. From the fourth century the idea obtained that God used the state as his instrument in the government of the world; the state was indispensable to the church. But this was not all. The removal of the seat of government from Rome to Constantinople in 476 made the Pope the greatest person in the West. The so-called Donation of Constantine, framed in the eighth or ninth century, which gave the papacy power over great territory, reveals the mediæval idea of the political function of the church. In the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries the church had a jurisdiction of her own, parallel to that of the state. This is shown by the development of

Canon Law, modelled after the Roman civil law. Nor did the development stop here for there finally was evolved the idea that the church, as the arbiter of men's souls, had supreme authority on earth. The history of this development is clear. Leo the First in the fifth century asserted the primacy of the Roman bishop. The bishopric in its development followed the territorial Roman division; there were metropolitan bishops and patriarchs. In the East, Antioch, Alexandria, and Constantinople were rivals. Rome had no such rival in the West; hence the Roman bishop became the œcumenical bishop. The assertion of political power was natural; the masterful Leo went forth to overawe with his spiritual presence the superstitious barbarians. Charlemagne was crowned emperor by the Pope in 800. Otto the Great in 962 was crowned by the Pope emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. Gregory VII (1073-85) actually made the church supreme over the state; it was he who humbled Henry VI at Canossa. In Innocent III the papacy was at the height of its temporal power. From the twelfth century the ecclesiastical courts had control over marriage, which had become a sacrament and was indissoluble; the Council of Trent (1545-63) required that the marriage ceremony be performed by a priest in the presence of two witnesses. So far had the church gone in its attempt to govern the world.

As Carter says, the Oriental element of world-denial could not survive in the West. Neo-Platonism had no organization, and of course failed to win the Roman world. Mithraism had an organization and a system of ritual, but it lacked the sympathy and love of the

common man that came from the Nazarene. Christianity had the personality and social teaching of its founder as its greatest asset; hence its success. And so in the fourth century Constantine as emperor of Rome adopted Christianity as the religion of the state. Furthermore Constantine removed his capital to Constantinople, leaving Rome a free field for the evolution of the Holy Roman Empire—the old Rome with its culture and government interpreted in terms of the New Testament as it was then understood. The emperor Gratian in the fourth century, under the guidance of Ambrose, cut off the old pagan cults from the financial support of the state. Gregory (604) gave definite outline to the institution of the Catholic Church which embodied the Christian ideal in a definite organization, and so enabled the old Roman world of philosophy and culture and government to continue in spite of the barbarian invasion.

In the Middle Ages church and state went together; the church represented the inner spiritual life of the New Testament, and the state the old Roman idea of a social order which had rested on "status." The state was the body, the church was the soul, of mediæval society. In estimating the central idea of the mediæval period we must keep in mind the fact that freedom of political action and of religious belief was impossible until individual citizens had reached a point in their moral and social development where they would voluntarily carry out those common social ideals which in the mediæval world were guaranteed by the emperor and the pope. When in the Reformation period the separation of church and state did take

place, immediately each nation set up its own state church founded on its own kind of dogma. In England it was the Church of England; in Germany it was Lutheranism; in Scotland it was Presbyterianism. Individuals could not separate themselves from scholasticism, ecclesiasticism, the unity of church and state, from authority, until they had achieved for themselves a system of institutions, educational, religious, political, which was the free expression of a voluntary but social will. The elements of license and individualism in the Renaissance show that it takes time for men to achieve a free church and a free social order. In his dealing with Zwingli, for instance, we see not Luther the modern reformer, but Luther the mediæval scholastic. The same story is repeated in Calvin's treatment of Socinus. The fact that the Middle Ages was a period of authority must not prevent us from seeing that it was an epoch in which the old pagan social order was being spiritualized. It was a period in which the earlier world-denying type of Christianity was learning to master the forms of social organization through which it could christianize the world.

The old Hebrew, Greek, and Roman civilizations believed in the reality and divinity of the civic consciousness. But Greek philosophy, in the person of Socrates, brought to self-consciousness the inner life of western civilization; it brought the Hebrew mind to self-consciousness also; this is seen, for example, in the Fourth Gospel. At the beginning of the Christian era the chief interest of the whole Greco-Roman world had become cosmopolitan; the highest virtue consisted in an inner, universal state of mind, and because the

underlying condition of the mind was cosmopolitan, the old social virtues, which centered in the family, the community, the state, were regarded as local and accidental. This was the atmosphere in which early Christianity developed; hence its tendency toward world-denial. Church was against state because the Roman state was founded on principles incompatible with the newer virtues for which Christianity stood. In Revelation Rome was represented as Babylon because she destroyed the saints. But the inner, pietistic type of Christian life changed as the centuries passed by; the inner spiritual kingdom came to be regarded as a kingdom realizable, at least in part, in this world. This change was furthered by the continual postponement of the supernatural coming of the kingdom; but, more to the point still, the Christian Church fell heir to the legacy of the old Greco-Roman civilization. Early Christianity preached the separation of church and state; it declared that the kingdom would come through means extraneous to the state. Later Christianity controlled and transformed the state; it used the state as an instrument to establish its kingdom on the earth. There existed warfare and opposition between Christianity and paganism for four hundred years; then there was a truce for a thousand years. What does this mean? It means that the Greco-Roman civilization represented the old social institutions, and that the Greek reason and the Christian will were beginning to transform these fundamental institutions of the old social régime. This is the explanation of the political interests of the mediæval Church. At first the Empire was the enemy of the new conscience; then it was due

to man's fall, it was the result of sin; finally it was the instrument of the Church in the working out of man's salvation. This represents the stages of transition from the Apocalypse through Augustine to Dante. To hold political office in the early days was irreconcilable with membership in the Church; later on the church laid claim to temporal sovereignty.

But the mediæval unity of the individual and the state was not brought about in the spirit and method of the New Testament; nor was the mediæval Christian alive with the Greco-Roman devotion to the state; the state was incarnated in the emperor and was upheld by his armies. The mediæval individual could not have been held loyal to the state through the spirit and method of the New Testament; only fragments of Greco-Roman civilization remained, mingled with the incoming material of barbarism. Will implies habit; freedom implies tradition; true individuality implies social organization. Greek and Roman civilization had fallen through its own inner decay and the hordes from the North were but the crude, raw material of civilization. The mediæval world demanded organization and authority; the conditions of individual freedom did not exist. Jeremiah implies Moses; Homer must precede Plato; the New Testament presupposes the Old Testament. Will, self-consciousness, freedom, are achievements. The Middle Ages were necessary as a "foundation of routine" upon which could be built a civilization comparable with those that produced St. Paul and Socrates and Cicero. In the Middle Ages Christianity ceased to be a world-denying, and became a world-transforming institution; but the mediæval

method and spirit were those of Moses and Lycurgus, not those of Jeremiah and Socrates. A new foundation of routine had to be laid—the foundation of an authoritative social order.

In the early days of Christianity war was entirely outside the sphere of Christian ideals; no Christian ever thought of serving in the army. But the Church had inherited a world in which war was a necessary part. Christianity was now the religion of the state and the state was preserved through arms. The result was a fusion of the pagan idea of war and the Christian idea of service; and this is the meaning of the mediæval institution of chivalry. Chivalry stood for the sword, but it meant a sword in the defense of the weak and the oppressed. The sword of the knight was blessed by a priest before the altar of the Church. The Crusades, for example, were wars sanctioned by the Church because in the interest of religious faith. And this ideal of chivalry was something new in the history of morals. To the Greek and the Roman service meant slavery, but here was a new idea that service was noble when devoted to a lofty ideal. In the schools conducted in the castles of the nobility, the sons of the highborn served their knight as pages and squires. Even menial service was exalting when squire and lord were actuated by one ideal! Such is the fusion of pagan and Christian ethics. The old Greek and Roman ideals regarding birth, wealth, noble bearing, love of power, ability to command, luxury in dress, are here fused with the tender Christian virtues of love, humility and service, and devotion to the weak, making the new ideal of chivalrous conduct.

The Intellect Compromises with the Old Order

We have just seen that Roman organization helped to give Christianity control over the social order. We now turn to another great contribution of antiquity which assisted in this same process; namely, Greek philosophy. "The Christian faith could overcome ancient culture and attract the philosophers only by entering into some form of Greek speculation. [1] On the other hand, the ancient culture could be preserved for later ages only at the price of an alliance with Christian faith." This is the key to the understanding of the historical and social significance of Christian doctrine. The Catechist School at Alexandria is an ideal illustration of this process. In this school Clement and Origen (in the third century) continued the development which began in Philo and the Fourth Gospel. According to Clement the divine Logos had spoken through Greek philosophy as well as through Hebrew prophecy; both lead up to the full expression of the Logos in Christ, who is the incarnation of that divine principle active everywhere in the world. Origen was the most famous head of this Catechetical School. Trained in the neo-Platonic philosophy he thoroughly christianized Hellenism and hellenized Christianity. The incarnation is the "process [2] by which the divine Logos becomes one with a morally pure human person, who may be regarded as the realization of the universal ideal of God-humanity, differing only in de-

[1] Pfleiderer, *The Development of Christianity*, p. 56.
[2] Pfleiderer, *Ibid.*, p. 63.

gree from the Logos which dwelt in the prophets and the pious generally." Here we have "the great thought of a general kingdom of God wherein all peoples, Greek and Roman and barbarian, shall be united by a common morality and a common religion, a realm in which there shall be no oppresion by force, but a free moral community in which all are governed by the Logos. Such is the Christian interpretation of Plato's ideal state and of the Stoic thought of a universal kingdom of God governed by the Logos . . . The best thoughts of Greek philosophy were here united with the moral earnestness and all-encompassing love of humanity of the Gospels in such fashion that they became the common property of Christian theology and of the Church." [1] In the great Nicene controversy in the fourth century there was at stake the same issue of the divine in the human. Greek philosophy was thus the greatest instrument of the intellect which antiquity had to bestow. Scholars like Boethius became famous merely as translators. The intellectual interpreters of Christian doctrine of this period are known as the Church Fathers; they defined the relation of God to man in terms of the divinity of Christ, and the world they defined in terms of the kingdom of God.

When the fall of Rome took place the Christian Church was the only institution which survived from the old order. Her problem was to christianize the incoming barbarian races which were to make up the coming order. The evolution of the papacy, which we have already noticed, was a part of this process. Parallel with this development went the intellectual develop-

[1] Pfleiderer, *Ibid.*, p. 65.

ment known as scholasticism; since there was one universal church there had to be one universal body of doctrine. To provide this was the function of scholasticism, which was the intellectual interpretation of the consciousness of the period extending from the last part of the eleventh century to the Renaissance. The Church Fathers had worked out a body of doctrine; it was the function of scholasticism to show that this body of doctrine was in harmony with reason. As Kuno Fisher, using Anselm's phraseology, says, the Church declared *deus* to have become *homo,* and scholasticism's fundamental problem was: *Cur deus homo?*

Scotus Erigena in the ninth century first applied formal dialectic to theology and thereby became the forerunner of Scholasticism. God, the Logos, the unity of the world and God, were treated in characteristic Platonic fashion. Erigena, however, was declared unorthodox and it remained for Anselm in the eleventh century to become the founder of Scholasticism. According to Anselm universals alone were real, and through these universals absolute truth could be clearly stated. He proved in this purely formal fashion the existence of God and gave the Church its scholastic doctrine of the atonement. It was the universal reason of Stoicism which laid the basis for the universal application of Roman law to the civilized western world. This principle holds true of mediæval realism. If our concepts do not apply to reality then we have no knowledge of reality and, therefore, no ground for faith. Realism held knowledge and faith to be inseparable. This is the significance of the dispute over realism and nominalism carried on near the end of the eleventh cen-

tury between William of Champeaux and Roscellinus. Scholastic realism and ecclesiastical centralization went together. The type of realism predominant in the twelfth century was Platonic—*universalia ante rem* —in which ideas are preëxistent. Down to the twelfth century only a part of Aristotle's logic was known. Then the inductive side of Aristotle's logic, his metaphysics, psychology, and physics, became known in translations. Hence in the thirteenth century we have the Aristotelian type of realism—*universalia in re*—in which the universals are real as formative elements within things. Aristotle's sway was at first opposed. Averroës, the famous Arabian philosopher of Spain, who was Aristotle's best interpreter, was for a long time regarded as the enemy of the Church. The transition from Platonic to Aristotelian realism began in the conceptualism of Abelard (—1142). The formulation of Aristotelian realism was the immortal achievement of Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century. He used Aristotle's idea of development to relate and subordinate the entire world of nature to the supernatural world of the Church. His *Summa Theologiæ* was the result of this application of Aristotle's deductive logic to the sphere of Christian theology. It is still the orthodox text of Catholic theology.

The old Greco-Roman order represented wealth, property, the family, the state, knowledge, art, and science—it was naturalistic and stood upon the earth. Christianity introduced love of the individual, deeper social sympathy, the worth of the common soul. Some of the Church Fathers could find nothing in common between Hellenism, on the one hand, and Hebraism

and Christianity, on the other. They were pietists, separatists. But the Greek fathers Clement and Origen saw that the Christian will and faith apart from the Greek Logos, apart from knowledge and science, could not control, and therefore could not save, the world. The same tendency prevailed in Scholasticism. The universal authority of the Church, with its absolute dogmas, was interpreted in the light of human reason through the best knowledge they could get of Plato and Aristotle. *The Christian will was brought into working adjustment with the world through the Greek intellect.* This was the mediæval way of christianizing the world of philosophy and science.

The early Christians, as a body, made no use of the intellectual achievements of Greek civilization—science, education, philosophy; the mysticism of early Christianity, as Paul himself tells us, was "foolishness" to the Greeks. But there are Hellenic elements even in the Gospels themselves; Gnosticism played a fundamental part in the evolution of early Christian doctrine, and the Fourth Gospel is the very incarnation of Greek philosophy. Instead, therefore, of continued opposition to science and knowledge as incarnated in Greek philosophy, the Christian spirit soon came to use the Greek intellect to interpret not only the world and society, but even its own message. This is the meaning of the Christian Fathers and of Scholasticism. As Moses came from the meditation of Midian to lead Israel out of Egypt; as Paul returned from the wilderness of Arabia to universalize the religion of the Jews, so the conscience of the Christian Church, interpreted by Greek philosophy, came from the contemplation of

the monastery to conquer the intellectual world. The mediæval Christian did not base the truths of Scholasticism on his own experience; the truth was incarnated in the Church and upheld by œcumenical councils. But Plato and Aristotle, as they were then understood, were used by the theologians of the Church to make intelligible to the Christian understanding the world which it was attempting to control and spiritualize. The reorganization of society demanded an authoritative truth for society as a whole; to provide this was the function of Scholasticism. Early Christianity emphasized revelation and faith; it admitted learning only as an aid to conduct. But the world needed the philosophy of Plato, the poetry of Vergil, the eloquence of Cicero. Accordingly Aquinas christianized Aristotle; Dante did the same for Vergil, and Raphael in his School of Athens gave to the Greek scholar and the Christian saint the same standing in the Christian imagination.

The Inner Ideal Compromises with the Family

We have seen that the world-denying spirit of early Christianity, when the coming of the Kingdom of God ceased to be an immediate expectation, began to appropriate the forms of the older Greek and Roman civilization, philosophy and law. Christianity became a world-conquering rather than a world-denying spirit. We have seen how the inner primitive Christian spirit appropriated the forms of Greek philosophy and Roman law, as instruments of control over the intellectual and political world. There remains to be con-

sidered another institution, coming down from the older social régime—the institution of the family. It was the Greeks who contributed science and philosophy and art, and the Romans the institution of the state; it remained for the Germanic peoples to contribute the institution of the family. Among the Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans, the family was the very heart of social life; but from the Orient there came into later Greek and Roman thought ascetic tendencies at variance with the very existence of the family; the prevailing philosophy was individualistic and cosmopolitan; even the Hebrew could become an Essene. This Oriental element of asceticism in early Christianity looked upon celibacy as a higher form of life than marriage. There came to be a double standard of life; there was a higher, perfect life, and a lower standard for ordinary Christians. In upper Egypt, in the third and fourth centuries, asceticism, especially under the influence of St. Anthony, expressed itself in the solitary life of the hermit. Pachomius, about the middle of the fourth century, presided over colonies of hermits in Egypt, thus leading the way toward the evolution of the monastery. Pachomius thus represents the intermediate stage between the hermit and the monk. At Nicæa (325) universal celibacy of the clergy would have passed the council but for the eloquence of one voice. This shows that celibacy was morally demanded of the clergy in the fourth century. Monasticism as an institution distinguished the West from the East, and was largely the creation of Benedict in the sixth century. Benedict's work was embodied in his Rule of the Monastic Order which centered around manual work, clear-

ing of forests, copying of manuscripts, regular hours for reading. In the eleventh century Gregory VII enforced celibacy on the clergy as a profession.

The monks were the greatest schoolmasters of the time. They copied and preserved the classics; they were the librarians and historians of Europe; they were the custodians of the old culture. The Bible could teach morals and religion, but the world needed grammar and logic and music and mathematics and philosophy. The classics—Homer, Plato, Cicero—were the source of these things. The monastery was the chief place in mediæval Europe for scholarship and study. But the institution of monasticism, although it served as the depository of ancient culture, represented a development in the field of morals which was essentially Oriental in origin. Christianity needed a positive ideal of the family. She had learned organization from Rome and philosophy from Greece; where was she to learn the ethics of the family as a social institution? The answer is, from the Germanic people.

In early Greek thought Aphrodite represented the principle of sex and the origin of life; and the principle of fertility was the foundation of religion among the Canaanites, who transmitted their practices to their Hebrew conquerors. Prophetism, however, was violently opposed to these nature religions. Likewise the ethics of Christianity was in direct opposition to the animalism and naturalism of the pagan cult of Aphrodite. The old view which looked upon woman as an instrument of fertility in the service of the family or the state was no longer possible. The new ethics of personality, of the inner life, could no longer look

upon any individual as a means to anything incompatible with his own inner life. Christianity treated woman as the spiritual equal of man; indeed Christianity seized upon the abstract essence of the soul of man and was from the first suspicious of the sexual life as endangering the spiritual reality of the individual. The doctrine of the virgin birth of Jesus tended to banish the sexual from the moral life. Moreover, the idea that the end of the world was near persisted even into the Middle Ages.

But it is difficult to condemn sex and to idealize motherhood; and this was what the Church did. Of course the child of the Virgin was a divine child; nevertheless, the Virgin was a mother, so that with all its inconsistency the Church did idealize motherhood. The idea of a divine mother was never lost; and it is evident that the notion of the spirituality of asceticism and the ideal of the divinity of motherhood cannot remain forever apart! There were, therefore, elements in the Christian tradition that tended powerfully toward the spiritualizing of sex and motherhood. But there was another source of influence which added a distinct momentum in the same direction; we refer, of course, to the Germanic peoples.

In the agricultural life of the Germanic tribes women tilled the soil and domesticated the animals; men were left free for the chase and for war. The bond between father and child was not enduring; the relation between mother and child, on the other hand, was the central bond of society. The German woman was physically strong and her virtues have been set in strong contrast to the Roman vices by the historian Tacitus.

In early Germanic law woman's worth was equal to and in some cases three times that of man. The Visigoths were the only Germanic people who valued woman less than man, and even they gave her a higher value (wergeld) between the ages of fifteen and twenty.[1] The unit of society was not the individual, but the family, consisting of those related by blood. Fines were paid not to the individual but to the family, and wrongs were avenged not by the individual but by the family. The family and tribe controlled the rights of the individual. Tacitus and Cæsar tell us that Germanic territory was not privately owned; among the Franks the land was not privately owned until the sixth century.[2] Roman law as modified by Stoicism was universal and treated individuals as having equal rights; amongst the Germans the individual secured his rights only through his membership in his family and clan.

This German ideal of woman and of the family was in marked contrast to the Roman and monastic ideals. The monastic ideal separated countless devotees from home, wife, and children. Only theoretically however were the clergy celibate, concubinage being the actual practice. The moral ideal of monasticism was at war with itself. On the one hand, woman was idealized; on the other hand, she was regarded as the very source of evil. With the development of monastic Christianity, woman lost the position of honor she had held in the older social life. The Romanic nations

[1] Rullkoeter, *Legal Protection of Woman among the Ancient Germans.* University of Chicago Press, p. 44.
[2] Rullkoetter, *Ibid.,* p. 90.

exemplify today the Roman, in contrast to the Germanic, view of woman. To the Germanic, rather than the Romanic, source we owe the idea of the family as the basic institution of society. This does not mean that asceticism and monasticism have not contributed elements to the Christian ideal of the family. Quite the contrary; the abstract spirituality of asceticism and the German family consciousness will yet unite to give a new type of family, just as Roman law and the Christian spirit have already partially united to suggest a new ideal of the state. The idealization of woman was the mainspring of chivalry. Unlike the Olympian games, the mediæval tournaments were attended by ladies who assisted wounded knights and gave the prize for bravery and skill. This idealization of love in chivalry was romantic and sentimental and tended to disintegrate the family; but as an addition to the Greek and Roman conception of love it was a unique ethical advance. Just as chivalry transformed the pagan ideal of military courage, by fusing it with the Christian ideal of service, so it idealized sexual passion by making it the medium of a religious devotion to womanhood. The animalism of sexual passion was transformed by the subtle alchemy of Christian idealism into the sentiment of love.

What chivalry did in the evolution of the sentiment of love is clearly seen in Chaucer's tale of the Knight. Seeing how Arcite and Palamon face death for his daughter's hand, Theseus exclaims: "Ah, the God of Love, Benedicite, how mighty and great a lord he is! Against his might no impediments avail; . . . of every heart he can make what he will. Lo here are this

Palamon and this Arcite, that were all quit of my prison and might have loved royally in Thebes, and know that I am their mortal foe and that their death lies in my power; yet love . . . has brought them hither both to die! . . . And yet they that serve love deem themselves full wise, for aught that may betide!" (*The Knight's Tale, Modern Reader's Chaucer*). Palamon in his prayer to Venus asks, if she denies him the love of his lady, that Arcite may spear him through the heart; for he would die in love's service! This is paganism, but it is a christianized paganism. Such sighing and lamenting, such warm feeling and tender devotion, has behind it a thousand years of Christian idealism. These knights are neither fierce barbarians nor Christians at heart; they are a mixture of both. The love of a tender lady is won in a lusty encounter with spears! Chaucer says that his knight had slain his foe in many mortal battles, yet he was a courteous, gentle knight. As Chaucer's prioress combines courtly manners and stately bearing with true Christian feeling; as his monk combines piety with a genuinely worldly love of the chase; so his knight combines honor, courtesy, and liberality in war with a deathless devotion to the sentiment of love. And this dying for love, this lifelong devotion to sentiment, did not exist in the ancient world; it was a new development in human experience. When Chaucer's knight at the temple of Venus offers his life in her service, he symbolizes the birth of a new experience in the life of the race. This new sentiment of love was wholly romantic; it was not made the basis of courtship; it was parasitic and often tended toward disor-

ganization. But the important thing is that such a sentiment came into existence; for it is impossible for such a sentiment to exist permanently without being transferred to wives and mothers as well as to courtly ladies.

Architecture shows us this same fusion of pagan and Christian ideals. When Christianity left the catacombs its first churches were Roman basilicas, roofed and enclosed. Then followed the Romanesque type in which the roof of the antique basilica was made of stone instead of wood; there was a spherical vault, and high perpendicular walls, with a ground plan in the shape of a cross. Finally there came the Gothic type with its flying buttresses and lofty spires. In the mysticism and the sense of the beyond of the Gothic type architecture expressed in stone the mediæval conception of the Christian ideal.

The development of language shows the same synthesis of the pagan and the Christian spirit; there is the same interpenetration of classic and Christian ideals. The attitude of the Christian toward classical forms and types varies all the way from the joyous synthesis of an Origen or an Abelard to the bitter antagonism of a Tertullian. Jerome's dream, in which Christ appears to him with the rebuke: "Thou art a Ciceronian! Where thy heart is, there is thy treasure!" shows the new Christian consciousness pathetically struggling to free itself from the older pagan classical tongue! How eloquent is the inconsistency of Tertullian, exclaiming that Plato and Christ have nothing in common, and yet insisting on the necessity of the study of classical literature! The Greek language for ex-

ample, expressed the basic Greek ideals of life, proportion, measure, balance, rhythm, rational self-control. The Christian saint, however, was a new creation; his fundamental virtues were no longer temperance, courage, wisdom, and justice, but faith, hope, and love. Love without measure had taken the place of rational self-control! There were new emotions, new attitudes, new views of life; and these new values, these new ideals, actually distorted classical linguistic forms; the new wine broke the old bottles. Christianity actually evolved a new repertoire of sentiments and attitudes and ideas; the portrayal of Christian experience in connection with the life of Jesus in Christian art makes this evident to all. The result was a Christian literature, old in materials, but new in spirit. These new feelings were the symbols of a new world.

The Inner Life is an Impossible Ideal

The Middle Ages was a period whose chief characteristic was the fusion of opposites, the struggle of contradictions. The older pagan elements were in constant warfare with the newer Christian spirit; the former characteristics were rooted in the world-old instincts of the human mind, the Christian spirit was a new attitude which aimed at a complete transformation of the world. The Greek and Roman consciousness expressed itself in the mediæval state; but the state to the mediæval Christian consciousness was merely a secular or worldly organization which—as the moon borrows all its light from the sun—derived its temporary significance from the Church. The Greek

love of wisdom was kept alive in Scholasticism but the mediæval intellect never faced reality directly as did the Greek mind; mediæval philosophy was but an instrument in the service of Christian faith. The dualism of state and church is paralleled by the dualism of knowledge and faith. This juxtaposition of conflicting ideals is most apparent in the mediæval ethics of the family; the Christian dogma of the divine mother and the Germanic idea of the sacredness of woman, go along with the monastic doctrine of the utter sinfulness of sexual love and marriage! The world-old pagan instinct of sex, with its love of child and its devotion to woman, stood in open opposition to the mediæval type of abstract spirituality. In the institution of chivalry there was evolved and refined the quasi-Christian sentiment of love. But this new sentiment was not made the basis of the Christian family until the period of the Reformation. Mediæval chivalry was the result of the influence of the Prince of Peace over the god of war; but the warriors of Charlemagne or even the warrior monks of the Crusades could hardly have understood the true significance of the Sermon on the Mount. Mediæval art revealed the reality of the "inner" life; but it never synthesized the "inner" and the "outer" worlds.

Nor need we be surprised at the number of unsolved contradictions in the Middle Ages; for the Middle Ages represent a break in the development of Western civilization. There could not have been a complete synthesis of the newer Christian conscience and the old pre-Christian institutions—the state, learning, the family, art, and literature—in the Middle Ages

because the fall of the Roman Empire removed the very foundations of culture and civilization, upon which the new conscience might have built a still higher level of life. Had the old foundations of culture remained in Palestine and Greece and Rome, there might have been a gradual transformation of the older ethnic morality of Moses and Solon and Cato by the newer morality of Socrates and Epictetus and Jesus. But the older civilizations of the West passed away. The Catholic Church was the only link with the past. To her fell the task of laying the foundations for another civilization. The Christianity of the Middle Ages was not the Christianity of Jesus; it was rather a continuation of the Hebrew priesthood, whose business was not to preach the Gospel but to teach the Law. The ethics of Jesus would have been impossible in the Middle Ages. The world demanded unity and order, not freedom; and the mediæval Church met this need. It was a period of centralization; the Emperor symbolized unity of government, the Pope, unity of religious belief; Scholasticism guaranteed unity of thought; art provided a medium for the expression of a common religious experience; the Latin language gave all Europe a common medium of thought and social intercourse. To provide a spiritual authority coördinate with the Empire; to evolve a system of morals and religion compatible with reason; to transform the spirit of war; to transmute the instinct of sex into the sentiment of love, and thus to lay the basis for a new type of family; to create a type of art and architecture which made real and dominant the spiritual life; to give to the world a new kind of emotional experience—such

were the achievements of the Middle Ages. They were epoch-making achievements, for upon these achievements, and upon these alone, as its necessary foundation, could modern morality be developed.

PART IV

TRANSITION TO A THIRD EMPIRE

CHAPTER XXI

INTROVERSION AS A REHEARSAL FOR A RICHER OBJECTIVE LIFE

Historical Christianity came to center about an inner, mystical, otherworldliness. But this process was only a stage in the moral evolution of the race; wherever it has been regarded as the goal of moral and religious development, the world of common life, of industry and politics has lost the ethical and human note, and the world of morality and religion has lost its earlier function as an organizing principle of the entire life, social, industrial, and political, as well as individual. Ethics, on this basis, becomes a system of abstract theories, and religion tends to center in a dogmatic theology created by speculative minds. Religion loses its old socializing function, because it loses its contact with common life; on the other hand, the life of the family, of industry, of the state, tends to become non-moral; it lacks those very values which alone can make it human and ethical.

This "internalization," this world-denying process, has quite commonly been regarded as a permanent philosophy of life. From the evolutionary point of view this is a very misleading theory. History, development, evolution, suggest another interpretation. After the passing of the Athenian state Greek philoso-

phy was converted from a theory of life, in connection with the family and the state, into a disembodied, cosmopolitan inner state of mind, such as we see in Stoicism and neo-Platonism. After the Hebrew Exile the old social and political consciousness of the prophets was transformed into a priestly, sectarian spirit, or a universal non-political spirit of inner contemplation, such as we see in Proverbs and Ecclesiastes. This point of view had completely conquered the western mind in the first Christian centuries. It converted the social message of the prophets, true to Hebrew life, into a mystical otherworldliness. Instead of taking this as a final point of view it would seem more historical, more in accord with the idea of evolution, to regard this philosophy of the inner life as a temporary retreat of the social and moral consciousness—as represented in Greek philosophy and early Christianity—from the life of society, controlled as it then was by force and war, and showing universal evidence of national and moral decay. Philosophical rationalism and Christian monasticism were the means through which reason and will escaped from a barbarous and disorganized society. This withdrawal of the Hebrew, Greek, and Christian consciousness from the world of social institutions means psychologically a divorce between the old social order and a newly developed moral consciousness. It means that the newer ideal, which had expressed itself in Greek philosophy, Hebrew prophecy, and New Testament Christianity, had not yet coördinated itself with the older social order. The social order rested on instinct, interpreted and reorganized by custom and tradition. In time there developed hereditary monarchy,

centralized authority, government by force, vested in the hands of the few. Rights belonged only to the well-born, to members of patriarchal families, to those of blue blood. Kingdoms were founded on force; power was necessary to success; war was essential to life. In Greek philosophy, Hebrew prophecy, and New Testament Christianity a new set of values was recognized; instead of war, brotherhood; instead of power, service; instead of high birth, righteous conduct; instead of force in the hands of the few, love in the hearts of the best. Unable to reorganize the old order the newer conscience turned in on itself and evolved the ideal of an inner life. But we must not view the inner life as constituting a world independent of the state, the family, the world of nature. We must regard the inner ideal as a protest of the reason and conscience against certain elements of the old world order. Greek philosophy, Hebrew prophecy, and New Testament Christianity introduced a new set of values; the old social order rejected these values; hence ensued a separation of the new from the old. But the Cynic's tub, the Orphic's mystery, the prophet's New Jerusalem, the monk's chastity and poverty, were a denial not of society itself, but of a type of society incompatible with these newer values. The very spirit of denial, therefore, was a prophecy of another type of society yet to come. The virtues of the inner life, reason, will, love, freedom, individual initiative, furnished a revaluation of the old social régime.

From the first century to the fourth the "inner" life, the new man, the Christian conscience, was forced to create a separate cult; it was compelled to embody

itself in a new organization, the Church, in contradistinction to the old ethnic state, which now became secular. This was a necessary defensive measure; it was a movement of retreat, a piece of spiritual strategy. But the mediæval mind took this attitude of defense, a necessary but temporary "internalization" of the mind, and made it into a permanent creed. An "inner" attitude was apotheosized into absolute reality! But to take the will for the deed, to separate an attitude of mind from its realization in the world, to identify subjective mental states with the objective moral order of the world, is to convert a transitional attitude of defense into an ultimate philosophy of life. To treat one's subjective states of mind as if they were a substitute for objective reality is almost a sort of moral insanity. Indeed, Nietzsche refers to this mediæval spirituality, a spirituality which consists essentially of a process of negating the fundamental instincts of the race, as a form of volitional insanity. And surely there is something abnormal in the apotheosis of inhibition and negation. This mediæval "soul" is a self-antagonizing self-consciousness. This type of will is a process directed against its own fulfillment. The mediæval moral self is a hopelessly dual personality. Modern psychology supports Nietzsche's contention that the permanent inhibition of an instinct does not bring about its annihilation; rather there results an inward manifestation, an "internalization." The instincts respond not toward their appropriate objects; they are repressed until they find subterranean outlets. Surely this is a form of "volitional insanity." The age-long currents of the animal instincts are diabolized.

Such a psychological paralysis negates the old ethnic will to live! This is the psychological explanation of the painful list of mediæval hysterias, ecstasies, visions, and swoons. There arises, says Nietzsche, such a chronic condition of nervousness, such a universal morbidity that health itself becomes a neurosis! Man suffers not from others, not from the world, but from himself! The old pagan virtues—love of philosophy, culture and science, loyalty to the state, attachment to wife and child—become vices! Even as late as the eighteenth century the great Kant teaches that the consciousness of duty must always be accompanied by the negation of one's natural impulses.

The mediæval theoretical absoluteness of the "inner" life, however, is forced to compromise at every point. It learns organization from Rome and the Papacy is the result; it takes its philosophy from Greece and there develops the composite fusion of philosophy and Christianity called Scholasticism; the sex instinct is reënforced by Germanic tradition and the inner life is forced to compromise with the old ethnic institution of the family. This process of synthesis goes further; it interprets woman and sex in terms of Christian love; it even moralizes war in its new conception of the Christian knight. It combines the old Greek devotion to beauty and Christian idealism in the new product of Gothic architecture. Nevertheless church and state, philosophy and religion, sex and Christian love, warfare and loyalty to Christ, are still externally juxtaposed; they are not phases of a living, organic experience which expresses itself equally in them all. The church is an end and the state is a

means; philosophy is allowed to explain only what one already believes; the idealization of virginity and chastity degrades the sacredness of the family. The morality of the Middle Ages is a compromise all the way through. Dualism is written over every phase of its life.

The Renaissance, therefore, is the necessary psychological reaction from the abstract spirituality of the Middle Ages. The old virtues, the old instincts, the old psychical patterns of antiquity, are not dead. They are the psychical foundations of civilization itself. This is the explanation of Nominalism, of Humanism, of Individualism. They are symptoms of a new life. Love of beauty, respect for the body, the love of life, of culture, of science, loyalty to family, city and state, cannot be permanently repressed. Nominalism symbolized a return of free inquiry. There are elements in the old paganism which are absolutely necessary to preserve the sanity of mankind. The old is the foundation of the new. This is the explanation of pagan, of humanistic popes. The new Rome, the Church, cannot break absolutely with the old, pagan Rome. The attack of paganism on the capital of the Church, —the paganizing of the church,—is but a symbol of the inadequacy of the mediæval philosophy of life. The will to live here and now, the love of life for its own sake, asserted itself against the mediæval internalization and consequent diabolization of life itself. The soul becomes a citizen; the monk becomes a father; the labyrinthine subjectivity of the "inner" life begins to express itself in objective interests. The mediæval inner life without the old pagan instincts is an abstrac-

tion; hence the influx of paganism in the Renaissance is necessary to embody and make real the mediæval achievement of the inner life. The mediæval ideals were empty forms, tenuous abstractions; they needed flesh and blood. And flesh and blood came in the paintings of Raphael and Leonardo da Vinci; they came in the wonderful forms—genuinely Christian and equally Greek—chiseled by the hand of Michael Angelo.

When ideas do not lead the responses of the organism clear through to the objective interests of the organism; when they lead to no definite objective; when they are detached from objective ends, the responses of the organism are disorganized. Mediæval life was disorganized by a dual code of ethics. In the field of sex the ideal was chastity. But ideas which do not control the actual responses of the organism to its environment become unreal. Inhibition of sex enriches the sentiments and stimulates the imagination. Inhibition was at the root of the mediæval concept of sin. In the field of property the pagan symbol of the cornucopia was superseded by the ideal of poverty, yet the Church owned one-third of Europe. An inner kingdom had in theory supplanted the pagan state but in practice the Church was actually threatening the sovereign power of the state. *The Prince* of Machiavelli (published in 1515) was an expression of the new political consciousness of the Renaissance.

When the inner ideal was fighting for its life against an established order the concepts of soul and pure form and universal idea were symbols of a profound and growing centrality of mind. But once this inner king-

dom was achieved there was a slow centrifugal drift of the mind toward the old pagan objectives—the state, the family, art, and science.

To recognize only a purely interior world is to set the instincts and emotions free to drift and flounder in a world of unorganized fact. Such a mind literally drifts into realism. Denial of objective ends through introversion prevents the intellectual organization of such objective ends. Theoretical adherence to an absolute inner ideal leaves an undercurrent of suppressed impulses which urges the will all the more powerfully toward its natural objective ends. It is the hungry man who is obsessed with the idea of food, the ascetic with the ideas of sex and woman, the churchman, who renounces the state, with the idea of power. When Santayana tells us that the world is doing what is done, that we are in the vortex, but that we see with the eye of contemplation, he shows us how a helpless inner stare at the world tends to turn into a materialistic form of realism.

That the Renaissance is a reaction from the inner world of mediævalism to an outer, objective, realistic world is perfectly clear from the double-mindedness which characterizes some of the greatest Renaissance artists. Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519) is one of the world's greatest scientists. He regarded himself as primarily an engineer. He attempted to work out a means of flying. His drawings show a minute knowledge of plants. He made elaborate studies of anatomy. He drew the attitudes of animals. Man to Leonardo was a part of nature. By this realistic treatment of nature Leonardo becomes the very incarna-

tion of the Renaissance. But this realism doesn't break with the soul, the inner life of mediævalism. No one has painted a more spiritual head of Christ. But Leonardo's spirituality is not that of Fra Angelico. In the face of his John the Baptist there is the spirit of a Greek faun. But Leonardo's faun is not a return to the Greek Pan. Pan is himself changed because he lives in the same body with the spirit of John. This same presence of two minds in one body is the cause of the baffling complexity of the Mona Lisa.

In Il Sodoma's St. Sebastian we find the same complexity of spirit. The martyrdom, the suffering, the spirituality, of Christianity and the pagan fascination of physical beauty are present in St. Sebastian. Sodoma's mind included them both. In the works of these artists we can actually see the constituent elements because there is a doubleness of mind, because there is not a complete synthesis of the inner and the objective aspects of our world.

In Fra Lippo Lippi (-1469) the inner mediæval ideal has lost its grasp. Instead of the mediæval soul we find positivism and realism. His virgins are his own loves. His angels are ordinary children. In Andrea del Sarto (-1531) we find light and shade and color, with very little depth or soul. In the figures of Luca della Robbia there is soul but it is the soul of Homer incarnated in dancing bodies, in the joy and grace of moving limbs.

Rubens' portrayal of the human body is a protest against the mediæval ascetic denial of the body. But this over-emphasis of flesh like the mediæval over-emphasis of soul has behind it an emotional complex.

Here we see not the evanescent soul of a Fra Angelico nor the Platonic soul of a Botticelli; nor do we see a body poised and adjusted to its environment as in the best Greek sculpture. The bodies of naturalistic, realistic art have through emotional conflict been brought to the focus, to the center of consciousness. Bouguereau's figures, with their palpable surfaces, their flesh tints, their veins through which is suggested the purple flow of blood, their odorous hair, are bodies that breathe and move with life under our gaze. And Bouguereau belongs to the Venetian tradition which accents sensuous realism as over against the classic form of Rome and Florence. But the naturalistic ideal of the body without a soul is just as much the result of a conflict of body and soul as the mediæval ideal of a soul without a body. It is the tortured mediæval soul climbing through asceticism above the body which has left the outstanding materialistic physical body of naturalistic art and literature. The body is a living organism but as a living organism it is always something more than a physical thing. On the other hand, the mediæval protest against body made of the soul a pale suffering ghost. Moral poise and harmony and strength can come not through a body breaking loose from mind and will, nor from a soul ashamed of its body, but through a vital unity of the will and the bodily life. One sees this in the Russian ballet where mind and body are fused in an unfolding artistic drama. One sees it in the Venus de Milo in which the soul of woman, the mother of the race, is incarnated in the most perfect of female human forms. This synthesis of mediæval form and pagan realism is the secret of

the supremacy of Florentine art over the art of Venice. Rich embroidery, gorgeous apparel, sparkling wine, luscious fruits, are glorious symbols of life. But these elements in a Titian or a Veronese are never found with those ideal qualities of limb and face, of mind and soul, to be seen in a Botticelli, a da Vinci, a Raphael or a Michael Angelo. The reason why Giotto is so great is that he accomplished this synthesis as early as the thirteenth century. To break with the mediæval heaven and yet have something more than the material earth; to reject universal truth and yet hold to something more than individual opinion; to surrender a changeless soul and yet retain something more than a body of clay; to break with the authority of Pope and Emperor and yet steer clear of the chaos of individualism, was the problem presented by Renaissance thought. In other words, the problem was the synthesis of the soul of the church and the life of the world. And the earliest form in which this synthesis was effected was the art of the Italian Renaissance. In the æsthetic intuition of art paganism humanized mediæval Christianity and the latter idealized and spiritualized the naturalism of paganism. Sometimes these elements were juxtaposed rather than harmonized; the mediæval sense of sin and the old pagan joy of life often existed side by side in unmediated dualism. Sometimes as in Fra Angelico, the mediæval ideal stood in opposition to the naturalness of human life. On the other hand, as in Venetian art, realism overbalanced the idealism of the Christian spirit. But Florentine art brought about a perfect fusion of Greek naturalism and the Christian spirit. The same thing

is true of Michael Angelo (d. 1564). The spirit of Savonarola and that of Plato are fused together in Angelo's prophets and sibyls. The powerful human forms of his art are the expression of neither the naturalism of Greek paganism nor the mediæval spirit of world-denial; they are the expression of a balanced fusion of both ideals. In Raphael (d. 1520) is seen a still more ideal combination of the pagan and Christian points of view. Raphael has given the world a new type of Madonna, which is neither the rounded figure of Giorgione nor the sensuous form of Rubens nor again the angelic figure of Fra Angelico; the Madonna of Raphael is rather the fusion of mediæval asceticism and Greek naturalism, the Christian spirit dwelling in a human body. Symonds sums it all up in the statement that between the Athens of Pericles and Renaissance Florence lay twenty centuries of Christian history.

The Virgin of the Renaissance art was Aphrodite but not Aphrodite in her ancient form because the western mind had been for centuries saturated with asceticism and the ideal of pure soul. The western mind having acquired the subtlety of feeling, the complexity of sentiment which we see in Dante could see in the Virgin not the pagan Aphrodite but Aphrodite idealized by the alchemy of mediæval asceticism. The same synthesis of motives, the same reorganization of ideals, was taking place in regard to the institutions of property and the state. The opulence and luxury portrayed in Venetian art was being interpreted and idealized and given a newer and richer form in the art of Florence and Rome. Likewise a newer, pagan,

civic consciousness was evidenced in the rise of the Italian republics in Florence, Venice, and Milan. This is the meaning of the appearance of Machiavelli's *Prince*. But these modern states, although in themselves they may have been pagan enough, were created by people who were Christian at heart. And people who know and love Plato and Jesus and St. Francis and Dante, cannot wholly forget or ignore their ideals in their state-building.

This synthesis of paganism and Christianity, this reconstruction of life's objectives, was the special achievement of Florentine and Roman art. And this synthesis acquires a newer and richer meaning when we compare the achievement of Italian art with the fragmentary achievements in other fields. No such synthesis has yet been achieved in philosophy or science or religion as was achieved by the great Italian masters of art.

If mediæval introversion was merely a form of day-dreaming, if its thinking was a form of phantasy, then the mediæval inner life was a hysterical return to a narcissistic emotionalism; it was a flight from reality. But if it was an unconscious rehearsal for a deeper, a richer reorganization of the older ethnic patterns of life, then the mediæval process of introversion was one of the most significant stages in the evolution of the human mind. To cut off one's reactions to life because the mind is lost in phantasy is to exemplify a loss of nerve; but to gaze into the mirror of thought in order that there may be a better reorganization of life is to lay the basis for a creative civilization.

CHAPTER XXII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF REALISM IN THE RENAISSANCE

The break with mediæval thought is clearly seen in Chaucer (d. 1400). To the mediæval mind there was an inner mental world which was an end in itself. No such world exists in Chaucer. His characters do not find the world of sense to be extraneous and unreal; they drink deep the joy of life. In the Prelude to the *Canterbury Tales* we meet characters whose dominant interests are realistic. There is the Squire, who loves so ardently and is as fresh as the month of May; the Prioress, whose pleasure was all in courtesy; the Monk, who owned many a blooded horse, who let old things pass and followed the ways of the newer world, who didn't pore over books but followed his greyhounds as swift as birds. "He was not pale like a wasted ghost . . . He was a sleek, fat lord . . . His bright eyes rolled in his head, glowing like the fire under a cauldron." Such are Chaucer's characters. The mediæval soul, the soul of Fra Angelico's art, for example, like a vapor, a breath, a divine fire, was hardly linked to sense at all. Of this there is nothing in Chaucer. Hear his Theseus speak in the Knight's Tale at the death of Arcite, the knight: "His spirit changed house and went to a place where I never was.

I cannot tell where. Therefore I leave off, I am no diviner; I find naught about souls in this volume that I follow, nor care I to repeat the opinions of them that write where spirits dwell. Arcite is cold and may Mars have care of his soul" (Modern Reader's Edition). How absolutely new is Chaucer's world!

Thoroughly paganized is Chaucer's view of life in the charming Nun's Priest's Tale. Nowhere in literature is there a more beautiful idealization of the life of nature. Not only is human life worth while in Chaucer, but the gods of Greece have returned to humanize the world of animal life! Hear Chaucer's description of Chanticleer: "His comb was redder than fine coral, and indented like a castle-wall. His black bill shone like jet; like azure were his legs and toes . . . and his hue like burnished gold. This noble cock had in his governance seven hens, to do all his pleasure, his sisters and paramours, . . . of which the fairest hued in her throat was named fair Demoiselle Partlet. She was courteous, discreet, debonair and companionable, and bore herself so fairly . . . that truly she held the heart of Chanticleer all locked and herself bore the key." When he dreams of the fox and murder, Partlet spurns his spiritual interpretation of dreams; he is full of bilious humors; he must beware of the sun and look to his diet! Her courtly presence dispels his fears: "When I see the beauty . . . of your face, all my fear dies away. For as true as the Gospel . . . woman is man's whole bliss and joy!" And the royal cock roams up and down like a grim lion, not deigning to set his foot on the ground. The Canterbury Tales are as unlike the Divine Comedy as

Rubens is unlike Fra Angelico. Mediævalism has gone; modernity has come!

In Italian art we see this same development of realism. In mediæval art, fasting, suffering, contempt of the world, were necessary elements. In Fra Angelico (d. 1455) art is still the servant of the Church; he embodies the Christianity of St. Francis. His painting is beautiful but unworldly; it breathes the atmosphere of the cloister. The opposite swing of the pendulum is seen in Venetian art, in which the dominant influences are not the Church, religion, Greek culture, but commerce, wealth, worldliness, luxury. In Giorgione's (d. 1511) paintings, says Reinach, saints and Biblical characters gather together for the mere pleasure of being together! He paints glowing flesh and luminous atmosphere. Titian (d. 1576) gives us color, movement, life. Tintoretto (d. 1594) is unique in the presentation of passion and imagination. Veronese (d. 1588) is the painter of richness, luxury, and material magnificence. "From the close of the fifteenth century," says Reinach, "the Madonnas and Saints of the Venetian painters were no longer ascetic and morose persons, but beautiful young women and handsome young men, with blooming complexions and sunny hair, who loved to deck themselves with gorgeous stuffs and held life to be well worth living."

This transition to realism has been gracefully portrayed by Sir Wyke Bayliss as it is seen in the field of art. Formerly there ruled Proserpina and Ceres; Pluto, Apollo, and Pan. But the scene changes: Ceres has become a field of corn; Apollo's coming has changed into the sunrise; Pluto has become a lake and

Pan, a shepherd lad. "The beautiful Proserpina we see no more; for the wind that bent the tender blades of wheat, lifted her hair as it passed, and before it could fall again on her fair bosom she had become a Maytree" (Seven Angels of the Renascence).

Here we see the new world of realism: instead of fasting, the idealization of the body; instead of supernaturalism, naturalism; instead of world-denial, world-affirmation. Fauns and nymphs replace mediæval angels; the Virgin becomes Aphrodite. The mortification of the body gives way to the charming grace and exquisite movement of Donatello's dancing boys. Ammanati is reported as having repented late in life for having created so many satyrs and fauns because he then thought their influence to be in opposition to the Christian moral consciousness.

This new love of the world, this new devotion to the present, this warfare on mediæval asceticism, this new sense of the worth of life, as it bursts forth in Italian renaissance art, is set to poetry in Browning's *Fra Lippo Lippi*. Let us hear Browning interpret this fifteenth century artist:

I was a baby when my mother died
And father died and left me in the street.
. . . . . One fine frosty day,
. . . . . they made a monk of me;
I did renounce the world, its pride and greed,
Palace, farm, villa, shop and banking-house,
Trash, such as these poor devils of Medici
Have given their hearts to—all at eight years old.
. . . . . They tried me with their books:
Lord! They'd have taught me Latin in pure waste!
I drew men's faces on my copy-books,
Joined legs and arms to the long music-notes,

Found eyes and nose and chin for A's and B's,
And made a string of pictures of the world
Betwixt the ins and outs of verb and noun,
On the wall, the bench, the door. The monks looked black.
The Prior and the learned pulled a face
And stopped all that in no time. "How? what's here?
Faces, arms, legs, and bodies like the true!
. . . . It's devil's-game!
Your business is not to catch men with show,
With homage to the perishable clay,
But lift them over it, ignore it all,
Make them forget there's such a thing as flesh.
Your business is to paint the souls of men—
Give us no more of body than shows soul!
Here's Giotto, with his Saint a-praising God,
That sets us praising,—why not stop with him?
Why put all thoughts of praise out of our head
With wonder at lines, colours, and what not?
Paint the soul, never mind the legs and arms!"
. . . . Here's spring come
And I've been
A-painting . . . . saints and saints
And saints again.[1]
. . . . . Now, is this sense, I ask?
. . . . . Take the prettiest face,
The Prior's niece . . .
Suppose I've made her eyes all right and blue,
Can't I take breath and try to add life's flash,
And then add soul and heighten them three fold?
If you get simple beauty and nought else,
You get about the best thing God invents:
That's somewhat: and you'll find the soul you have missed,
Within yourself, when you return him thanks.
"Rub all out!" Well, well, there's my life, in short,
And so the thing has gone on ever since.
I'm grown a man no doubt, I've broken bounds:
You should not take a fellow eight years old
And make him swear to never kiss the girls.
And yet . . . . . .

[1] The sentences in this quotation have been transposed.

The heads shake still—"It's art's decline, my son!
You're not of the true painters, great and old;
Brother Angelico's the man, you'll find."
Bless us,
Don't you think they're the likeliest to know,
They with their Latin? So, I swallow my rage.
And my whole soul revolves, the cup runs over,
The world and life's too big to pass for a dream.
. . . . The old mill-horse, out at grass
After hard years, throws up his stiff heels so,
Although the miller does not preach to him
The only good of grass is to make chaff.
What would men have? Do they like grass or no—
May they or mayn't they? All I want's the thing
Settled for ever one way.
You speak no Latin more than I, belike;
However, you're my man, you've seen the world
—The beauty and the wonder and the power,
The shapes of things, their colours, lights and shades,
Changes, surprises. . . . .
It makes me mad to see what men shall do
And we in our graves!

What Chaucer did for literature in his realistic interpretation of life, Rabelais (d. 1553) did for the Church in his realistic restatement of theological thought. His *Gargantua* (1535) and his *Pantagruel* (1533) give one of the most searching criticisms of mediæval ideals to be found in all literature. In his allegorical Abbey of Theleme the following rules were laid down: First, in the old view women who were not good nor fair became nuns. In Rabelais' abbey only fair women were admitted. Never were seen ladies so handsome or more ready with their hands in every good action. Secondly, the old convents were separated from monasteries. The result was that men entered the convents by stealth. The new rule is:

No women in case there be no men. Again, in the old abbeys men and women were constrained to remain against their will. Rabelais' rule gives full liberty to depart at will. The new rule reads: Do as thou wouldst. The reason for the change is that where men are free the will is prompted to good action through a sense of honor, whereas men held in slavish subjection will desire to do what is forbidden. In Rabelais' world the judgment and discretion of the individual take the place of the mechanical regularity of monastic rules. The hint is thrown out that kings themselves can build greater monuments in the hearts of the vanquished than visible arches of stone subject to storms and human envy. Finally, whereas in the old abbeys men and women took the three vows of chastity, poverty, and obedience, in the Abbey of Theleme men and women may be married, they may be rich, and they may live at liberty!

Gargantua's letter to his son Pantagruel shows how far Rabelais' ethics is from the mediæval ideal of chastity. Among the gifts with which human nature is endowed—so runs the letter—is that excellent prerogative by which we are enabled to obtain a kind of immortality through our children. Though the stately form of man is brought to naught in death, yet there remains in the child what is lost in the parent. Hence Gargantua does not view his death as annihilation, for he will continue to live in the visible image of himself abiding in his son. Of this immortality his son's physical likeness is the lesser part; in a far greater sense will Gargantua continue in his son's mind, well trained in virtue, honesty, valor, knowledge,

and culture. Thus does the old ethnic ideal of the family, transformed by liberty, displace the mediæval ideal of chastity!

The entire monastic outlook on life is condemned by Rabelais. The black of the monk's garb is replaced by white, the symbol of joy and gladness. The heroes of Rabelais—in contradiction to mediæval fasting—eat enormous quantities of food; their thirst is unquenchable: "Never yet did a man of worth dislike good wine." It were better, says Gargantua, to cry less and to laugh more! Rabelais gives a list of the plays of his heroes and it includes nearly two hundred games. Swimming, dancing, hunting, take the place of ascetic contemplation. Gargantua advises his son to study music, mathematics, literature, philosophy, science. A letter to his son is a plea for universal culture. Monkish devotion to the Latin language—the symbol and instrument of mediæval unity of thought and belief—is satirized. Each nation should cultivate its own language; this is a plea for differentiation and individuality. Rabelais' Friar John even explains his swearing as a Ciceronian adornment of speech! Rabelais is big with the future. The monk, he says, does not work as the laborer or artificer; he does not defend his country as does the soldier; he does not cure the sick as does the physician; he does not teach as does the schoolmaster; he does not import the things necessary to the commonwealth as does the merchant. Even in religion he mumbles legends he does not understand. And while he gives out that he is interested only in contemplation and fasting, you may read his true character in the red letters on his nose and in the

enormous size of his body. What a departure from mediævalism do we see in Rabelais!

Shakespeare's Hamlet shows us with more warmth and intimacy than is possible in any technical discussion just what the new realistic spirit meant in the early part of the seventeenth century. At the opening of the play the ghost of Hamlet's father had appeared to Hamlet and made known to him that his suspicions of murder were founded on fact. To the spirit of the Middle Ages this evidence would have settled the matter beyond all possible doubt. But the realistic spirit which Chaucer puts into the mind of Partlet, leading her to explain Chanticleer's dreams of the fox not as a message from the gods but as the result of a sluggish liver, appears in Hamlet free from figurative disguise.

HAMLET (to himself):
The spirit that I have seen
May be the devil; and the devil hath power
To assume a pleasing shape; yea, and perhaps
Out of my weakness and my melancholy,
As he is very potent with such spirits,
Abuses me to damn me. I'll have grounds
More relative than this; . . . .
. . . . I'll have these players
Play something like the murder of my father
Before mine uncle: I'll observe his looks;
I'll tent him to the quick: if he but blench,
I know my course.
. . . . The play's the thing
Wherein I'll catch the conscience of the king.
. . . . . .
HAMLET (to Horatio) . . . . When thou seest that act afoot,
Even with the very comment of thy soul
Observe mine uncle; if his occulted guilt

Do not itself unkennel in one speech,
It is a damned ghost that we have seen,
And my imaginations are as foul
As Vulcan's stithy. Give him heedful note;
For I mine eyes will rivet to his face,
And after we will both our judgments join
In censure of his seeming.

. . . . . .

KING. What do you call the play?

HAMLET. The Mouse-trap, your majesty
We that have free souls, it touches us not; let the galled jade wince, our withers are unwrung.

. . . . .

KING. Give me some light!—away!

ALL. Lights, lights, lights!

. . . . .

HAMLET. O good Horatio, I'll take the ghost's word for a thousand pound. Didst perceive?

This is the spirit of Descartes and Harvey, seen through the medium of the drama. It is a new world. Even the sacred sphere of religious ideals must be tested by scientific observation. Dreams and ideals and loyalties to the unseen must adjust themselves to the world of observed facts.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE INNER LIFE IN ITS RELATION TO VOCATION, FAMILY, AND STATE IN PROTESTANTISM

The unyielding character of the old order which showed itself most definitely in the crucifixion drove the newer conscience in on itself. A hard and fast outer world led to the development of a hard and fast inner world. This inner world reversed the values of the ancient régime. Over against the state it set the ideal of obedience to its own organization, the church; over against the organization of property and the family it set the virtues of poverty and chastity. These virtues of obedience, poverty, and chastity were the forms of moral organization which the newer régime imposed on its world, on the world over which it had control. It took half a millennium for this newer moral tradition to build an organization strong enough to rule the world; and then for a full millennium it imposed its discipline on European civilization. Its universal formal truths, its imposing ritual, steadied the will. Its music deepened and elevated and purified the feelings. The mediæval régime with its ritual gave common attitudes of mind and therefore solidarity to a society which needed a culture to save it from anarchy. The sacraments performed the function which custom and tradition had performed in

ancient Israel; they made for social order in minds that needed training and discipline. Ritual and sacrament gave unity to the will. The rigid dogmas that were often laid down by a majority vote performed a social function similar to that performed by myth in earlier society. These dogmas provided universality and order in the minds of those who had not been disciplined to think for themselves; they provided universal forms of thought for a world whose unity was rendered difficult by migrating groups. Dogmas and creeds and abstract scholastic universals guaranteed mental unity in what would otherwise have been an age of chaos. The chants and oratorios gave order and harmony to the emotions and feelings. The cloister gave depth to experience. The architecture of the cathedrals gave an unconscious sense of graded perspective. Painting and sacred statuary gave order and meaning to the world of sight.

But the Middle Ages with its monasteries, its cathedrals, its schools, its atmosphere of meditation, so thoroughly disciplined the will and the heart and the intellect that the mind began to dream of becoming independent of an authoritatively imposed discipline. A millennium of moral culture and tradition had brought the will to the stage of individual self-consciousness.

The inner mind of Protestantism broke with the organization of the Church because the Church was no longer regarded by the Protestant mind as the embodiment of the pure intellectual forms of reason. These forms upon which religion had rested for a millennium and a half, were transferred by Protestant-

ism from the Church to the Bible, and their interpretation was transferred from the Church to the reason of individual minds. The scholasticism of the Church was superseded by the various forms of Protestant rationalism. Calvinism was the most conspicuous of these systems. Centuries of scholastic tradition had crystallized into the unconscious assumption that the Bible was a textbook of formal reasoning. Conscience meant to the Protestant what it meant to the mediævalist,—an intuition of absolute truth in the individual mind. But this absolute truth was incarnated in the Bible and not in the Church and it was interpreted by the conscience and reason of the individual.

The new inner world of mind and heart had proved itself real in its conflict with the old order; it was now coming to self-consciousness in the reason and the will of the individual. Socrates had described himself as a mental midwife; it was his mission to help individuals to a mental as well as a physical birth. And here, two thousand years later, the conscience, the heart, the will of the Church, were coming to self-consciousness in the mind of the individual. The development of an inner life which could set itself free from the old order resting on aristocratic ancestry and slavery and military power constituted a new epoch in civilization. And now this inner mind, disciplined for centuries in language, in philosophy, in ritual and sacrament, in music and art, was flowering out in a voluntary, individual will and reason. The individual was achieving a creed, a ritual, a tradition, in music and art, which was an interpretation of his own experience.

The centuries of mental brooding, the long tradition which imposed on the mind the almost unbroken habit of gazing in a trancelike way into the mirror of its own projected imagery, brought the mind to such a level of disciplined self-control that the intellectual forms and ritual of the past came to be experienced not as an aid to the will and the intellect, but as a restraint. What had for centuries been a necessary support of an undisciplined and unstable will came to be experienced as a mechanical incumbrance when the will had become disciplined and independent.

The break between Protestantism and mediævalism was not due to a change of belief in the reality of the inner world of the mind; it was due to a difference in the method of organizing the world of the inner life. The mediæval inner world had come into human experience because the newer conscience had been driven in on itself by the powerful opposition of the old pagan régime. But this inner mind, schooled to a higher level of independent thought, no longer centered in a universal Church; it had come to center in the consciousness of individual minds. The absolute inner life which had meant the life of the Church came in the Reformation to mean the inner life of the individual.

As regards his philosophy of the inner life, Luther's views are on the whole those of Paul and Augustine. To Luther there is "a true and almighty dominion, a spiritual empire" which is independent of the traditional external world. When one becomes a Christian he ceases to be the old, outward, fleshly man and becomes a new inward, spiritual man. According to Luther, "absolutely none among outward things . . .

has any weight in producing a state of . . . Christian liberty." Whether the body is in health, whether we eat and drink and live in a pleasurable way, are outward, external matters which have nothing to do with the world of the inner life. No outward deeds have any relation to the inward man. We must lay aside all reliance on works. Whatever works can be done through the body are of no profit. "No work can . . . be in the soul." Good works from the soles of our feet to the crown of our head cannot make us Christians. "The more of a Christian a man is, to so many the more evils, sufferings, and deaths is he subject." But none of these things can do him any hurt.

The reason we perform works is because we are not now "thoroughly and completely inner and spiritual persons. . . . As long as we live in the flesh we are but beginning and making advances in that which shall be completed in a future life." While we are in the flesh the body should through discipline be conformed to the inner man. The Old Testament, says Luther, is concerned with works, with the human and social virtues, with the law. These are pagan matters and do not concern the inward man of the Gospel. Luther's distinction between works and faith corresponds to the distinction, with which we are so familiar, between the Old Testament world of objective social interests and the Hellenistic world of the inner life. For "those who pretend to be justified by works are looking . . . to the works themselves; thinking that, if they can accomplish as many great works and as great ones as possible, all is well with them." People are made Christian and spiritual by baptism, by

the Gospel, and by faith, and by these alone. Quoting Romans vi, Luther insists that baptism is not the death of sin and the life of grace; it is a real death and resurrection. "When we begin to believe, we begin at the same time to die to this world, and to live to God in a future life; so that faith is truly a death and a resurrection." Baptism is not a washing but a dying. It corresponds to the death and resurrection of Christ. The Church was at her best in the days of the martyrs, when Christians were given up to baptism, to death, and resurrection. Now we have quite lost sight of this because of "the multitude of human works." The Christian or spiritual man can do all things, has all things, and is in want of nothing. The whole Gospel, says Luther, is the remission of sins, and in this work plays no part but the Gospel through its sacraments as a free gift does. A spiritual man needs no works for his salvation. He is saved by faith, by grace. He cannot lose his salvation by any wrongdoing, however great; he can lose it only through unbelief.

Luther's doctrine of the inner spiritual man is reflected in his theory of education. "Doctors of Arts, of Medicine, of Law, of the Sentences, may be made by Popes, Emperors, and the Universities; but . . . a Doctor of the Holy Scriptures can be made by no one but the Holy Ghost." In Aristotle soul and body, form and content, God and the world, idea and fact, are distinguishable but inseparable aspects of our world. This was the philosophy which was reflected in the world of Pericles, in its statuary, in its architecture, in its politics, in its theory of nature. Luther was right in regarding Aristotle as his enemy. The univer-

sities, he says, are schools of Greek fashion in which the blind heathen Aristotle rules more than Christ. The books of Aristotle should be abolished. In his best book, Of the Soul, he teaches that the soul dies with the body. We have the Holy Scriptures "to teach us fully of all things," but "this dead heathen has conquered." There is no book more contrary to the Christian virtues than Aristotle's Ethics. Such books should be kept from the reach of all Christians. His Logic, Rhetoric and Poetics should be used only for the improving of speaking and preaching.

This view Luther consistently applies to poverty, commerce, and business. Not much good, he says, has ever come into a land through commerce, and for this reason God let Israel dwell far from the sea. "I do not understand how . . . one guilder can gain another, and that not out of the soil, or by cattle, seeing that possessions depend not on the wit of men, but on the blessing of God." On this point the inward, spiritual Luther agrees with the blind heathen philosopher!

And what of the law? Here again Luther is consistent. There is nothing good in the Canon law. It only perverts the study of the Scriptures. It ought to be abolished. We are taught sufficiently in the Bible how we ought to act. The Civil law is better than the Canon law, but there is too much of it; "good governors judging according to the Scriptures, would be law enough."

As Christ put himself under Roman law, although he was himself a king, so we do certain works because we are in the world; but these works are no essential

part of us. Work is done either to discipline the body or to help our neighbors; it is not necessary for the individual's own salvation. We are, as Christians, as far as possible inward, spiritual beings. "Thus our doings, life, and being, in works and ceremonies, are done for the necessities of this life, and with the motive of governing our bodies; but we are not justified by these things."

The real man to Luther is the character regarded as an inner reality absolutely apart from any objective achievements in the physical world. The character, the will, the person, is "a substance" which must be good before any good works can be done. The fruit does not bear the tree. The building of a good house does not help to make a good carpenter. The workman must be a good carpenter before he can build a good house. A bishop is not a bishop through the performing of the duties of his office; his works would have no validity unless he had been previously consecrated a bishop. In the same way a man is not made more of a Christian through the doing of good works. Unless he were previously a Christian his good works would have no value at all; they would even be "impious and damnable sins."

If, then, this German monk, Martin Luther, held to the mediæval ideal of the inner life; if he thought that Aristotle's logic should be used only to improve Christian preaching; if he distinguished profane knowledge of ordinary life from the inner knowledge which comes from the spirit; if he could see little or no good in property, in commerce, in economic goods, wherein was the revolution which was wrought by the Reforma-

tion? The answer is that we are not now completely inward spiritual beings, that we are spirits in physical bodies, that we have sexual impulses and that we need the protecting arm of the state. Since we exist in physical bodies, work is a necessary form of spiritual discipline. Therefore there should be no mendicants, no friars. Work should take the place of poverty. Since we have sexual impulses, every one should be free to marry. Therefore chastity is not a Christian ideal. Since we need the state as a protection against wrongdoers, and since the state has itself become Christian, there are no longer two estates, clerical and lay. Clergy and laity are equal as servants in a Christian community. Here we see not the mediæval but the modern revolutionary aspects of Luther's teaching.

The Reformation inherited from mediævalism its apotheosis of the inner life, its dualism of an inner and an outer world. The inner life, to Luther, was the same interior entity which it had been in the thought of Augustine and St. Francis. The mediæval ideal of the inner life remained in Protestant thought. Nevertheless there are in Protestantism two distinct departures from mediævalism: there is an assumption of authority by the individual which marks the beginning of a new epoch, and there is a change of attitude on the part of the inner, spiritual, Christian mind toward the world in which it finds itself, toward property, the family, the state.

Luther gives work a low place in the scale of values. Deeds, results, objects achieved, are set over against the inner man. Nevertheless work is a means whereby we can discipline the body and bring it into harmony

with the inner realm of the spirit. Therefore there should be no pilgrims or mendicant monks, for many have become priests and monks to obtain support without labor. Knaves and vagabonds are supported under the name of mendicant monks. Indeed the monasteries are poor in order that they may be rich.

If one agrees with Luther that work is a virtue superior to poverty, he may later on come to see that work, that devotion of the will to objective ends, is essential to the will and that there is no inner man without work, without objective interests and objects. On all these questions Luther was introducing departures which if followed out would lead to the realistic views of the Renaissance. If one substitutes work for poverty, he may come to see that the objective ends of work change and enlarge the will and the character. This is not only contrary to the mediæval inner ideal, but to Luther's inner life as well. But once work is substituted for poverty, a realistic interpretation of the will is in time sure to result.

Luther's view of marriage is the same as his view of work. The ideal Christian is a completely inward, spiritual being. But while in the body we are subject to sexual impulses. Because we are sexual beings "human frailty does not allow men to live an unmarried life." Comparatively few are able to keep the vow of chastity. Priests should marry or not as they please. Those in authority ought to consider how young people might be brought together in marriage. As it is, every man is urged to become a monk. Luther speaks of the clergy as "that unhappy crowd who now live in trouble with wife and children, and

remain in shame, with a heavy conscience, hearing their wife called a priest's harlot and their children bastards." Such is the "wretched unchaste chastity" of the papacy.

Because we are not yet thoroughly inward and spiritual beings, Luther is opposed to any mode of life determined by a perpetual vow. Every man should be at liberty to make private vows at his own peril. What time, he asks, shall we assign for a man to feel the impulses of the flesh or to feel himself avaricious? "There will never be any sure and legitimate vow, until we shall have become thoroughly spiritual, and so have no need of vows." Priests should not take the vow of chastity and thus avoid danger and sin. There is no more authority for the vow of chastity "than to forbid a man to eat and drink." Vows should be left free to the spirit alone and not converted into a perpetual mode of life. Monasteries and convents should be schools in which individuals should remain so long as they wish. Now they are turned into "eternal prisons."

Luther regards marriage as the instrument through which the sexual life is brought into harmony with the inner life of the spirit. Luther is therefore opposed to the ideal of chastity. Chastity, like poverty, is to Luther not a Christian virtue. In spirit and motive Luther is mediæval but in practice he is revolutionary. Luther renounced monasticism because he regarded marriage as the means of molding the sex impulse into harmony with the life of the spirit. But to recognize the dependence of the will on sexual impulses and to treat marriage as the means of disci-

plining the sexual life is a half-way station toward the recognition of marriage as the natural objective expression of the sexual life, which is the realistic view of the Renaissance.

Luther's doctrine of the state is parallel to his doctrine of the family. We aim to be completely inward and spiritual beings. But we are as yet in the flesh, in the world. Since we are in this incomplete spiritual condition, God has ordained the state as an instrument with which to protect the good and to punish the bad. According to the mediæval ideal there were two estates, the clergy or the spiritual estate, and the laity or the temporal estate. According to Luther all Christian laymen are as spiritual as the clergy, since they have received baptism and faith and the Gospel in the same way. One would think from the way in which the clergy treat the laity, that the latter were not themselves Christians. But the temporal power being baptized is also priest and bishop. One faith, one Gospel, one sacrament, enable the Christian to determine what is right. Through baptism "the temporal power has become a member of the Christian body." "It is, indeed, past bearing, that the spiritual law should esteem so highly the liberty, life, and property of the clergy, as if laymen were not as good spiritual Christians, or not equally members of the Church. Why should your body, life, goods, and honor be free and not mine, seeing that we are equal as Christians, and have received alike baptism, faith, spirit, and all things?" The Church is not above the temporal power. The difference between the clergy and the prince is one of office. All have equal power in the

community; we differ in function because there are different kinds of work to be done in the community. The prince must punish the clergy when it is necessary for the good of the community, for that is his office. All Christians are kings and priests and lords of all things.

Thus although as Christians we are aiming to be completely inward and spiritual, yet while we are in the flesh, and in the world, the state is a necessary part of the economy of life. The inner spiritual life is the sole end as in the mediæval view, but the state is a necessary instrument in molding the world in harmony with the inner life.

There is nothing here of the naturalistic doctrine of the state which we see in Machiavelli's *Prince,* in which the newly-developed national consciousness of the Renaissance finds expression. Man is not, as with Aristotle, a political animal. Luther thinks of the Christian man as an inner, spiritual, supernatural being. Nevertheless the national consciousness of which Machiavelli is so well aware is an unconscious drive in Luther's mind. In teaching that the state is a part of the economy of life, Luther is unconsciously a spokesman of the German nobility. Luther the mediævalist rationalizes his position by holding that the German state is free because it is a baptized, spiritual state. Only as a spiritual being is man free. Nevertheless when once the absoluteness and independence of the inner mind are surrendered, or even seriously modified; when it is admitted that the state is a necessary instrument in molding and training the inner life, the way is open toward the naturalism, the realism, of

the Renaissance view of the state. Luther the mediævalist had in mind a baptized, Christian, spiritual state, but Luther the leader of the Reformation broke down the dualism between the inner life and the political life.

Luther's view of work, of marriage, of the state, is an open surrender, so far as practice is concerned, of an independent inner world of mind. Conscience had not yet come to center about the organization of the state and the family, of agriculture and commerce; it was not yet concerned with one's daily vocation or with the scientific study of nature. The idea that the state, the institution of property, the family, the organization of work around the ideal of a vocation, were essential to the psychological and moral structure of the individual himself, would have been unintelligible to the leaders of the Reformation. But Luther's concessions to the family and the state were a transition stage between the mediæval ideal and the modern interpretation of sex, of creative work, of the state, as normal and necessary aspects of human personality.

CHAPTER XXIV

RATIONALISM, INDIVIDUALISM, ROMANTICISM, AND VOLUNTARISM AS FORMS OF INTROVERSION

We can understand the modern individualistic development only if we see it as the continuation of the mediæval inner ideal. The normal will follows through to the completion of the objective ends of conduct. On the other hand, a blocking of the will before it reaches its objective ends results in various developments. Because the modern world inherited from mediævalism the tradition of an inner mind, this inner mind in its modern individualized form continued to build around itself a wall of defense. Any world which was immediately possible was still incompatible with the demands of the inner ideal. Hence a blocking of the will by its environment. There floated free therefore between the organism and the objective world an inner world—a world of ideas, of feelings, of attitudes. This inner mental world was elaborated by the imagination into various forms of mental absolutes and infinites. When the will is blocked so that it does not attain its objects, any one of three main types of introversion may result. There may be a detachment of the idea or of knowledge from its object. This is the explanation of rationalism or of intuitionalism. This is true transcendentalism. It is

best exhibited in German philosophy. In England this detachment of knowledge from its object took the form of an empirical idealism. Another type of introversion results when the blocking sets free not a system of detached ideas but a complex of feelings, emotions, or sentiments. This form of disassociation is known as romanticism. It is typically illustrated in Rousseau. The third form of introversion is seen in the disassociation of attitudes of will from their normal objectives. Such a type of thought is illustrated in the voluntarism of Fichte and Schopenhauer.

In Kant we see the inner mind of Protestantism defending itself against the objective world of fact projected by modern science. The Copernican system, which had reached such a confirmation in Newton's law of gravitation, regarded man as a result of the causal mechanism discovered by astronomy and physics. Philosophy's business in the case of Kant was to save the inner mind of Protestant thought from the mechanism of modern science. He succeeded by differentiating a transcendental realm of mind from an empirical realm of mind. The mind by an act of pure reason produces universal, a priori, forms of thought which themselves make possible the objects of scientific knowledge. These pure universal forms of thought come from the mind itself. On its ethical side this means that impulses and dispositions and the raw material of sensation can become elements of rational conduct only as they are interpreted and approved by this transcendental moral reason. There is only one thing which can be good—an inner autonomous moral will. It is the only moral end. Kant

had a double personality. As a lecturer in physics he sincerely believed in the physical mechanism which had been discovered step by step by modern physical science. But as a moral being Kant did not belong to the objective world of physical science. As a moral being he transcended the world of objective science. It was his inner transcendental forms of knowledge which made the objective world of science a possibility.

The mediæval inner life, individualized in the Reformation and the Renaissance, is in the philosophy of Kant forging for itself weapons of defense against the mechanistic world of fact produced by modern science. Over against the Copernican world of independent objective fact Kant sets up a moral consciousness which lays down forms and laws by its own pure inner reason. The very possibility of the moral life is the outgrowth of the a priori forms of the moral reason. The inner mind in the system of Kant saves itself from the realism of modern science by making itself transcendental. The very knowledge of the objective facts of exact science is possible because of an inherent law-making faculty of the mind itself. Kant's most important work was published in 1781.

If we look upon such notions of Kant as, let us say, the transcendental unity of apperception or the categorical imperative, as the products of a disinterested logic, they may seem very strange or even unintelligible. But if we add to our philosophy a knowledge of psychology, if we understand the technique of introversion, we shall see in the philosophy of Kant a defense reaction against the mechanistic realism of modern science.

This defense mechanism of introversion is still more apparent in the case of Hegel. The concept of unity was apotheosized in Hegel. It literally became divine.

The character of inwardness, of *Innerlichkeit,* in German philosophy, is usually ascribed to the intuitional or mystical nature of the German mind. The mythical character of this point of view becomes apparent when we study Hegel's type of unity from the standpoint of social psychology. From the battle of Jena in 1806 to the downfall of Napoleon in 1815 Germany developed a powerful consciousness of internal unity. This was not a mystical unity. It was the social and moral solidarity of a nation that had been politically humiliated and was preparing itself for liberation through social and moral unity. This is the meaning of the a priori unity in Hegel's philosophy. His unity through a synthesis of opposites was an unconscious rationalization of the political unity necessary for Germany's restoration as a nation. France and England having achieved national stability could produce a Rousseau or a Stuart Mill who labored for individual freedom. But this was not possible in Germany. The state, according to Hegel, made possible the individual. That was self-evident to the German mind in the early decades of the nineteenth century. Therefore all right preëxisted in the state.

There was in the revolutionary philosophy of England this same process whereby the mind set up an inner screen of defense against its world. But it took a form of development very different from what it took in Germany. In Germany the struggle against foreign states led to an unbreakable internal unity. In

England—and in France—the struggle was directed against kings, against autocracy, against unreasoning authority. The inner world therefore in English development existed not in an a priori, absolute state but in a world of individual minds and consciences. Rationalism of the English type is not characterized by a priori unities and universals; it is rather an atmosphere of individual freedom. It is the spirit which accepts only what it is able to understand.

The recognition of the state in the period of the Renaissance in Machiavelli's *Prince,* the support of the Reformation as voiced in Martin Luther by the German nobility, the disassociation of the Church of England from the universal Church of Rome under Henry VIII, are, as McDougall points out, to be understood as evidences of a new sense of nationality. But the modern philosophical tradition did not surrender its ideal of an independent inner world. The state is an instrument external to the nature of individual human minds, but necessary as a tool because these individual minds through a self-imposed intellectual contract are now living in a social world. These individual minds are the modern individualized transformations of the mediæval inner life. They themselves are original metaphysical entities in contrast to the acquired, derived, temporary, and instrumental character of the state. This is the meaning of the contract theory of such thinkers as Locke, Milton, and Rousseau. There is also the fact that the state which the modern world inherited was an authoritative institution. But the association philosophy of Locke and Hume, of James and John Mill, pulverized the known world into a

stream of sensory phenomena. In such a world there is no place left for a priori ideas, for unanalyzed tradition, upon which authoritative feudal social relationships are founded. Modern philosophy not only inherited the tradition of an inner mind unadjusted to social institutions, but existing political institutions were associated with the a priori dogma of the divine right of kings. Hence arose the new doctrine of the social contract which was an unconscious defense mechanism in the hands of the middle classes in their struggle for individual freedom. This conflict helped to perpetuate the traditional dualism between institutions regarded as external to mind and the world of individual minds regarded as a purely interior world.

According to Hobbes every voluntary act of the individual has as its object some good to the individual himself. All individuals originally existed in a state of nature. Because of the universal sway of egoism life in this state of nature was brutish and mean. Property was unstable; agriculture was hardly possible; science could not exist; death was premature. Individuals therefore transferred their rights to a commonwealth, created by contract. But the egoism of individuals would continually break such a contract and therefore the common power was lodged in a sovereign with sufficient authority to demand obedience. Hobbes' sovereign is a defense against individuals in whose constitution every spring of action, even pity, love, and benevolence, has been traced back to egoism. Hobbes' *Leviathan* was published in 1651. It is a defense of sovereignty against individuals who are demanding their liberties.

Milton—the secretary of Cromwell the protagonist of parliament against the divine right of kings—has left us in his *Areopagitica* one of the world's outstanding utterances on freedom of thought and speech. To do what is right, says Milton, against one's own will, is to do wrong. We may quote two passages from Milton's *Comus* which illustrate the idea of an absolute individual conscience which is the outstanding characteristic of Protestant ethics. They are as follows:

> Virtue could see to do what Virtue would
> By her own radiant light, though sun and moon
> Were in the flat sea sunk.
>
> He that hath light within his own clear breast
> May sit i' th' centre, and enjoy bright day.

As the inalienable rights of Milton, Rousseau, and Jefferson constituted the chief bulwark of the new struggle for freedom against an autocratic state, there was likewise an economic individualism which was directed against the old order of vested rights. In this old order rights came through political and social and economic position. Against this society of "status" the new view of free competition, of *laissez faire,* was the open road of opportunity. The division of labor makes it possible for each individual to pursue his own good and by this very pursuit to contribute to a like good for others. This view held sway from the publication of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* in 1776 down to the opening of the twentieth century.

In economics this doctrine interpreted the object of all endeavor in terms of financial profit. Man ceased to think of himself as coöperating with nature to pro-

duce grain or flocks; he was no longer moved by the feudal ideals of loyalty and honor; the new ideal of an independent mind was evolving a new economic motive. The motive was coming to be self-expression or pleasure or financial profit.

Browning has given us in his *Cleon* his philosophy of the individual consciousness:

> If in the morning of philosophy,
> Ere aught had been recorded, nay perceived,
> Thou, with the light now in thee, couldst have looked
> On all earth's tenantry, from worm to bird,
> Ere man, her last, appeared upon the scene—
> Thou wouldst have seen them perfect, and deduced
> The perfectness of others yet unseen.
> Conceding which, had Zeus then questioned thee,
> "Shall I go on a step, improve on this,
> Do more for visible creatures than is done?"
> Thou wouldst have answered, "Ay, by making each
> Grow conscious in himself—by that alone.
> All's perfect else: the shell sucks fast the rock,
> The fish strikes through the sea, the snake both swims
> And slides, forth range the beasts, the birds take flight,
> Till life's mechanics can no further go—
> And all this joy in natural life is put
> Like fire from off thy finger into each
> So exquisitely perfect is the same.
> But 'tis pure fire, and they mere matter are;
> It has them; not they it; and so I choose
> For man, thy last premeditated work
> (If I might add a glory to the scheme)
> That a third thing should stand apart from both,
> A quality that rises in his soul,
> Which, intro-active, made to supervise
> And feel the force it has, may view itself,
> And so be happy."

Browning assumes that the evolution of self-con-

sciousness is an end in itself. Self-consciousness exists that the self

> ..... may view itself
> And so be happy.

The only thing which Zeus could add to perfect the scheme of things is the deathlessness of this introactive soul. One gets the impression that individuality is a new addition of some kind which is unique and separate from the older régime. One gets this impression from Tennyson's lines:

> So rounds he to a separate mind,
> And thro' the frame that binds him in
> His isolation grows defined.

Even in the sphere of the family the doctrine of an independent inner self maintained itself. The family existed because already completed individuals formed rational contracts with each other. The individual mind was somehow linked to the instinct of sex, and marriage was therefore a compromise which supposedly independent individuals make with an animal instinct which never received overt recognition.

This philosophy of an inner individual mind, whose nature does not include those relationships to family, state, property, and vocation so essential to the biological man, expressed itself politically in the writings which aimed to interpret the American and French revolutions. According to this view the individual has an original, innate, absolute nature by which certain authority is delegated to a fictitious product of man's reason which is the state. The state is not a part of the individual's nature. The individual is thought of

as existing in his full stature in "a state of nature." The state is a compromise measure which these individuals create through contract to protect themselves against certain inconveniences in the state of nature. These arguments were a part of a process of rationalization, they constituted a mechanism of defense, through which the eighteenth century mind freed itself from institutions which had been outgrown. But unfortunately this philosophy of defense perpetuated the illusion of a self-inclosed individual mind and the idea that the state is an external and disadvantageous appendage.

Mill in his book *On Liberty* (1859) voiced the rights of the individual against society. There was a limit beyond which society must not go in restricting the freedom of the individual. This consciousness that the mind was blocked by an authoritative form of society threw Mill's mind back on itself. This doubling back of the mind upon itself gave him a consciousness of an individual mind separate from society. This consciousness of a mind separate from society is shown in his speaking of interests which the individual has which in no way concern other individuals. It is also seen in his statement that one's motives have nothing to do with good and bad conduct when they make no difference in one's objective deeds. Here is the assumption of an inner individual world of mind set over against an objective world of deeds and social events.

So deep has been this dualism of an original natural world of individual minds and a world of acquired or artificial social relations that it still persists. The

motive behind the English philosophy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the justification of the priority, the original nature, of the individual mind. This was the way in which the modern conscience transferred absolute authority from state and church to the inner world of the individual mind.

Spencer is perhaps the world's leading expositor of individualism. He makes the degree of individuality the test of any stage of evolution. The process of evolution is a process in individuation. A knowledge of anthropology and sociology had shown Spencer that there was very little individual voluntary life in primitive society. He looked upon all forms of corporate or social control as essentially immoral. Only individual, voluntary life is a morally good life to Spencer. His *The Man Versus the State* was published in 1884. It is a deification of the individual mind.

Indeed it may be said that western civilization has developed an "emotional complex" which centers about the idea the individual has of himself. In its extreme form the consciousness of self has prevented the growth of a real consciousness of things. This has been called "the egocentric predicament."

The problem of these thinkers was to free themselves from an externally imposed system of institutions. And they solved their problem. They pulverized all experience, including institutions, into impressions and feelings and ideas linked together by habit. Institutions were analyzed into the same sort of stuff of which the intelligent man's mind is made. Men came to see how states were made and how kings came into existence. The white light of the

Enlightenment was thrown on every custom and tradition.

As a result of this process we have substituted for the standards of family, custom, the organization of the Church, and the law of the land, the intuitions of our own individual conscience. And the overwhelming significance of such a change of thought does not strike us as peculiar because the new point of view has become an unconscious part of our thinking. Even the hopeless conflicts between our intuitions have not yet shaken our faith in their truth. The Renaissance was individualistic to the core; the Reformation, in theory at least, made the individual's conscience final in its interpretation of the Bible; the political individualism of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries defined the state as a means subordinate to the development of the individual. Throughout the whole modern development the relations which bind the individual to social institutions were regarded as accidental to the individual. Western civilization in the main still holds the individualistic point of view. Paul's inner experience, set over against the whole Jewish world; Luther's individual conscience in opposition to the papal hierarchy; Patrick Henry preaching liberty or death; Thomas Jefferson formulating the doctrine of independence, still represent the ideals in modern history that lie nearest men's hearts.

The Puritan and pioneer type of mind that settled in the United States with its ever-moving frontiers became more individualistic than the Europe it left behind because of its geographic and economic environment. We need only mention Thomas Paine, Franklin

and Jefferson, Thoreau and Emerson. The unlimited sovereignty of the individual is in part the result of an unconscious rationalization of a sense of enlargement which goes with geographic and economic expansion.

There was in English philosophy an a priori type of moral thought but it tended toward intuitionalism rather than toward rationalism. Intuitionalism is an idealistic defense of an inner mind. There is an inner moral sense which immediately perceives right and wrong. This inner intuition is a form of self-knowledge. The inner motive constitutes right or wrong independent of objective results. Consequences are external. Moral knowledge is a form of insight. Foresight is intellectual; it arises from acquaintance with the past. Insight is from within the mind itself. Results are but expressions of what is within. Objects are but occasions for the unfolding of what is subjective. Here we see in the doctrine of the moral sense or of intuition the inner mind making itself secure against the realistic development of modern objective science. Shaftesbury's *Characteristics* (1711), Butler's *Sermons upon Human Nature* (1726), and Martineau's *Types of Ethical Theory* (1885) set forth this view.

The modern individual, set free from external authority, has in defense evolved different forms of ethical subjectivism. Intuitions and a priori truths took the place of objective social procedure. There grew up a new philosophy of the interior life which differed from mediævalism only in its worldliness and its individualism. The work of the Enlightenment, of

associationism, of individualism, was done when it set free the mind from the authoritative traditions and institutions of the past. It gave no sense of direction for the future. It became clear in the nineteenth century that a new social order needed a new social philosophy. What was a great truth for the eighteenth century might be a dangerous error for the twentieth century. The individualism which meant progress and liberty in the eighteenth century might mean disorganization in the twentieth century. Indeed the individualistic doctrine which makes of each self a fixed unit is the thing which has made modern social problems seem so insoluble.

In some minds a blocking of the will in its outgo towards its natural objectives will produce not defense systems of ideas but complexes of feelings and emotions. In the romantic type of mind we get not a disassociation of ideas from their objects, but a disassociation of complexes of feelings and emotions. This setting free of detached feeling through a chronic blocking of organic response gives us the typical mechanism which lies at the basis of romanticism. The man who best typifies this movement of romanticism is Rousseau. Lord and serfs, master and family, and the whole feudal system, furnished a situation in which the sensitive nature of Rousseau could not function. Not only the state but the authoritative character of eighteenth century society so blocked and thwarted the will and imagination of Rousseau that he lived in a detached world of subjective romance. Out of his world of detached feelings his imagination constructed the compensatory dream of a "state of nature" in

which his impulses, suppressed by the traditions of society, could be freely realized. The state of nature was a concept to rationalize the world of romantic feeling disassociated from the existing authoritative social order. Psychology supported by anthropology makes this perfectly clear. Rousseau at times confesses that for him the world of memory or imagination is more real than the actual world given in perception. Such statements are symbolic of a romantic type of mind which in opposition to an unwelcome given world has set up a satisfactory inner world of fantasy. There are no facts to substantiate the dream of a state of nature. It was created out of the ideals of the romantic imagination. As German philosophy substituted a transcendental world of thought for a world of unwelcome fact; and as English empirical idealism substituted an inner world of detached individual minds for the unwelcome objective social system, Rousseau and the romanticists substituted an inner world of feeling and subjective fancy for the world which they found so incompatible with their sensitive imagination.

Rousseau in 1750 wrote his prize essay on human inequality in which he attempted to show that the arts and sciences of civilization are opposed to human liberty. In the state of nature where there were no social relations there was no necessity for conjoint endeavors. Therefore no individual need become enslaved. In the state of nature the individual was a completed entity, an independent unit, for the state of nature means to Rousseau the complete absence of social relations. The individual was truly himself in

this original state of nature; the social institutions are what the individual has acquired since leaving his original condition. Man's social relations are therefore acquired, external, and fictitious. The state of nature is Rousseau's weapon of defense against autocratic government. The old absolute incarnated in the state is attacked by the new absolute of inalienable rights incarnated in original individuals who antedate the existence of the state.

English hedonism is one phase of this maladjustment of the mind and will to its environment. When the will is adequately realizing itself through an intelligent reorganization of its world, when there is no blocking of the will short of its natural objectives, pleasure and happiness are experienced as undifferentiated accompaniments of objective achievement. When pleasure is disassociated from the realization of the normal objectives of life; when it becomes an ethical object detached from the ordinary ends of life; when it becomes an ideal to be directly aimed at, we are witnessing a form of romanticism. In so far as Mill's utilitarianism dealt with objective results, with observable deeds, it belonged to the realistic movement of modern science, but its measuring of results in terms of pleasure was a survival from an earlier subjectivist point of view.

Romanticism in England was a fringe of pleasure which decorated the border of a practical, utilitarian mind. In Rousseau romanticism although belonging to a social situation was the outgrowth of temperament. In Germany, although it was in part the expression of temperament, it was primarily a form of

expression determined by the existing type of political and social organization. England and France, having attained political and social solidarity, were free to develop still newer movements for the freeing of the individual mind. Such were the philosophies of David Hume and of Voltaire. But such developments in Germany took place not in the open forum of political life. The free development of the individual life as the Frenchman or the Englishman understood it was not associated with the political system in Germany. Political unity in Germany was assumed; it was a priori, transcendental. The political system did not admit of individualism. Freedom and individuality therefore could develop and expand only in spheres detached from the state. This means that freedom in Germany was romantic. It was limited to certain detached spheres of experience, such as, for example, Goethe's court at Weimar. Hence pleasure, happiness, freedom, were not coincident with an achievement of the normal central objectives of life. In Goethe's Faust feeling is detached from the objects of the will, converted into a sort of emotional infinite and made the object of an endless romantic striving. Schiller's ideal of *Freigeisterei* has a similar explanation.

In the normal relation of the mind to its objects there is a molding of the object by the intelligent responses of the organism. There is no divorce of the object from the will. But when the objectives of the will are beyond control there takes place in certain minds a disassociation, not of ideas, not of feelings, but of attitudes of the will. Because of the unattainableness of the object the will falls back on itself. It

substitutes its own attitudes for the object. The will makes itself independent of "external" objects by willing itself. It becomes transcendental. This is the language of emotion, of sentiment. It is the language of introversion.

This is the explanation of the voluntarism of Fichte. It is not the defense reaction of Kant against the wall of objective scientific fact. It is a rationalization of the social unity necessary to protect the German nation against foreign attack. Fichte's positing of the non-ego by the ego, his doctrine of self-limitation, is no metaphysical puzzle. It is no mysterious creation of an objective world from an a priori process of inner subjective moral activity. The technique of psychology enables us to see that Fichte's transcendental unity, his positing of an objective world as material of duty for an inner world of will, is his unconscious way of rationalizing the necessary political unity presupposed in the preparation for the war of liberation from the yoke of Napoleon. It was the hypostatization, the reification, of this inner attitude of mind which made the will in Fichte's philosophy a transcendental reality.

CHAPTER XXV

THE OBJECTIVE SCIENCES AND ETHICAL REALISM

Social tradition in western civilization since the seventeenth century has been more and more determined by the objective sciences.

The classical world of Greece and Rome which grew up around the Mediterranean was built around the ideal of form, of proportion. Formal tradition dominated all the material of life. Life was characterized by a sense of centrality.

When Columbus went beyond the Pillars of Hercules he opened up a new era. The compass introduced a new geography which shattered the world of formal tradition. Discovery and exploration supplanted acceptance of classic forms. The telescope brought about the same result in the world of astronomy. Man and the earth ceased to be the center of the universe. The seventeenth century was preëminently an age of the objective sciences. Its greatest achievements were in the field of mathematics and astronomy. And in the eighteenth century physics and chemistry regarded the world as a system of objective events in certain observable relations. These sciences not only ignored the older animistic and religious aspects of the world; they treated as irrelevant any relation of the human

subject to the observable objective world of science. In this way there arose a purely objective world, a world independent of any relation to a subjective world of mind or will. As the sun supplanted the earth as the center of the universe so matter and the physical environment supplanted human will and desire in the field of human knowledge. The will and final causes were supplanted by the objective environment and efficient causes. Men ceased to think of the world in terms of purpose and began to think in terms of mechanism. The center of thought was transferred from persons to things, from quality to quantity, from an inner centrality of will to an outer order of fact.

The industrial revolution in the nineteenth century, made possible by the invention of the steam engine, was the culmination of this realistic movement. It was this new realistic world made possible by objective science which was the occasion of the transfer of the leadership in the West from the Mediterranean world to the area of the Atlantic ocean, to England, France, Germany, and the United States. This economic realism was the outgrowth of the compass, coal, steel and iron, climate and fertility of soil. Physics and chemistry and biology made possible a new physical world. And then oil and hydro-electric power were added to coal. The gas-engine was invented. Power in the form of electrons was sent on wires through high-voltage transmission to distributing stations.

Life is no longer carried on in monasteries and chapels; it is no longer meditative and introspective. Music and the drama are detached by scientific technique from the immediate performance of the artist,

and through the press, the phonograph, the cinema, the radio, are made available to millions.

This scientific development has made possible more food and clothing, better shelter and easy transportation. There has been an overwhelming development of the material aspects of civilization. And there has been no corresponding growth of moral organization. Financial profit and economic power have become controlling motives in civilization. Exploitation of the earth's natural resources has become a central drive in life. Politics and legislation were instrumental in this economic exploitation.

This economic realism, this ethical materialism, has expressed itself in a realistic conception of education. Our industrial development has gone on improving its various forms of machines without regard to the impulses, the desires, the feelings, of the human beings who operate them. The technique of the machine, and not the mind and life of the operator of the machine, has been the chief concern. The brain, the muscles, the senses, the hands, of the workman are all lumped together as belonging to manual labor. They approach the category of the material, the physical. Work so conceived, work so disassociated from heart and mind, is limited in hours by the threat of strikes. Increasing technical and general knowledge and a continual spilling over of Christian ideals into labor philosophy, tend to set into revolt the feelings and ideas already disassociated from the routine of daily work.

On the other hand the intelligence, the scientific technique which do not belong to the "manual" workers, do belong to the administrative classes. But the old feudal

sense of public honor and responsibility, of devotion to the state as the sacred depository of religious and moral tradition, is a thing of the past. The newer ruling classes, for such they are, do not know the God of Jacob as did their fathers. Their new gods of the machine, of coal and oil, have begotten in them a new form of loyalty. These new ideals are profit and power.

And biology has added impetus to this realistic development. It has substituted an objective for an introspectionist point of view. Biology gives us an organism in vital interaction with an environment. And psychology is built on this biological foundation. The eye is adapted to objects that emit light, the ear to objects that give sound. The hand has evolved through contact with external objects. Anger is an emotional response to things that resist the impulses of the organism. Fear is an emotional response to things harmful. Love is a response to the opposite sex. Life and mind have to do with adaptation to an environment. Mind has ceased to be introversion; it has become extroversion. In Patrick's language we have gone from a centripetal to a centrifugal mode of life. Watson would interpret mind as being a form of implicit response to objects. Mill's *Utilitarianism* which made goodness center in objective deeds that give pleasure was an earlier expression of this new realistic ideal.

Here we have a will which exists in connection with the responses of the organism to the environment. The will is a developed form of response to objects. It is an organization, always imperfect, of such responses. An inner mind and will apart from an objec-

tive world has come to be regarded as a myth. The response of the organism to the opposite sex which develops into a family life, the response of the individual to his fellows which underlies the development of language, common traditions and culture, constitute the very nature of the moral will.

The general movement of modern philosophy has been in the direction of phantasy thinking and the real world since the Renaissance has more and more come under the control of modern science. But to live in an inner subjective ideal when our scientific thinking is realistic is to be guilty of autistic, wishful, dream thinking. Our ideals and our thinking cease to be real. The philosophy of an inner life, individual or social, is in this case a defense mechanism against the objective world of modern science.

To live in an inner subjective world—or a world beyond—as a substitute for the organization of the normal objectives of life reduces the moral life to an unreal dream. The only ideal that can be proved to be real is the sort of ideal which nature herself can use in raising herself to higher levels of existence. To secure a workable moral organization of the forces of nature which have been put into human control by mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology, is the outstanding problem of the social and political sciences.

If we are to maintain an inner world of changeless form then we must declare all desires, all objective interests, to be illusory. The inner divine Knower or the Buddhistic Nirvana of the Hindus is their answer to this dilemma. On the other hand a philosophy which takes account of the objective sciences will hold that

the objective world and the new impulses which the new objective world has released have completely destroyed the ideal of an inner life. All the current forms of realism, materialism, sensationalism, impressionism, are evidence of the inadequacy of the inner ideal to deal with the newer world of objective fact which has come about through the development of modern science. Henceforth there can be no will, no mind, apart from the objective aspects of the world.

Modern science has given us a new environment, almost a new world. Our ethical ideals are accordingly threatened with the grossest kind of realism. Our wills are in danger of becoming passive responses to physical objects. No idealistic disproof of the existence of physical objects will suffice. No defensive return to an inner life can deal with this ethical materialism. There must be a frank acceptance of the revolutionary results of the objective sciences.

The new objective world which has come about through the development of modern science is releasing impulses which were never dreamed of by the older introspectionist psychology. It is true that we have lost our traditional perspectives, our centrality. But this loss of centrality is due to the fact that a rich new world has resulted from the development of the objective sciences and that ethics has not yet evolved an ideal capable of giving organization and perspective to this new world of objective fact and the new world of impulses which it has released. The inner ideal of mediævalism, the eighteenth century inner mind as a preconditioning subject of knowledge, were once necessary walls of defense against a threatening objective

world. But mind as an inner process of introspection is today tending toward a vanishing point leaving the objective world without meaning. Our traditional introspectionist philosophy has left the whole modern movement of the world without constructive, adequate moral guidance.

PART V

THE THIRD EMPIRE

CHAPTER XXVI

THE LARGER INDIVIDUAL

The idea of mind, will, conscience, as prior to objects and behavior is a survival from the mediæval and Protestant conflict between soul and body, mind and world, ideal and fact. We do not start in our thinking today with an inner preconditioning categorical imperative or moral intuition which imposes its ideals on objective facts, which in theory claims to be independent of objective facts, which pronounces sensations and impulses and a physical environment and social conditions external and indifferent. Modern science has given us a living organism in vital contact with a physical environment. This living biological process contains certain innate ways of responding toward certain objects in the environment. In the human, in contrast to the animal, world there is greater plasticity of response to the environment. There is not such a definite correlation between impulse and stimulus. Nevertheless the only linkage between the mind and the objective world is through the organism with which and through which the mind has been evolved. This correlation of organism and environment though plastic in the human sphere is the biological foundation of the psychological correlation of mind and environment.

Although the development of the human cerebrum has rendered plastic the correlation of impulses and their appropriate stimuli, nevertheless there is an innate correlation between impulse and the objective environment. There is not the stereotyped correlation which exists in the animal organism. But there is correlation. Habit and custom and intelligence and the environment may account for the different forms of family, of property, of social life. But that all men have some form of family, some property system, some type of social and political organization, is due to innate human needs. These needs, these impulses organically, psychologically, imply certain objective interests and fulfillments. This means that purely inner attitudes of will and purely introspective states of mind can only be the result of a process of introversion. They are aspects of experience which have become detached from their appropriate objective ends through conflict and consequent disassociation. Will, attitudes, purpose, conscience, can be understood only as conscious parts of a living segment which is part of, and which completes, the circle of life. The other segments are physical, chemical, physiological and biological. Will is the result of the development of judgment which makes possible motivation and conscious control. But moral control is a control of something, and this something controlled can only be a biological process. This process is not the same in the higher, as it is in the lower, forms of life. But it preserves certain needs, predispositions—sexual, proprietary, social,—which give to the normal moral will certain necessary objectives. However, these needs do not

get expressed in stereotyped forms. A normal moral will is a process which completes, through intelligent interpretation and control and more plastic reorganization, the biological process which it inherits. And this biological inheritance predisposes the human will to some form of manipulation, some form of ownership, some kind of sexual life. The specific form of vocation, of property, of family, of social organization, will depend upon the experience and activity of the individual.

This means that the mind as conceived by mediævalism, and this same mind as individualized by Protestantism and modern individualism is a subjective aspect of a living whole which has been detached from the objective ends of normal living as the result of a conflict with an unyielding world. This inner subjective will and conscience is a fiction because the will presupposes and is built upon a biological process which is incarnated in the bodily organism. The normal mind is through the organism correlated with the physical world; through instinct and impulse it is given certain objective ends and interests. The mind of the ancients, before the introversion process which culminated in the mystery religions, was through muscle and nerve and desire and imagination and will inseparably and organically a part of family, industry, politics, education, and art. But the conflict between the old order and an inner conscience typified in (historical) Christianity, the successful one of several mystery religions, brought about a dualism between a newer world conceived as inner and the older order which through conflict came to be regarded as external and outer.

Protestantism and individualism with their warfare on institutions and authority have perpetuated this bifurcation of experience.

Modern ethics based on psychology and biology does not start with a will which has walled itself in from a world of objective fact. We are coming to see that will is a process of behavior. Our general view of the mind is behavioristic. Sensation is an aspect of a motor response. Memory, Watson defines as the ability to repeat a form of response with a certain amount of loss. Perception is a response to a physical object as a unity when the stimulus is any one of a thing's sensory qualities. Hence perception is a consolidation, a unification of motor responses. Dewey and Watson are insisting that all these mental processes are forms of habit. Instinct, they insist, even if it be the ultimate root of behavior, appears in human conduct as a socially conditioned process. And Dewey has gone on to define thought as a reorganization of habit to include impulses set free through conflicting stimuli. Conscience, of course, is just this process of thought applied to matters of conduct.

This means that morals no longer deals with an inner will detachable from impulse and object. The moral will is a process of behavior wherein we achieve certain forms of organized response. There is no inner form of will which does not normally issue in some kind of objective response. Ethics presupposes psychology and psychology presupposes biology. The evolution of the cerebrum has introduced plasticity into the functioning of impulse but it has certainly not made impulse and behavior in any way independent of those

objective expressions with which they are correlated in the biological process. There is no inner moral will independent of those impulses which link the world of animal life to offspring, which give the gregarious animal some necessary social form of behavior. Such biological impulses seem to be constitutive elements and threads in the structure of the human will. If so any failure or defect in the organization and objective embodiment of such impulses means a loss or defect in the moral life. Ancient morality knew no individual without family, property, vocation and political solidarity. Modern morality in making war on the traditional forms of conduct has walled in a protesting and defiant will. Such a will, disassociated from the objective, institutional aspects of conduct, regarded as a symbol of transition is a genuine reality. But no such will exists as an independent moral entity. Impulse implies objective expression. This is the basis of ancient morality. But the objective expression of impulse must vary with the individual. This is the heart of modern ethical thought. When these two ethical truths are synthesized both the old ethics of authoritative tradition and the ethics of traditional individualism will disappear as conflicting ideals. Individuality will appear as the way in which the process of living behavior is realized, is embodied, is incarnated, in objective social ends, in plastic institutional forms.

Our ethics must define the individual in such a way as to include the social aspects of experience. We think of the inner life as sacred, but if will and thought are unintelligible apart from social behavior then the sacredness of the inner aspects of experience must be

extended to the social phases of life as well. The will must again identify itself with the objective social aspects of experience which it surrendered at the close of the ancient régime.

If, as Trotter points out, individual variation has been made possible by the solidarity of the group, then the individual is under obligation to contribute toward the integration of society through what seems to be a purely inner process of isolation and abstraction. Moses in Midian, Elijah in his cave, Paul in Arabia, Jesus in the wilderness, each lifted Hebrew society to a higher level. The deepening of the individual life should be a process through which the social and political life is more richly integrated. There is no magical way of acquiring social organization. Only through the development of individual minds can social organization be achieved.

The transition from mediævalism to Protestantism involved a momentous change. Mediævalism through a universal language, through universal intellectual forms of thought, through music and ritual and painting and architecture, which provided common attitudes and sentiments, gave to the mind of the West a unique consciousness of solidarity. Over against this world, the individualism and subjectivism of Protestantism stand out in strong antithesis. Each individual is to be his own pope or emperor; each person is declared to have absolute "natural" rights of his own. Subjectivism has taken the place of absolutism. The individual arrogates to himself all the absoluteness and all the authority of the mediæval inner life.

With the setting up of subjectivism on the throne

of the old absolutism, what is to guarantee the preservation of social standards? The modern mind has become free, but to what end is this freedom leading? Our limbs are free to dance but they do not dance folk-dances or the minuet or the intellectually controlled ballet of the Russians. Our music is free but it has disassociated itself from the best classical models of the Germans. We have fought the battle of free speech but without a definite objective a free tongue leads only to loquaciousness. Not knowing what we are free to do we set up the bare negative ideal of "freedom" itself as if it were an end or an object at which to aim. This lack of objective, this homelessness which is characteristic of our ethical thought, is indicated by the fact that we have made a virtue of conscientiousness. We have become "free" in religion and with what results! Religion has ceased to be a faith in dominant social ends; we have disassociated the attitude of faith from these objective social ends and we have attempted to make a religion of this detached faith state itself. We have cultivated prayer not as an attitude of mind toward certain dominant objectives in life but as an end in itself. Religion has become religiosity. The current disassociation of the mind from what should be the dominant objectives of conduct, the state, workmanship, vocation, the family, art, religion, is responsible for the current development of sensationalism. Happiness and pleasure cannot be secured if pursued as ends in themselves divorced from the ends and processes of normal living.

The levels of the nervous system below the cortex constitute the mechanism of that part of our mental

life which we inherit from an ancestral past. It is the racial part of our neuro-mental equipment. Our breathing, our bodily equilibrium, our sensori-motor life, our instincts, constitute the deeper, racial phases of our life. Our behavior on this level is not so much the expression of ourselves as individuals as of the race that lives in us. On the higher level it is not the race that lives in us; it is ourselves as individuals that think and feel and act. Here is the psychological dualism which has given rise to many moral problems.

That the animal normally mates and rears its young; that some groups of animals are gregarious; that all the higher animals have in some form an instinct of curiosity; that the apes manipulate objects, are universally observed facts. But in the human mind a dualism has grown up between all these instinctive dispositions and man's conscious volition. When, however, we see that the instinctive dispositions are synthesized into that higher unity which we call volition we are no longer able to think of these instinctive trends as blind or mechanical, neither can we regard volition as a purely interior, wholly subjective entity which stands aloof from the rich repertoire of instinctive dispositions which on the animal level furnishes the lines of direction that the living organism must take.

The traditional dualism between our instinctive and emotional dispositions and volition has, on the one hand, given us a mechanistic interpretation of the instincts, and, on the other hand, has disassociated volition from our instinctive conative dispositions. In this way volition tends to become a thing in itself. It loses all sense of direction. This is the explanation of our

current individualism. The will has become a purely interior entity which has no intelligible connection with the various objective relations in which we live.

If this means to some a leveling down of reason to the plane of instinct, it means to others an incorporation of the more instinctive modes of behavior within the sphere of the moral will.

When the reason arrives on the scene of human life it finds the mind already functioning in a plexus of instincts which relate it to various objective ends and interests. The reason and the will take over and consciously redirect the instinctive and habitual modes of experience which they inherit. This reorganization, this remodeling of the lower levels of behavior is a new aspect of experience.

This new aspect of experience has been interpreted as implying the coming into being of a new entity or independent reality, namely, the individual. This aspect of integration has been treated as if it were synonymous with the individual. But the individual consists not only of this organizing process of reason and will but also of the deeper more instinctive and habitual modes of responding to the various social and physical objects of the environment. The will is precisely the process through which these more instinctive and habitual modes of response are reorganized and directed to ideal ends. On the moral side a will detached from its physical and social environment is a disoriented and therefore disorganized will. Individuality is not a thing, a substance, an entity; it is a way of responding to, of feeling toward, of thinking about, a social and objective world.

After a civilization has gone through the process of individuation there is no way of submerging the will and the reason. When we come to see that individuality is a process of interpreting and reorganizing the more instinctive and habitual and customary modes of response to persons and objects, the inner world of feeling and thought and will loses its seemingly unreal character. If individuality is a process of reorganizing our sub-rational modes of behavior then it is real just so far as it succeeds in this process of consciously directing experience. It is just as real as it succeeds in making itself real; and it is real in no other sense.

When nominalism and the inductive methods of modern science and realism and individualism destroyed the dogma of formal universal truths elaborated through introspection within the mind itself there was destroyed the foundation for that whole world of the inner life which had been believed to exist independent of actual concrete objects. The a priori Platonic forms and the purely interior thought world of mediævalism were incompatible with the world disclosed by modern science and with the modern scientific attitude of mind. There remained no longer any belief either in an absolute inner world or an individual inner world independent of the objective concerns and interests of life embodied in the state, property, the family, and the world of nature. Protestantism like mediævalism held to the self-sufficiency of the inner life. The Renaissance was a movement to restore the old objective aspects of experience which were emphasized by the ancients. But the abuses of the Church focussed the mind of the West on the moral and religious issues of the Reformation

and temporarily subordinated the Renaissance emphasis on the objective aspects of experience such as the development of the state and the experimental study of the external world.

The mediæval intellectual forms which had separated themselves from the state, from property and the family and the world of nature and had projected themselves before the mind as changeless, universal, and eternal, were incompatible with the realism of the Renaissance and the inductive methods of modern science. And the conflict which in the Protestant movement developed between the enlightened individual reason and an authoritative Church soon spread to the sphere of the state. Truth no longer resided in the pure forms of an "inner" mind independent of the state. Instead of a universal Church and a universal Empire there developed a new sense of nationalism. This is the meaning of such a work as Machiavelli's *Prince*.

The Protestant notion of the subjective right of the individual is a purely formal conception. A will without a state, system of property, a vocation, a family life and some form of religion, has no meaning to our imagination. The idea of absolute truth attributed to the Bible and interpreted by the reason of the individual limited moral and religious knowledge to an inner world. The passing of the formal, absolute, changeless truths which identify individual thought with an absolute mind was due to the criticism of Kant as well as that of Hume. Biology has taught us to think of the reason as an instrument in the reorganization of experience to meet a changing environment. This view

makes it impossible to think of the conscience as a form of knowledge set apart from the knowledge of the state, of work, of property, of the family, of art, and opens the way for the extension of the field of conscience to all spheres of experience.

Protestantism brought into existence many churches where there had been one. There was the Church of England and the Church of Scotland and Lutheranism in Germany. This pluralism cast doubt on the pure intellectual forms, the universal truths, of an inner reason which was disassociated from state and family and property and the world of nature. Modern science destroyed men's faith in an inner formal world of truth apart from the objective interests and concerns of life. Conscience as an inner absolute form of knowledge ceased to be creditable; and the way was left open for a type of conscience which concerned itself with the moral organization of all the various objective interests of life. The Reformation itself was made possible by political support in Germany and in England. Not from the Reformation but from the Renaissance and from modern science has come the knowledge that the organization of the state on a basis of freedom and morality is one of the essentials of the development and expansion of the modern conscience.

Individual integration is a new aspect of experience; it is a new addition to the animal mind. It is the aspect of volition which gives individuality to experience; it gives an individually integrated, in contrast to a racially or instinctively integrated, experience. This achievement of individuality marks an epoch in the history of human conduct. It lies at the

very heart of modern civilization as reflected in the Italian Renaissance, the Protestant Reformation and the modern political and industrial revolutions. The dominant ideal of the West was expressed in Woodrow Wilson's statement that the individual should have the privilege of choosing his own way of life.

In stark opposition to this view Buddha and Hume —representing the most searching analysis, the one of Oriental, the other, of Western thought—have both explicitly denied the existence of an individual ego. At the very climax of eighteenth century thought the individual self is declared to be an illusion.

But the individualism which has ruled western thought since the Renaissance has not been founded on an illusion. Illusions do not sustain entire civilizations for centuries. Not even the analytic psychology of a Buddha or a Hume could annihilate such a momentous reality as the modern consciousness of individuality. It lies at the very heart of modern thought.

And yet the philosophy of Buddha and Hume has gained momentum with the passing of time. An individual entity remaining unchanged through all the relationships of experience Hume rightly declares to be nonexistent. Against the individual existing in the mind of the eighteenth century the analysis of Hume holds good. Constrained to live under a state ruled by divine right the individual had arrogated to himself the self-contained absoluteness which had belonged to the state. It was against this conception of the individual that Hume's logic was directed. Buddha had in mind the changeless absolute subject of Hindu thought. Hume had in mind the absolute inner subject of scho-

lasticism brought to individual self-consciousness by modern thought.

The fallacy of individualism is that it regards the individual aspects of experience as coterminous with the entire self. That which gives individuality to experience is precisely the reason in its functional capacity as an agency for the reorganization of the older more instinctive and habitual modes of experience to meet the complex environment, physical and social, of a more developed mind. As a center for the reorganization of experience the individual is preëminently real.

The higher aspects of experience, reason, and will must be reinterpreted. Reason and will are precisely those modes of our mental life through which the reorganization of experience takes place. Only an individual mind can reason or will. This is the truth at the heart of individualism. But individualism has transferred the absolute character of the mediæval inner life to the individual; it has conferred on the individual a self-contained and absolute character. It is this absolutistic character of the individual which has given us moderns such confidence in our own intuitions and a priori ideas. Such a confidence, were it not so customary, would appear simply monstrous. Individualism is to be lived through; we cannot go around it; we cannot go back. But we can go forward only by enlarging our conception of what it means to be an individual.

When individuals learn to associate themselves in organized shareable social objects; when by the aid of science they learn to control and direct the processes

of the physical world for human good, we shall know the larger aspects of human individuality. The wider the interests which can be shared with others and the more richly such interests are integrated the higher is the quality of one's individuality. The will acquires reality and durability by its association with recognizable social ends and with the common-to-all objects of exact science. To take the inner life and separate it from the state and from the world of nature, to make it absolute in itself, as mediævalism did, resulted in mysticism; but to interpret this inner aspect of the will as an individual entity is to add chaos to mysticism. We must preserve the contribution of individualism by incorporating it within the system of a larger self. The individual apart from the complex of instincts, habits, and customs, which furnish the groundwork of one's relations to the family, to the state, to one's vocation, is an unlocalized abstraction.

This new modern sense of individuality is the result of the evolution of a new aspect of experience. Human experience will never be again what it was before the differentiation of the individual reason and will.

Individuality is the highest mental achievement. When properly interpreted and directed there is no point moral or social beyond which individuality should be limited or checked. When individuality proves itself by more adequately organizing experience its development becomes necessary to all the higher levels of conduct. Right conduct does not mean the subordination of individuality; it means the cultivation of a type of individual that can better organize

the objects of experience. The only limit to the development of individuality of this type is the creative intelligence of the individual. There must be a newer and larger interpretation of individualism. The more intelligent the individual the more necessary becomes the reorganization of experience. The capacity for such reorganization determines the grade of individuality. There is no inner individual will or mind or conscience independent of the various organizations of life. One's grade of individuality is determined by the extent and quality of the reorganizing, the remodeling of experience, of which one is capable. The more intelligent the individual mind and will the greater is the necessary remodeling of the traditional modes of behavior. The measure of individuality is shown in the extent and nature of the creative activity whereby the will brings into existence newer forms of those organizations, the state, the church, the family, vocation, and all those objective interests, through which experience is enlarged. Only as the will uses the reason as an instrument in the reorganization of the objective interests of experience does the development of individuality become constructive. Any other type of individuality leads to confusion and disorganization. The organizing of the instincts, the habits, the customs, the sentiments and ideas, which relate the will to the various objective interests of experience is precisely what is meant by individuality.

The objective sciences have broken down the traditional inner ideal. An objective world has become the necessary counterpart of the will. A new environment is furnishing a rich world for the enlargement of hu-

man life. The new world of the objective sciences is setting free a new world of impulses which brings about unpredictable unfoldings of heart and will and mind. The realism of science has shown us that an inner world apart from objective ends and interests is a fiction. A constructive ethics must now show how an expanding, creative ideal of conduct can so use the impulses set free by a newer environment that they may lead to ways of larger living. We must replace an ideal of defense with an ideal of adventure. If a coming war should destroy our civilization with poison-gas and disease germs it would not be the fault of the objective sciences. Science learned about gas to save us from pain through anæsthetics. It studied disease germs to save us from disease. The newer objective world of science has disorganized our world. But this is not the fault of objective science. Our disorganized world is due to the fact that science has expanded and philosophy has shrivelled and contracted in conservative and unintelligent defense. Philosophy must enlarge its program to include the new world of the objective sciences.

There are in the human being instinctive trends which underlie the development of the will in the various spheres of experience.

The sex instinct gives each individual a necessary relationship to the opposite sex. Biologically, psychologically, ethically, no individual can be an independent unit.

The instinct of workmanship when properly supervised by intelligence issues in some form of creative work. Every well-organized individual is trained to

perform some skilled or professional work which has social value.

Every well-organized individual is also aware of a relationship to the state, and in addition, to a group of states. An individual with no organic relation to political organization is a moral torso.

Every individual by the mere drift of his nature interprets the world of which he is a part in terms of mind and will. He is therefore linked in his own mind with mind in the world at large.

These and other relations make it clear that the human individual is not a simple unitary reality but a very complex being. The being which the individualists have taught us to believe in is an illusion. The individual is never a completed unity of experience but a growing organization of experience. Each individual has threads, threads that are structural in his constitution, that link him with a complex system of institutions. These institutions, the family, the state, vocation, etc., are the objective phase of human life, and the rational volitional process through which these objective aspects of experience are organized constitute the inner or subjective phase of experience.

Our instinctive trends and capacities unconsciously go out toward their appropriate objects. The intelligence builds on these instinctive relationships a higher level of custom and tradition. It is the function of the reason and the will to reorganize and to elevate to ever higher levels these relationships. The character of this reorganization constitutes one's individuality.

The greatest individual is not the person who has no family, no vocation, no state, no loyalty, no developed

religious convictions. The greatest individual is he who has all these organizations of experience developed in the richest possible manner. To be individual does mean to be different from others. The greatest individuality however arises not through breaking with the fundamental relationships of life but through giving these relationships of life a unique and distinctive form.

Volition in the sphere of social behavior does not mean separateness. It does mean an inner process of organization. The greater the individuality of this type the greater the social unity. If we see in the individual only the subjective aspect of experience then we make of the individual an exclusive being. It is this view of the individual which has brought about the dualisms and conflicts in the social world. When we come to see that the subjective aspect of the individual has a function and that this function is the organization of all the objective relationships of life we shall have achieved the conception of an individual of an expansive and inclusive type.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE FAMILY

In all forms of ancient society, as in China and Japan today, marriage for every son and daughter was a cardinal concern of morality. Men and women did not choose whether they would become fathers and mothers any more than they chose whether they would be born as sons and daughters.

The woman idealized in classical antiquity was the mother of children, the organizer of the home. Sentimental, romantic feeling toward a wife in Rome, as in old Japan, savored of immorality. There was an august sentiment toward the mother as the bearer of the sacred life of the race; there was no romantic feeling toward the wife as an individual. Woman is biologically different from man and the woman in ancient society lived a biologically normal woman's life. For years her body nourished the lives of her children in her womb and at her breast. Her brain and heart and intellect were molded by tradition for the organization of the family life. This classical family system did not rest on love, on sentiment, on romance. It rested on profound religious regard and loyalty.

The human mind inherited a bodily organism which, when it reached a certain stage of biological development, exhibited sexual behavior toward individuals of

the opposite sex. The sexual behavior in men and animals, like that in plants, was nature's way of reproducing herself in each new generation. The human will in ancient society was not differentiated from the life of nature as it has since become in the mediæval and the modern mind. Sex and the family belonged primarily to nature and only secondarily to man in early society.

The profound moral consciousness of Jesus was inwardly compelled to remain aloof from the traditional Hebrew family because it had not yet incorporated the deeper and richer aspects of the higher prophetic morality. With all his passion for social justice and all his profound sympathy for women, Jesus made little of the family. This was because the Hebrew family of his time was founded on ancestral blood and offspring; the family was organized not by love but by tradition; it rested on property inherited, and not acquired by work, and on slavery. One must be able even to hate fathers and mothers by blood for the sake of a greater family which rests on love.

In the development of the philosophy of the inner life man ceased to be a part of nature. The mind through introspection set itself above the world of nature. The mind regarded the body as an extraneous adjunct. Man's essential life came to be wholly within. Sex lost its recognized place in the sphere of the moral life.

The ideal of the inner life put a taboo on sex; sex was left outside the sphere of morality. In this way the mind of the West died to the family. With this inner retreat the family was less idealistic than before.

Over against the profession of chastity, there was half-concealed immorality. Sex was deeper than chastity; it was too deep to be suppressed by the ideal of an inner life. The mediæval ideal was at war with itself. Mary was both a virgin and a mother. The former ideal acted as a taboo on the notion of sex; the latter ideal moralized and spiritualized the instinct of sex. Mediæval art visualized this conflict of ideals. This inner ideal still persists and acts as an unconscious taboo on normal sex relations.

This dualism between the Christian moral consciousness and the traditional pagan family produced the monks and nuns of mediævalism, with their temptations and hysterias. Because of this mediæval inheritance romantic love persists in remaining outside the traditional family. The modern man does not respond to the traditional good woman who bears children, cooks and goes to church. He prefers the romantic woman with her complex and baffling sentiments. The modern woman will marry the man who supports her in a home of luxury but she will not usually love him romantically. She craves her knightly lover. The new woman will be contented only if in addition to being a wife she can be also the object of romantic love. The birth of romantic love is an invaluable addition to human development but there has as yet been no conscious correlation of these newer romantic elements of experience with the institution of marriage.

As Cheyne and Frazer and Cumont and others are showing in their researches, the Great Mother is older and deeper in human nature than the Virgin. As a symbol of a higher inner life the cult of the Virgin

marks an epoch in the evolution of human morals. The next step in advance will consist in the absorption, the incorporation, of these higher inner aspects of the reason and the will, symbolized in the character of the Virgin, within the deeper, older, more instinctive sexual life on which was built the cult of the Great Mother and the institution of the family.

The old family system of the Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans, like the Chinese system today, lacked the romance and idealism which have come into the sphere of sex through the refining fires of mediæval asceticism, and the self-conscious reflection of modern individualism. But in mediævalism the refinement of sex issues in no flowering process. Nor have modern romanticism and individualism come to an understanding of themselves. These movements are not ends in themselves but processes through which the older patterns of experience are to be refined and reorganized.

The woman of today has a love life which has been illumined by the idealization of Jesus, the romance of Chaucer, the refining fire of Dante. Can the deepening and refining of the sex life which has been achieved through all the centuries of Christian history be included within the sphere of motherhood and wifehood? Can the Christian idealism which converted woman into a saint and the polite idealism of chivalry which made woman the object of romantic love now accomplish the more difficult task of making the wife and mother an object of equally romantic, equally profound love? Can the depth of romantic sentiment toward mediæval saints be maintained toward a woman who has become a wife and mother? Must the Wagners

and Goethes of the future use the laboratory of promiscuous sexual relations to secure the emotional drive to write the world's music and poetry? Must Dante continue to find his Beatrice outside his own household? Must the priest, the poet, the artist, the creative scholar, be forever unadjusted to normal life?

In the Middle Ages the will and the heart were thought of as an "inner" world and the sex instinct and the body and the physical world were thought of as an "outer" world. We know now that this dualism was the reflection of a conflict between an older, ritualistic form of family and a new world of conscience and will. And the only solution of this conflict is the illumination of the older, more instinctive modes of conduct by a consciously intelligent will. In the human world the instincts can no longer function in the unconscious way in which they function on the animal level. Human imagination and reason so reorganize the instinctive reactions that the patterns which exist in animal behavior are unconsciously remodeled in human experience. If the instinct of sex stands over against the moral will it will destroy the balance of that will; on the other hand, a will which does not incorporate the instinct of sex within its conscious purposes will be thrown out of its orbit. The will must reörganize the instinctive modes of behavior and upon these remodelings it must build its own conscious structures.

The ideal of the Virgin must be transformed into that of the Mother. The ideal of the Holy Family is the meaning of the family as it is transformed by the newer conscience, by the ideal of the inner life,

This newer conscience has destroyed the old family. It has also set free the individual will and reason. It remains now through the ideals of the inner life and the individual conscience to so reorganize the sexual life that it will promote the development of the moral will.

The ideal of the Virgin is a valuable symbol of the moral organization of the pre-marital life. Virginity is not an end in itself; it is the organizing moral ideal of the preparatory stage of woman's life. The ideal of the Holy Child is a symbol of childhood; it gives the meaning of human birth as it is interpreted by the newer conscience. Does not the dogma of the Annunciation mean that sex life and the processes of birth may voice the accents of the moral ideal?

The dogma of the Holy Mother is the symbol of woman into whose sexual and parental life there enters the moral refinement of the inner life and the reorganization and control of sex which have been made possible by modern science. What is the bearing of the Gospel birth stories on the ethics of the family? How many men and women are deterred from a happy love life by insufficient income to support children? Would there not be more marriages and happier homes if women were taught how to choose their children before birth? What is the lesson of the Hebrew mothers who longed to give birth to the expected leader of Israel? Were they not raising the old Hebrew longing for children to a higher moral level? What would the application of this symbolism mean in the field of moral education? What is the bearing of this symbolism on an economic process which excludes

countless women from motherhood? What is the bearing of this symbolism on the false egoism and unenlightened hedonism of women of wealth who have no personal knowledge of the moral idealism of the birth stories or of the divine mother?

When the thought, science, art, and romance which have come into our modern life, when the deepening of the inner life through the centuries of mediæval discipline, enrich the mind and the will, and when this enriched and deepened experience reorganizes and elevates the sex life and the life of the family, the dualism which now exists between the will and the family will disappear.

Mediæval introspection and introversion, taken over and individualized by Protestantism and our modern revolutionary philosophy, interpreted the mind and the will as an inner, purely spiritual process. According to this view, marriage is a purely formal contract which independently existing minds choose to make. Such a marriage conceivably alters in no way the nature of the contracting individual. The family is not a part of the nature of the individual. The revolutionary philosophy of the eighteenth century, born of conflict between the individual and institutions, has left in the mind the idea that all institutions are limitations imposed on the nature of the individual. The individual has come to define himself as having an inner nature independent of institutions. Marriage is something which happens to an individual. One is free either to marry or not to marry. The individual through mediæval introversion, through the modern conflict with institutions, through an idealistic, introspectionist philosophical tra-

dition, became detached, in the individual's view of himself, from marriage and the family. Sex and offspring become disassociated from the individual's conception of his own essential nature.

One of our dominant passions is to be free, free in body and brain, free in heart, free in mind. The nervous interest in the professions, the little philanthropies, the broken and unorganized scientific interests, the imitating of the educational curriculum of men, are all symbols of the unrest and unattached character of woman's mind at the present time.

As conscientiousness is the outstanding virtue of our present moral code so flirtatiousness is the quality which most characterizes the present relation between the sexes. Sex has become a distracting preoccupation.

Furthermore our current hedonism which regards pleasure as an object of the will that can be abstracted from our established modes of behavior, from our personality, is indicative of our present stage of moral development.

The instincts of sex and parenthood have so tied the traditional woman to her children and her home that her intellectual development in the past has been kept below that of men. The new woman, on the other hand, is literally breaking into the educational field. Women respond more than men to the cultural values of education. The mind of the highly educated woman is too complex and sensitive to be kept within the lines of the traditional family.

The modern woman has set out to be free; nothing can prevent her from making this turn in the road. The old family resting on "status" cannot contain the

modern free mind. But if the individual gets free just for the sake of being free then freedom is a serpent which drives the individual from Eden without a vision of the promised land.

Romance today centers about the individual and it is practically coterminous with courtship. Very little romance attaches to woman as a wife, as a mother and a builder of the family and the home. But the individual as a detached individual can never be made a moral ideal. The feelings of one such individual toward another which are motivated by sex can never rise to the level of reverence or moral dignity. Woman in the Old Testament, in China, and in Japan, is the religious and social and economic center about which is organized the life of the family. Such an individual is the center of a moral and religious life. And just so far as the modern woman ceases to be the symbol of the life of the family and the race does she cease also to be an object of moral and religious regard. Here is the truth of the old ethnic morality.

The naturalism of the Renaissance and the realism of modern science are in stark opposition to the self-centered mind of the individualistic tradition. Sexual impulse, sexual love, give the lie to any and every theory which attempts to make the individual a self-centered independent unit. Sexual impulse is not the result of introspection, of conscious thought and purpose. Sexual predispositions with their organic feelings and desires are the basis, the foundation, upon which alone romance and personal regard in matters of sex are made possible. The true symbols of the relation of man and woman are Plato's myth of an orig-

inal nature which was later divided into male and female so that each sex is now seeking its lost complement and the myth in Genesis of the creation of woman from Adam's rib. The individual is not free to marry or not to marry but to marry ill or well; that is, he is free to so treat his sexual life that his moral nature will be limited or enlarged.

There is no remedy for sexual vice as long as individuals are unadjusted in their sexual life. There is no cure for sexual vice but there is a substitute which is to be found in a normal sexual life. The inability of the Hebrew prophets to prevent their people from falling back into the old nature worship, symbolized by the pillar and the green tree, shows how impossible it is to organize the will without regard to the drive of the sex life. When the higher morality ignores sex there will be set up about the pillar and the green tree an independent sex worship which will frustrate moral advance. The green tree and the pillar must be incorporated within a higher morality.

Whether an instinctive response to some object can be repressed and then be incorporated in the response of the will toward some other object is a matter about which our psychology is not clear. When the observable bodily response, let us say, of the instinct of sex is inhibited the inner organic processes do not cease to function. Now it is a question whether this suppressed inner bodily activity can furnish impulses toward objects which are not intrinsically related to the suppressed instinct. Whether the energies of the sex instinct can be drained into other channels we may leave an open question. The suppressed instinct of sex may

have had much to do with the development of the cult of the Virgin in the mediæval period.

Woman at present is not satisfied with the traditional family. The new woman would therefore quit the family. She would be a new social unit in herself. This is a false and impossible philosophy. Woman will achieve a new freedom, a richer individuality; but this freedom, this higher individuality, will be possible only through a new form of motherhood and wifehood, a higher type of family. The deeper, more complex personality of the modern woman will express itself in a newer, freer type of family.

Individualism made each individual free to marry or not to marry. But if there is no social tradition, if each is free to do as he prefers, then the matter of sex is regarded as indifferent. The future will look on the development of individualism as a turning point in the higher reorganization of experience. The real contribution of individualism will in the long run be not that it enabled the individual either to marry or not to marry but that it enabled each person to organize the family life according to his or her own individual experience. The modern movement making so rapidly for individuality is affecting women as well as men. A new sense of individuality is being born in woman. Woman has the same right to the richest and fullest development of her individuality that man has. Democracy and individualism will reorganize woman's status as much as man's. But when woman achieves her freedom, she will find that freedom is not an end. The will cannot be free by being independent of instinct and emotion and sentiment. It can be free only by re-

organizing these older, deeper modes of behavior and feeling in such a way that they will promote, and not conflict with, an intelligent life. Instead of attempting to cultivate modes of thought and conduct independent of sex the woman of the future must cultivate modes of thought which will raise the sex life to a more intelligent level. Not in disassociating her mind from children will woman's intellect develop but in learning to control the birth of children, to intelligently conceive children, and to educate them. Woman will live her larger life not by being free from children but by choosing her children. Not in romance independent of the family but in a more intelligent kind of romance within the family will woman find her larger life.

The new woman is nervous and disoriented not because she is highly enlightened but because her new enlightenment has not come in her own sphere. The new woman's education has so far been a joyless reproduction of man's intellectual interests. Woman is at present coquetting with the different professions but her heart is not in these professions. She has not yet found out that her greatest intellectual development is possible only in those aspects of experience which most concern a woman's life. Woman's greatest intellectual development will produce the greatest and most lasting results when it proceeds along the lines of her own generic interests. When the modern woman finds her intellectual clue she will not copy man's education; she will develop her own mind on its own lines. There are aspects of economics and sociology, of biology and psychology, of art and literature, that vitally concern a woman's life. Woman must have her own type of

education; she must think enough of herself to be not satisfied but joyously happy in being a woman. Woman will be free to use divorce but only with the greatest caution as she would use surgery. She will have the right to own property but not for the sake of spending it but in order that she may share in the control of the economic phases of her life. Women have a right to all the individual freedom that men have. But biology would seem to make it clear that a woman cannot have the same type of individuality that men have. Her sexual differentiation makes her the bearer and nourisher of the young in a way that can never be shared by man. Any organism can attain its highest development only when it functions along the lines of its natural characteristics and capacities. A woman can attain her greatest individuality only when she voluntarily and intelligently is true to her sex.

It is only when the mind is free to coöperate with and to organize the sexual life that the will in the sphere of sex is realized and the sexual life blooms. Love on its physical side is possible only when mind and will coöperate with the instinctive sexual life. Prostitution therefore is a disorganization not only of the love life but of the sexual life as well. The sex life reaches its full flower only through love. And love develops and matures not in promiscuous but in established and dependable relationships. A mutually organized life is essential not only to mental and moral trust but to a full and healthy expression of the sexual life itself.

It is one of the newest discoveries of modern psychology that the sexual life of woman comes to its full

expression only where there is the mental and moral stimulus of love. And such an atmosphere can endure only in a mutually organized relationship. How wise therefore are the words of Proverbs (5:15, 18, 19, 20): "Drink running waters out of thine own well. Rejoice with the wife of thy youth. Let her be as the loving hind and pleasant roe. Be thou ravished always with her love. Why wilt thou be ravished with a strange woman?"

The new ethics of sex is attempting to bring romantic love within the family system. It contemplates a synthesis of romantic love, of Christian love, of the love of chivalry, with the pagan ethnic family ideal. In the new ethics of sex the sentiment of love, which tends to exist outside the family, and the pagan love of immortality through the family line, coincide.

The unrest in the sphere of the family is due to the emergence in the individual of a newer intelligence, a richer individuality which is incompatible with the traditional family. This has introduced dualism between the individual and marriage. The dualism can be overcome only by a newer conception of the individual. The higher intelligence of the individual must be made to remold, to reorganize, the instincts, emotions, habits, the customs, sentiments and ideals, upon which the institution of marriage rests. Only through such an intelligent and plastic reorganization can the dualism between the individual and marriage be prevented. As the individual learns to reorganize the institution of marriage, as he learns to give objective, social expression to his growing intelligence, he experiences an enlargement of his personality. Marriage is one of the

social aspects of the individual's essential nature. The type of marriage must change with the type of individual. There is no inner nature of the individual which exists prior to the individual's social behavior. The institution is the organized, and the process of intelligence is the organizing, aspect of one unbroken unity of human life.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE GOOD WILL IS CREATIVE

When the conscience of western civilization outgrew the conception of property which it had inherited from the old pagan order it was natural that the moral pendulum should swing from the old extreme of slavery and paternalism to the ideal of poverty. The new virtue of poverty was a protest against an outgrown conception of property.

But to set apart the will, the heart, the motive, from the material interests of life, to make the inner disposition independent of the world of property, was to leave the world of property outside the sphere of morality. Such a dualism made the will unreal and standardless and deprived it of the content which was necessary for its functioning. To define the moral will as independent of the world of property may have been a strategic move forward at the breaking down of the pagan régime; but to continue this ideal is to cultivate economic and moral chaos. The ethics of the inner life although it seems to have been a step backwards was in reality laying the basis for a great moral advance. The virtue of poverty taught western civilization a profound lesson in the ethics of property—the lesson that only those material interests have moral worth which are organized about a moral will. Only

the mind which has been trained in self-control can be entrusted with the care of property. A mind disciplined in poverty has the capacity to achieve a superior moral organization when it gets behind it the fire and the drive of the old impulses to work and to create. The mediæval ideal has survived and has enriched our conception of personality. The problem today is to enable this enriched personality to incorporate the drive of workmanship within its moral experience.

When possession and workmanship are no longer recognized as basic in human morals the way is left open for a monstrous development of these interests in certain individuals. Mediæval dualism still blinds the conservative conscience to the necessity for the moral organization of workmanship and vocation. The modes of behavior which have to do with workmanship and creation must be trained to function with regard to their proper objective ends and interests. The most immoral thing in contemporary life is the dualism between an "inner" life and a commercialized interest in material objects pursued as ends in themselves.

Property was extraneous to conscience in the Middle Ages because it did not rest on a creative moral will. Morality set up an inner will independent of the world of property. The Reformation not only did not break with this inner mind independent of external objects, but it interpreted it in terms of an individual will. It set up an individualized form of the mediæval inner life.

Now the Renaissance and modern science have taught us that there is no purely inner world without material ends and objects. The problem before us

therefore is an organization of our modes of behavior which underlie workmanship and vocation that will enrich and enlarge the will.

It will require a more complex organization of conscience to be able to abound morally than to be in want. It will be more difficult to organize the will to work than it was for our mediæval ancestors to practice poverty. Even in the Middle Ages the thoroughgoing disassociation of the will from the behavior which underlies man's work in the world was more theoretical than real. The saint owned by proxy. Through the institution of the Church the saint was richly endowed with cathedrals, art galleries, universities, hospitals, homes for the sick and the aged. The virtue of poverty was practicable in the mediæval world because the Church with its monasteries, its hospitals, its cathedrals, its schools, and its great estates gave the individual a sense of corporate economic security even when as an individual he adhered to the ideal of poverty.

The chief difficulty concerning the ethics of property is due to the fact that possession is generally divorced from workmanship. Workmanship is the only moral justification of ownership. When men dance at their work, as David did in taking the Ark to Zion; when men get drunk with their vocation, as Paul several times reports himself to be; then the dualism between the will and its objects disappears.

Poets, generals, inventors, are successful in so far as their activities are built on those systems of impulsive and habitual processes which make possible certain creative forms of will. William James could have

made of himself an artist or a man of letters. The character of one's work, says Watson, depends upon one's original tendencies, "factors which, when taken singly, are difficult to detect, but which when taken together are most important." No two painters, no two musicians, no two actors, are alike in their technique. There "are different fundamental part activities which have persisted in spite of instruction" (Watson). Here we see the "original tendencies" which furnish the drive through which each individual must organize his pattern of workmanship. To discover these "original tendencies" is the purpose of vocational psychology. Bertrand Russell thinks that much of the unhappiness of life is due to the fact that we have cultivated our property pattern more than our workmanship pattern. There are some professions which are not prosecuted for gain because the profit is so universally low. Preaching, teaching, painting, sculpture, scientific investigation, are such professions. Those who succeed in these professions do so because their wills are elevated by an organized drive to a creative level of activity. Such a will is not actuated by financial gain; it is driven to expression by an inner urge to create, to produce, to bring into being, some objective fulfillment for whose existence there is a compelling, dominating, mental hunger.

Owing to the conflict between the newer moral ideal and the older pagan régime, our forefathers projected their moral ideal partly into a future world and partly into a purely inner world. As the result of this dualism the world of common experience was temporarily, at least in theory, bereft of all the higher elements of

moral control. The old pagan ideals were dead and the newer ideals functioned only in heaven or in a purely interior world. This background explains in part the chaos in our ethics of property. The conservative conscience has an ethics which is propertyless; property is extraneous to morals. It is in a sort of no man's land where the predatory type may preëmpt all that they can lay hands on.

Protestantism broke with mediævalism because of its individualism; but it carried over into its own tradition the dogma of the absoluteness of an inner life. It did not relate this inner life to an outer world; it simply interpreted it in terms of the individual. In addition, therefore, to the traditional dualism of inner and outer, which demoralized the world of property, there arose the new dogma of an independent individual self. This sense of self is a dangerous illusion until it becomes a center for the reorganization of objective interests and ends which can be shared by others.

The perfection of organization of modern industry is far superior to that of any other department of life. The development of such great corporations as those which have organized the railroads, the express business, the production of oil and steel, is perhaps the most characteristic achievement of our time. And yet while we are evolving such a perfection of technique in the organization of business we are confused by the fact that we are rapidly outgrowing our economic ideals. We are shocked to find that our ethics of business has to be reorganized. One reason for this disorganization is due to the fact that our conception

of the individual is undergoing a profound change. The individual self which lay at the basis of the older ethics of economic competition no longer exists. The idea of the individual as a self-centered independent unit grew out of the blue atmosphere of introspection and has no foundation in fact. This notion was a psychological fiction necessary for a certain purpose. But to act any longer on the supposition of the reality of this eighteenth century conception of an independent self-centered unitary individual conscience and will in our age of complex organic interdependent relationships is only to create social disorganization. The technique of big business is today thoroughly organized. And when its leaders show great moral concern for the preservation of the old individualistic ethics as applied to the employees, either their intelligence or their motives need reorganization. The staggering possibilities of the economic exploitation of our undeveloped resources have furnished an atmosphere which has stimulated the growth of individualism. This condition will rapidly change in the future.

The older order dealt with mass feelings and mass modes of behavior; modern ethics deals with the individual will. This revolution has brought a disorder and chaos which have driven many thinkers to a condemnation of individual ethics. But after the individual has achieved an inner will of his own, it becomes forever impossible to act in the mass as if individual volition did not exist. No socialistic baptism, be it ever so full of fire, could make our modern Herbert Spencers eat from the common dish of the Chinese family. Individual wills can never again be lumped

together with other wills as they were in the old herd morality. This is the assured result of individualism. And yet our present type of individualism can only lead to more chaos.

The solution of this difficulty is the cultivation of a new type of individual. The individual cannot abdicate his own will but he can train himself to will objects and ends which can be shared by others. The individual must have a property reward for his workmanship, but it should be determined by the extent to which he contributes to the achievement of a world in which others can share. The moral self must organize its property interests, its vocational pursuits, in such a way as to fulfill the lives of others as well as its own. The present form of individualistic ethics is leading the business world into a form of interminable war. Romantic, altruistic solutions of the ethics of property are powerless; no one can escape his own ego. But one can so organize his own interests as to make them shareable by other individuals. The will to work must learn to find itself not in a process of acquiring property by outwitting others, but in organizing vocational ends, in pursuing creative interests, which can be shared by others working in the same spirit. It is in the enlargement of the individual that his salvation in economic as in other fields of experience is to be achieved.

The Greeks and the Romans associated workmanship with slavery; and those who hold to the classical view are offended at the central place which industry holds in the life of today. They say that Vulcan is driving Apollo from his throne. It is certainly true

that the old gods are coming back into our pantheon. Prominent in our pantheon are Indra, the god of electricity; the Bull-worship of Iowa; the worship of Ceres in Kansas; of Pluto, the god of waterpower. We even offer up our first-born in child labor to these gods. Our feast-days in which we worship these gods fill the greater part of our calendar. That these gods are back in the temples of today is evidence that we no longer believe that our minds must be disassociated from our will to work and to produce. This is a sign of health. The will disassociated from the interests of workmanship and possession is a thwarted will, a diseased will. It is a moral torso. These modern gods of fire and steam, of electricity, of oil, of coal, of water power, of gold, of copper and other metals, of food and grain, are the offspring of the control of nature by science.

It was the disassociation of the material interests of life from the moral will which drove them from the temples of religion and morality. The moral organization of all material interests will bring them back again into the temple of morality and religion where they were in the ancient moral régime.

There must be an extension, a retraining of the will, to incorporate the newer, richer objective world given us by modern science. There must be a frank disavowal of a will or conscience which can exist in an inner world detached from a will to work and to create. A good will implies economic creation. Once this is seen, the wall between conscience and material goods vanishes as a dream. An adequate moral will must issue in productive, creative activity.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE SYNTHESIS OF INDIVIDUALITY AND SOLIDARITY

The social patterns of experience are so variable and have undergone such a change that it is no wonder that our intellectualistic and individualistic modes of thought have regarded them as the product of purely individual thinking. It is easy to see the social patterns that run through the pack, the horde, the clan and tribe, the ancient city-states; but in the ever-widening circles of modern life, these traditional forms of social behavior have been quite blotted out of our thought.

The development of knowledge in the modern world turned the burning focus of introspection on the sources of conduct. And a strange transformation took place. Introspection knew nothing of the older social patterns of conduct. A custom or a habit, when it gets filtered through the processes of introspection, becomes a series of observed phenomena with the "go," the drive, left out. In this way the drive of habit and custom and the consciousness of solidarity lose their significance for a theory of conduct. In the modern world this basic social trend to live in groups which makes possible the world of society is so covered over by the later and higher and more conscious processes of the human mind that many individuals seem unaware of its existence.

Such intensity of gregarious behavior as a herd of cattle exhibits in a stampede or in a concerted attack on an enemy is rare in human behavior. It occurs at fires, at religious revivals; it is seen in lynchings, in strikes; and it is in evidence in war-psychoses. Ordinarily gregarious behavior is under severe intellectual restraint, but the unthinking intensity of gregariousness which occasionally dashes all the intellectual restraints of civilization to the winds shows the energy and power which lie dormant in these social forms of human behavior. The emphasis on reflection, which culminated in the eighteenth century, has blinded us to the depth and sweep of group behavior. The urge, the thrusting forth of the will, the surge of the tides of emotion and interest in group behavior give movement and life to the mind. Without the underlying consciousness of solidarity the most illuminating analysis of the intellect can produce only negations in the field of social behavior. In the modern mind there is a practically universal tendency to associate the desires and interests and ideal strivings of life with a consciousness of one's own ego. And the conflict between this modern ego-complex and the older trends of custom and tradition is a most significant phenomenon. The energies which group behavior set free in the World War were never dreamed of by the older introspectionist and rationalistic psychologists. The adjustment of the rational ego, of the modern ego-complex, to the wider social patterns of experience is one of the outstanding social problems of the present time. Our intellectualistic psychology has seen only the volitional, the rational, the self-conscious aspects

of the mind. It has transformed society into a collection of disconnected individuals. And the individualism which has resulted is just as much in need of an atonement of the social sort as were the earlier centuries in need of an atonement of the theological sort.

We have been taught to view the strife between individuals as rooted in psychological and ethical fact. On the other hand, a form of behavior which brings unity into this world of conflicting selves is supposed to be a matter of individual sentiment or of religious enthusiasm. The social phases of experience are regarded as the expressions of some unaccountable sentiment. This limits the ethics of economics to the sphere of individual competition and politics to the function of a disinterested umpire and regards the consciousness of solidarity in all its phases as belonging to the realm of chance sentiment. It is this lack of a scientific basis of social interests which has helped to make ethics and politics so unreal. The individualistic tradition has taught us that egoism rests upon ineradicable instinct and we have been led to infer that social objectives are essentially evanescent and unstable. Such an antithesis makes impossible a science of social conduct.

Nothing is more characteristic of our age than the loss of social perspective which so many individuals have suffered. An intellectualistic psychology has tended to narrow down our experience to a nucleus of self-conscious volition and reason. The contract theory is just one phase of this psychology as applied to social institutions. Family, community, municipal, national, and international aspects of life have been

interpreted as resting on clear-cut, intellectual contracts between independent, self-conscious minds. Parental and social behavior and the development of sentiment through group tradition have been set aside by a rationalistic psychology. The volition and reason of the individual are regarded as ends-in-themselves. This is the view which is responsible for so much confusion in our social world. Conscience has become a mystical voice. Thought has become a standardless intuition. Moral and social and political forms of thought have seemed to spring right out of the blue. Such a situation makes necessary a thorough reorganization of our moral and social ideals.

A biological psychology, however, is teaching us a different view of social conduct. We are coming to see that there are inescapable social patterns of behavior due to parental and other social customs which identify the ends of the individual with the ends of others. These social patterns are just as much a part of the individual's constitution, as hunger or fear or anger. These patterns of social and traditional behavior produce a sense of isolation, of loneliness, of incompleteness, when the individual is deprived of certain social relationships.

Our introspectionist philosophical tradition has given us a conscious mind which claims to be the logical and the real presupposition of all objective facts and all forms of social behavior. We are coming to see, however, that this alleged priority of an inner reflective mind is the result of a process of introversion. It is a form of mental fixation due to a long continued conflict between the mind and its environment. We do

not first exhibit consciously individual minds over against a world of social customs and traditions. This idea of an inner individual conscious mind existing prior to objects and social customs is a legacy from a traditional process of introversion which began in the conflict between Christianity and paganism, and even earlier, and culminated in the mediæval conflict of mind and world and in the modern revolutionary conflict between democracy and traditional institutions. It is this definition of the mind in terms of introversion which has bred the dualisms of self and other, of individual and social, of will and impulse.

As Dewey has shown the fact that we are born as helpless infants makes impossible the individualistic view of a conscious mind existing prior to a world of custom and tradition embodied in the family and in other social groups. But this interpretation of Dewey makes impossible also the view of the recent school of instinct psychologists who regard any social consciousness such as that involved in the family, the state, the mob, the crowd, as an expression of a system of predetermining instincts. For if the individual is necessarily born into a family with already organized customs and traditions, the expression of any instinct would be molded by the customs of the family group.

This view is true, but it is not necessarily incompatible with the view of McDougall who holds that without the push and pull, the urges and inner predispositions of impulsive behavior, the associations based on habit and custom would be as incapable of holding together as aggregations of sand. What we eat and the manner of our eating, the form of our

family life, the type of our political consciousness, depend upon our environment, our history, our philosophy, etc. But if there were no impulse to eat, no sex impulse, no impulse toward gregariousness, there might be no binding together by habit of our behavior into forms of diet, into families, into states. Custom molds the expression of impulsive behavior; it gives the forms which impulse assumes in human behavior. But custom and habit do not create the unlearned tendencies with which our natures are stored, and it is these tendencies that furnish the raw material of impulse which is organized by intelligence into habit and custom.

We are no longer able to define the individual merely in terms of reason or will or any other form of a so-called purely interior life. The world of custom into which every individual is born is incompatible with the sharply-defined boundary lines which seem to exclude each self from every other self in our traditional ethical philosophy. A definition of the individual which includes the returns of modern psychology looks upon custom not as limiting the will but as constituting the means through which the will finds the basic outline of its relations to the world. It is in part through a routine of tradition that we human beings have become the individuals that we are. Community cannot be manufactured by a priori reasoning. The old conflict between self and society is absolutely hopeless when approached from the point of view of pure reason. Habit and custom and tradition furnish objectives through which the boundaries of the ego may be widened until they correspond with

those of the family and other social groups. In this way the dualism between the self and society disappears. Reason has never succeeded in crossing the chasm which seems to introspection to exist between individual minds and wills. The old chasm between individual minds is the product of a traditional process of introversion. Volition directed toward certain objects by an organized system of custom and tradition leads to the development of a self with social interests.

Parental custom and group tradition which create in the individual definite social attitudes of mind are the chief roots of the conscience. These customs favor the survival of the individual not as an individual but as an individual of a certain type. And these group patterns make possible the development of social standards. A consciousness of social standards was once practically synonymous with conscience. Socrates in the *Republic* cannot understand the moral nature of the individual until he views him as an organic member of the state. Trotter points out that membership in a complex social group makes it possible for the individual to vary without endangering survival. The motive underlying much of our speech, according to Trotter, is determined by our gregariousness; we simply want our fellows to share our opinions! Very few have the ability to think as individuals, to cultivate habits of independent thought.

These objective trends of custom and tradition tend to organize the will about certain social situations and interests; they give the attitudes of behavior out of which certain forms of solidarity develop. But going along with this development of the various levels

of social interest there are corresponding levels of intelligence and will. To every objective social aspect of experience there corresponds an inner subjective phase of experience through which the social interests are organized.

The newer social psychology has come to be contrasted with the older individual psychology. If, however, there are trends of custom whose reorganization by the reason constitutes the objective institutions of society, then there is no basis left for the older individualistic psychology which dealt with a purely interior mind and which regarded institutions as external expressions of these interior individual minds. Anthropology and history do not show us the self-centered reasoning mind which we read about in our individualistic psychology. We find in India, in China, in Japan, in the Old Testament, a group life resting not on a priori reflection but determined by custom, tradition, and social sentiment. Only in a few places like Athens and Renaissance Italy and individualistic England do we find a reason which professes to be independent of a routine of custom and tradition.

And even in these highly individualistic communities war, which is a form of organized pugnacity, temporarily overcomes and suspends men's reason. War thrives best under autocratic direction of mass-action, but it shows the fallacy of the doctrine of a disinterested reason. Any one who has ever lived in a foreign country knows how helpless the will can be when unsupported by organized public opinion. A foundation of tradition, no matter how highly intellectualized, is necessary to give momentum and direction to indi-

vidual wills in their attempt to focus and carry through common political action. Reason cannot build states by being independent of custom but by directing the trends of custom to constructive political ends.

The emphasis on the inner life of the reason and the will has made us think of the impulses as a limitation of our intellectual lives; this is particularly true of our attitude toward social impulses. The horse protects himself through his instinctive group behavior; the dog, as a member of a pack, does efficient team-work in hunting game; the soldier is indomitable in mass attack; but the horse, the dog, the soldier, trained to fight en masse, are inefficient when unsupported by their group. This is cited by the individualist to show that gregariousness narrows and mechanizes individual behavior. Independent initiative is attributed to the mule and the cat because they can survive as individuals. This we believe shows confusion of thought. The intelligence of the gregarious and the solitary animal must be measured by different criteria. A horse or a dog thought of as functioning outside the herd or the pack is an abstract and not a real horse or dog. We cannot abstract the gregarious mind from its group and then condemn such a mind for its lack of intelligence and efficiency. The gregarious mind cannot function in a normal way when it exists under conditions natural to the mind of the solitary type. When we speak of gregariousness as limiting the individual, we are assuming that the individual by nature exists apart from the group. To say that a cat has more initiative than a dog when isolated from his pack is to say that a solitary animal has more initiative than a gregarious ani-

mal when the latter is removed from its natural social environment. Man's mind is the mind of a social being, and to speak of social impulses as limiting the human will is like speaking of hunger as limiting the will or intelligence of a being having the impulse to eat.

The difficulty in dealing with this whole subject is that we have defined ourselves as human individuals without regard to an inescapable group life. It is as if we regarded ourselves as more closely related to cats and tigers and eagles than to dogs and horses and apes. We have conceived of ourselves as individuals existing in a self-centered independence and then we have puzzled our minds over the problem of the relations of such individuals to each other. There is no inner, mystical, purely individual personality which first exists and then enters into relations of a social sort. Just as the relation of the dog and the horse to the pack and the herd is deeper than their intelligence, so parental and social customs are deeper than individual intelligence, and make necessary the development of certain types of social consciousness.

Since the horse, the dog, and the wolf are gregarious animals, their type of behavior and therefore their intelligence can develop only along the lines demanded by their group life. Likewise in man parental and social behavior actually predetermines the human individual to survive and develop in a group life. Within this group life the human will may tap sources of incredible power; outside this group life man's mind is powerless and inert.

A free mind can function adequately only in a group which stimulates the intelligence and the will. The

mind can be alive only in those groups which evoke initiative. Blind impulse and blind tradition are incompatible with intelligent volition. The individual can adequately function only in groups which share his interests. Group life is nothing else but the social phase of individual minds.

The only enduring political organization is one that incorporates the wills of its constituent individuals. Organizing is the individual phase of organization. Individuality and social organization are correlative poles of experience. Nehemiah built the walls of Zion by having each individual build over against his own house. The greater the intelligence and the freer the will the greater the solidarity if the intellect and the will are directed toward material and social ends that are intelligently and freely shared by others.

The animal group rests upon an instinctive consciousness. In early human life there is superimposed upon this instinctive social consciousness a superstructure of tradition and sentiment. Civilization took this society resting on custom and tradition and through criticism and science and art and drama brought it to a higher level of mental and moral freedom. Then came the refining fires of mediævalism. Later still came individualism, making the reaction of the individual mind necessary to the development of an intelligent group life. A state which incorporates the will that has gone through these stages of development must be a higher and more complex and freer organization than has ever existed in the past.

The more original the interest the smaller the group having the interest in common. Individuality is not a

thing or entity, but a mode of reorganizing activities, experiences, and relationships. Each group in which an individual functions evokes some new and different phase of that individual's nature.

The group should stimulate and not override the initiative, the creative activity, of the individual. And this takes place when the individual enters and works with those groups whose dominant interests are his own interests. In this way the powerful drive of group behavior may underlie a creativeness of will and thought in the individual. But any group behavior which overrules the initiative, the sentiments, the higher intellectual interests of the individual forces the individual to function on a lower level. This is the law of the mob or the crowd which levels down the individual to its own plane. The individual cannot function effectively without the urge and power that come from a sense of solidarity; neither can the group advance by suppressing the higher, more advanced sentiments and intellectual processes of its own members. Reason, will, imagination, refinement of sentiment, are necessary to all the higher levels of life. Since it is the social patterns in our experience which make social life possible, the cultivation of these social patterns is possible only through the refinement of reason, imagination, and sentiment. It is the failure to control, to elevate, to refine, these social patterns of experience which makes possible the development of the mob spirit. What an individual feels and thinks as a member of a crowd is a genuine phase of his own experience; but it is a phase of experience of distinctively low grade, because it must be shared by all indi-

viduals in the crowd. This is social solidarity on the crowd level. Crowds have their place. It rests the individual to drop down to the older, lower level of experience. Hence the abandon experienced in a crowd. But if solidarity is to aid the mind to higher levels of achievement, the individual must function not in a crowd but in a group. A group is an association in which the sentiments and ideas of individuals are appreciated and stimulated; and the more specialized the group the more the initiative and intelligence of its members are stimulated. An individual can adequately function only in those groups whose members share his sentiments, his ideals, his interests.

The consciousness of individuality is perhaps the greatest single source of power in the modern world. Only where this sense of individuality is recognized can there be real unity in social life. The only durable social unity is one which rests on the will of the individual. It is easier for politicians and social engineers to put through a program imposed by themselves. There is less lost motion. But there are wills to be trained; there are personalities to be developed. Any program which excludes the coöperative interplay of minds and wills is essentially non-moral. A group differs from a crowd. Crowd and mob-psychology tends to function on the lower levels of the pack or horde; in a human group one must reckon with the presence of reason and will.

The moral will must include the objective, social phases of experience. The moral quality of the inner aspects of experience which have been deepened by the individualistic tradition must now be extended to

the social or institutional aspects of experience. As the narrowing of the moral life in the individualistic tradition excluded institutions as external to the will, so the enlarging of the will to include the social phases of experience means that the objective, the institutional aspects of experience are to be definitely included in the sphere of the moral life. This enlarges the nature of the individual so that the inner and the outer, the individual and the social, cease to be exclusive worlds; they are equally real aspects of moral experience.

A definition of self which includes social and political objectives implies also a new conception of the state. If our conception of a free moral personality includes as a part of its nature an organic relation to the state, then the authoritarian conception of the state as an institution imposed on the individual or the individualistic idea of the state as an organization external to the inner life of conscience and morality becomes immediately inconceivable. In the moral individual of today we see the disassociation of the will—a will deepened and enriched by centuries of spiritual discipline—from a state whose morality belongs for the most part to the pre-individualistic régime of the old pagan world. We must evolve a state whose morality is the objective or social aspect of what we now call the morality of the individual conscience. There is no other remedy for the dualism which now exists between private and public morality. Only as this type of state is evolved will there be a foundation for governmental coöperation in international concerns.

The dominant social patterns of thought of our age

were created when the individual was at war with institutions. The laws concerning the family, property, the state, the ideals of education and religion, were regarded by the individual as imposed from without; where this is not true these laws were made by the individual to protect himself from an authoritative state. The modern individual has for three or four hundred years been cautiously freeing himself from a social order which he did not create. This is why our dominant social concepts today are individualistic. These social concepts have given an individualistic pattern to our economic thought. Individual gain is the ruling motive of modern business. But our psychology is making it perfectly clear that the exclusive self of our economic philosophy is an abstraction left over from an intellectualistic type of thought now recognized as inadequate. Psychology today is showing us clearly that there are impulses which underlie the development of motives which are genuinely social. The motive of gain, of profit, is essential to any creative economic process, but it is psychologically possible and ethically necessary to include the motive of gain within a wider social ideal of conduct. And the same thing is true also regarding the religious consciousness. The interest in personal salvation in certain phases of Protestant thought seems to us today to be immoral. Personal religion, like personal economic profit, needs larger social objectives.

It is customary to contrast public with private morality. The difference between morality and legality and the survival of war in international life are examples of this contrast. And yet public or social institu-

tions are a genuine aspect of experience, and when they do not express the conscientious purposes of the individuals concerned, moral ideals are just so far thwarted and rendered ineffective. We are told that men of character are independent of circumstances, social and political. We are told that some men, because of what they are in themselves, are not so much moved by external events. And there is a profound truth in this statement. But the only way to be independent of events and institutions is to have sufficient character to take part and perhaps to lead in the creation of social events and institutions. Institutions are never "external" to morality. The individual must learn to cultivate his own group support. Traditions, conventions, social taboos, are imposed on the individual with the overwhelming power of community emotion. The individual can oppose a tradition only by organizing group support for a new tradition.

To be morally great does not mean to be independent in an exclusive sense; it means that one contains within himself the potential outlines along which objective morality will in due course of time develop. Every individual must function in certain groups. Whenever the conscience of the individual is repressed by the state there is always a transfer of the consciousness of solidarity to some other organization or organizations; and this transfer gives support to the temporarily repressed will. To speak therefore of a difference between public and private morality does not mean that private morality is independent of morality as organized in social institutions. It means that ideals have to be evolved and integrated by indi-

vidual effort before they can be adopted as ideals by various groups. Ideals must be conceived and nourished in the creative imagination of individuals until they can be made acceptable to the majority. But when they do so live in the creative imagination of a comparatively few individuals they represent possibilities of experience not yet embodied in institutional form. In so far as an individual's ideals are not socially approved and embodied in social institutions his moral will and his moral life are incomplete. This is not at present understood. Any disassociation of the individual's will from public and legal morality acts as a repression by organized society of the cherished ideals of the individual. When there is a disassociation of the will from the state there is a transfer of the consciousness of solidarity from the state to other institutions. Guilds and religious and scientific organizations and secret societies receive the divided energies of the will when it is disassociated from the state. The differentiation of society into a multiplicity of organizations enriches the will of the individual and thereby society itself, but a breach open or hidden between the state and the moral will acts as a frustration, as a repression of the will. A divorce of the will from a sense of solidarity with the state as the chief instrument of organized society deprives the will of one of its main sources of energy. It shunts off the activity of the will from one of the fields of experience which, until the break of the individual conscience with the state just prior to the development of Christianity, was universally regarded as the most fundamental of all the institutions of

society. Until this dualism developed the state was a basic, necessary objective interest of the will. Our own age is the end of the individualistic era. The great achievement of this era has been the recognition of the conviction that social progress is possible only through the richest development of the inner life—the will, the sentiments, the capacities and preferences—of the individual. But in the recognition of this truth we have temporarily lost sight of the complementary truth that the individual elements of experience—the will, the reason, choice—are aspects and not the whole of experience; that the individual aspects of experience are processes of control within the larger totality of experience; that these inner aspects of experience are essentially incomplete unless they terminate in the realization of objective interests; and that such objective results are possible only through action socially and politically approved and organized. When we come to see this we will make the social and political aspects of the will as fundamental in our thought as they were in the older classical moral tradition. Of course these objective ends, after twenty centuries of discipline of the individual imagination and volition, will not be attained in the same spirit which characterized pre-individualistic morality. Our social interests will be achieved in a new spirit. In the transition from pagan to (historical) Christian ethics we lost our social objectives. We must keep alive individual initiative but we must re-discover and re-dedicate ourselves to the objective interests of organized society which we have inherited from an immemorial past.

APPENDIX

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE ON GREEK AND HEBREW LITERATURE

The first seven chapters deal with pre-prophetic Hebrew life and pre-Socratic Greek life.

The writings of Homer reflect Greek life as it existed in the eighth century B. C. Our Iliad and Odyssey were given their form in sixth century Athens, probably under the leadership of Peisistratos. (Jane Harrison, *Ancient Art and Ritual,* pp. 145, 157.)

Deuteronomy deals with the last part of the wandering of the Israelites before the entrance into Canaan. It sets forth the laws of the period prior to 1300 B. C. Its composition is late. It was brought to light in 621 B. C. It shows the influence of the great eighth century prophets. But it contains precious material from Israel's pre-Canaanitish period. Judges gives the history of Israel's local heroes or heads of tribal groups, such as Gideon, Jephthah, Samson. It gives us material from the period before the kings. Cornill's tentative dates of the period of the Judges are from 1300 to 1000 B. C. I and II Samuel deal with the establishment of the monarchy under Saul and with the period of David. Roughly we may place Saul at 1060, David at 1040 and Solomon at 1000 B. C. I and II Kings begin with the period of Solomon.

SUGGESTED LITERATURE

CHAPTER I

THE GREEK AND HEBREW LOVE OF LIFE

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CHAPTERS III AND IV

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